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Abstract
Human rights violations occurring as a consequence of drug control and enforcement efforts 
are growing concerns among both civil society and multilateral organisations.  In many cases, 
these violations are driven by domestic and/or international attempts to meet the obligations 
enshrined within the three United Nations drug control conventions, creating a situation 
where seeking to fulfil the requirements of the UN drug treaties encourages or justifies 
policies and practices that violate international human rights law.  This raises questions of 
treaty interpretation, and the appropriate balancing of concomitant obligations within these 
two legal regimes.  This thesis poses the question of how the international law of drug control 
should be interpreted within the context of international human rights law.  
Tracing the evolution of international drug control law since 1909, and through what it 
identifies as four chronological stages, it explores the historic tensions within the regime 
between what are described as its humanitarian aspirations and the suppression of a common 
human behaviour as a form of ‘evil’, and the resulting impacts on human rights. Drawing 
from this history, it explores the object and purpose of the United Nations drug treaties, 
adopting a teleological approach to the question of treaty interpretation.  Building upon this 
approach, as well as that of the International Court of Justice and of international human 
rights courts and bodies, it makes the case that international drug control law must be 
interpreted in an evolutive or dynamic fashion that considers treaty obligations in light of 
present day conditions and developments in international law.  In doing so, this thesis posits 
the development what it calls a ‘fifth stage’ of drug control, a dynamic, human rights-based 
interpretative approach emerging from the engagement between the two regimes.  Drawing 
2
upon illustrative examples from the jurisprudence or proceedings of domestic, regional and 
international legal bodies, it concludes by exploring basic principles for resolving tensions 
and conflicts between the two regimes in manner that safeguards human rights. 
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Chapter One - Drug Control, Human Rights and ‘Parallel 
Universes’
1.1 Background and Context
1.1.1 Quincy Wright and the ‘Three Stages’ of Drug Control
Writing in the American Journal of International Law in 1924 on ‘the opium question’, 
Professor Quincy Wright described what he termed the ‘three stages’ of international drug 
control contemporary to that era.  The ‘first stage’ Wright described as beginning in 1729, 
continuing up until the early 1900s. This period might today be characterised as the pre-
multilateral era of drug control, during which time a handful of States adopted what were 
essentially national or bilateral measures on drugs. In 1729, Chinese Emperor Young Cheng 
issued the first edict prohibiting the smoking of opium.1  It is also from this year that the 
earliest records exist of a European opium trade, in this case conducted by the Portuguese.2  
The first stage of drug control was characterised by the monopoly trade in opium by the 
British East India Company from 1773, which led to the important role of opium within 
international affairs in the eighteenth century.3 This period saw the increase in domestic 
opium production in China, and attempts by China to stop British opium imports into the 
country, leading to the first and second Opium Wars fought between the countries in the 
10
1 Quincy Wright, ‘The Opium Question’ (1924) 18/2 American Journal of 
International Law 281.
2 Kenneth W Makowski, ‘Narcotics Regulation: A Study in Irresolution’ (1960-1961) 
34 Temple Law Quarterly 310, 311.
3 William M Hepburn, ‘International Legislation on Social Questions’ (1931-1932) 9 
New York University Law Review 310, 321.
mid-1800s.4 It was the first of these wars that lead to the cession of Hong Kong to England in 
1842.5 It also included the negotiation of numerous treaties and trade agreements intended to 
suppress or restrict the opium trade, particularly among and between China, Great Britain, 
France and the United States.6  
Wright’s ‘second stage’ covers what was essentially the first phase of multilateral efforts in 
drug control, when control measures ‘became a matter of international law, but without a 
specific international supervisory machinery’.7 Beginning with the International Opium 
Commission in Shanghai in 1909, and the subsequent resolutions emerging from that 
meeting, and continuing into 1912, with the convening of the second International Opium 
Conference at The Hague. The International Opium Convention that emerged from the Hague 
conference codified the resolutions adopted in 1909 into the first truly international treaty on 
drug control.   Over the ensuing years, efforts were made to encourage other States to ratify 
the treaty and to participate in the newly created international regime it defined.8  These 
efforts included the Treaty of Versailles, ending the first World War,  Article 295 of which 
committed the High Contracting Parties who were not already Parties to the 1912 convention 
to ratify the treaty within a year. Furthermore, Article 295 specified that in the case of those 
Powers that were not yet State Parties to the Opium Convention, the ratification of the Treaty 
would itself ‘be deemed in all respects equivalent to the ratification of the Convention and to 
11
4 Frank Dakota, Lars Laamann and Zhou Xun, Narcotic Culture: A History of Drugs 
in China (University of Chicago Press 2004) chap 3.
5 Makowski (n 2) 311.
6 Wright, ‘The Opium Question’ (n 1) 281-285.
7 Herbert L May, ‘Narcotic Drug Control’ (1951-1952) 29 International Conciliation 
491, 497.
8 Wright, ‘The Opium Question’ (n 1) 281-285.
the signature of the Special Protocol...for bringing the said Convention into force’.9 Similar 
clauses were also inserted into other peace treaties at the conclusion of the war.10
Wright’s ‘third stage’ begins with the foundation of the League of Nations in 1920, and is 
characterised by an increased commitment to international cooperation in drug control, and 
the creation of a ‘permanent international control machinery’.11  This is reflected in the 
adoption of Article 23(c) of the Covenant of the League of Nations, which ‘intrust[s] the 
League with general supervision over the execution of agreements with regard to traffic 
in...opium and other dangerous drugs’.12 This third stage sees increased and expanded 
multilateral efforts to control opium and other drugs, including the creation of new 
supervisory bodies under the auspices of the League, the adoption of new resolutions, a 
growing number of States agreeing to come into the regime and, in the decade after Wright’s 
article was published, the adoption of new international treaties under the supervision of the 
League that expanded the scope of international legal obligations in this area.13 
Using the evolutionary stages posited by Wright in 1924, this thesis will examine what might 
reasonably be called the ‘fourth stage’ of international drug control, namely the system 
established by the international community after 1945, supervised by the United Nations. At 
the level of international law, the UN period is marked by the drafting and ratification of 
12
9 Peace Treaty of Versailles 1918, art. 295. 
10 Adolf Lande, ‘The Adjustment of the International Opium Administration to an 
Eventual Dissolution of the League of Nations’ (1945) 45 Columbia Law Review 
392, 396.
11 May (n 7) 497.
12 Covenant of the League of Nations (adopted 28 April 1919) (Covenant) art 23(c). 
13 Wright, ‘The Opium Question’ (n 1) 285.
three new conventions that incorporate and expand upon the previous League of Nations 
instruments.14  It includes the creation of new and invigorated supervisory bodies, and 
increased State participation in the regime to the point where the treaties today enjoy near 
universal ratification.  However, this fourth stage of drug control differs in several ways from 
the League of Nations era that preceded it. In addition to the developments described above, 
the fourth stage of international drug control is marked by the increased use of penal laws to 
suppress drugs,15 resulting in what the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime describes 
as the negative ‘unintended consequences’ of the regime.16 Despite the robust nature of the 
modern international drug control system, and the near universal ratification of the core 
instruments, the demand for and consumption of the drugs prohibited by the treaties remains 
high.17  As a result, the negative unintended consequences of this fourth stage regime are 
many, and include the creation of huge criminal markets for drugs, controlled by cartels that 
often use violence and the corruption of State officials to maintain their vast profits, 
destabilising weak States; untold billions of dollars spent each year in largely ineffective drug 
interdiction efforts, at the expense of public investment in health, education and social 
13
14 International Opium Convention (adopted 19 February 1925) 81 LNTS 319 (1925 
Convention).; Convention for Limiting the Manufacture and Regulating the 
Distribution of Narcotic Drugs (adopted 13 July 1931) 139 LNTS 303 (1931 
Convention).; Convention of 1936 for the Suppression of the Illicit Traffic in 
Dangerous Drugs (adopted 26 June 1936) 198 LNTS 301 (1936 Convention).
15 Neil Boister, ‘The Interrelationship between the Development of Domestic and 
International Drug Control Law’ (1995) 7 African Journal of International and 
Comparative Law 906, 913 (Interrelationship).
16 UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs, ‘Making Drug Control “Fit for Purpose”: 
Building on the UNGASS Decade: Report by the Executive Director of the United 
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime as a contribution to the review of the twentieth 
special session of the General Assembly’ (7 March 2008) UN Doc No E/CN.7/2008/
CRP.17 (Fit for Purpose).
17 See, for example, UN Office on Drugs and Crime, ‘World Drug Report 
2013’ (2013) United Nations, New York.
services; exploding prison populations in many parts of the world, often driven by the 
prosecution of drug offences; and millions dead from, and many millions more infected with, 
HIV as a result of sharing of syringes for injecting drug use.18 Another of the unintended 
consequences of the fourth stage of drug control is the negative impact of the regime on 
human rights.   
1.1.2 Human Rights in Drug Control’s ‘Fourth Stage’
One need only scratch the surface of domestic and international efforts to control illicit drugs 
during the United Nations era to see the potential for human rights concern.  Indeed, drug 
control and enforcement activities are prime areas for the abuse of human rights, not least 
because, as noted by Barrett and Nowak, the very indicators of ‘success’ of drug control 
efforts – number of criminal offences prescribed; number of people arrested and successfully 
prosecuted; number of people in detention; number of traffickers executed; number of people 
in drug treatment (whether voluntarily or involuntarily); number of hectares of crops 
destroyed; number of successful military operations against insurgents or criminal gangs – 
are also indicators of human rights risk, if not actual evidence of human rights violations.19 
As a result, the negative human rights consequences of the fourth stage of drug control are 
mammoth, spanning all regions of the world, and include the execution of up to 1,000 people 
14
18 UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs, ‘Fit for Purpose’ (n 16) 10-12. 
19 Damon Barrett and Manfred Nowak, ‘The United Nations and Drug Policy: 
Towards a Human Rights-Based Approach’ in A Constantinides and N Zaikai (eds), 
The Diversity of International Law: Essays in Honour of Professor Calliope K. 
Kpufa (Martinus Nijhoff 2009) 468. 
annually for drug offences;20 the arbitrary detention of up to half a million people worldwide 
under the guise of ‘drug treatment’;21 the denial of due process rights and rights to consent to 
treatment in the context of drug cases;22 and the denial of the right to health to millions of 
people who inject drugs by legally prohibiting access to effective HIV prevention measures.23
The negative unintended consequences on human rights also highlight another unique aspect 
of the fourth stage of drug control: that the international law of drug control during the 
United Nations era has developed alongside of, and in parallel with, the modern system of 
international human rights law, beginning with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 
1948.  Despite the contemporaneous development of these two international legal regimes, in 
practice there has been little cross fertilisation between the two.  The United Nations drug 
control system has rarely considered the human rights impacts of the regime, and the human 
rights system has rarely considered drug control efforts within its mandate.  In practice, this 
gap means that human rights violations in the name of drug control largely occur in the 
15
20 See Patrick Gallahue and Rick Lines, ‘The Death Penalty for Drug Offences: 
Global Overview’ (International Harm Reduction Association 2010).; Patrick 
Gallahue, ‘The Death Penalty for Drug Offences: Global Overview 
2011’ (International Harm Reduction Association 2011).
21 See, for example, Richard Elliott, Rick Lines and Roxanne Schleifer, ‘Treatment 
or torture? Applying international human rights standards to drug detention 
centers’ (Open Society Foundations 2011) 3.
22 See, for example, Juhi Gupta, ‘Interpretation of Reverse Onus Clauses’ (2012) 5/1 
NUJS Law Review 49.; Drug Policy Alliance, ‘Drug Courts are Not the Answer: 
Towards a Health Centered Approach to Drug Use’ (Drug Policy Alliance 2011).; 
Joanne Csete, ‘Costs and Benefits of Drug-Related Health Services’ in J Collins (ed) 
Ending the Drug Wars: Report of the LSE Expert Group on the Economics of Drug 
Policy (LSE Ideas 2014) 75-76.
23 See, for example, UN General Assembly, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the 
right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and 
mental health’ (6 August 2010) UN Doc No A/65/255, paras 50-58 (Special 
Rapporteur Health 2010).
absence of human rights scrutiny, and in some cases are even justified by States on the basis 
that the abusive policies or practices are supported under the UN drug control treaties. The 
current status quo prompted the former Special Rapporteur on the right to the highest 
attainable standard of health, Paul Hunt, to conclude that ‘[i]t is imperative that the 
international drug control system…and the complex international human rights system that 
has evolved since 1948, cease to behave as though they exist in parallel universes’.24 
Within the United Nations system, nowhere is the disconnect between the ‘parallel 
universes’ of drug control and human rights more apparent than on the 26th of June each 
year. On 7 December 1987, the UN General Assembly declared June 26th as the International 
Day Against Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking.25 This date was chosen as it coincided with 
the closing of the International Conference on Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking, which met 
earlier that year to agree the final text of the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic 
in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances.26 This third UN drug treaty, which was 
adopted in 1988, obligates States Parties to implement strict penal sanctions to punish drug 
offences. However, 26 June 1987 was also the date that the UN Convention Against Torture 
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment entered into force.27  Ten 
years later, in December 1997, the General Assembly commemorated this achievement by 
16
24 Paul Hunt, ‘Human Rights, Health and Harm Reduction: States’ Amnesia and 
Parallel Universes’ (International Harm Reduction Association 2008) 9.
25 UN General Assembly, ‘International Conference on Drug Abuse and Illicit 
Trafficking’ (7 December 1987) UN Doc No A/RES/42/112, para 5.
26 UN Convention against the Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances (20 December 1988) 1582 UNTS 95 (1988 Convention).
27 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (10 December 1984) 1465 UNTS 85 (Torture Convention).
designating the 26th of June as the International Day in Support of Victims of Torture, ‘with a 
view to the total eradication of torture and the effective functioning of the Convention’.28 
The ensuing years have illustrated how uncomfortably these two United Nations 
commemorative dates sit together, as some States choose to ‘celebrate’ the International Day 
Against Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking by staging the execution of drug traffickers, most 
visibly in China where the executions are often public and en masse.29 In fact, in the decade 
following the entry into force of the 1988 drug convention, the number of States legislating to 
impose capital punishment increased by fifty per cent,30 this during a period when scholars 
were documenting an overall downward trend in the use of the death penalty worldwide.31  
There is a case to be made that the increase in States prescribing capital punishment for drug 
offences came as the direct result of the ratification of the 1988 Convention, which created 
international obligations for States to impose punitive domestic laws and penalties for drug 
offences.  That the above executions are explicitly carried out to mark the International Day 
Against Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking, despite the fact that the UN human rights system 
has concluded that the death penalty for drug offences constitutes a violation of international 
17
28 UN General Assembly, ‘UN International Day in Support of Victims of 
Torture’ (18 February 1998) UN Doc No A/RES/52/149. 
29 Rick Lines, ‘A “Most Serious Crime”? The Death Penalty for Drug Offences and 
International Human Rights Law’ (2010) 21 Amicus Journal 21.
30 See, Rick Lines, ‘The Death Penalty for Drug Offences: A Violation of 
International Human Rights Law’ (International Harm Reduction Association 2007) 
7.; Rick Lines, ‘A “most serious crime”? International Human Rights Law and the 
Death Penalty for Drug Offences’ (18th International Conference on the Reduction 
of Drug-Related Harm, Warsaw, 15 May 2007).
31 William A Schabas, The Abolition of the Death Penalty in International Law (3rd 
edn, Cambridge University Press 2002) 19.; Roger Hood and Carolyn Hoyle, The 
Death Penalty: A Worldwide Perspective (4th edn, Oxford University Press 2008) 
13-18.
human rights law,32 illustrates ‘the contradictions faced by the United Nations as it seeks to 
protect and expand human rights while also acting as the international community’s guarantor 
of conventions to control licit and illicit drugs’.33
Given that June 26th marks the International Day in Support of Victims of Torture, this 
disconnect between human rights and drug control is also illustrated by the increasing 
international documentation of the infliction of torture, or other forms of cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment in the name of ‘drug treatment’.34  In March 2012, a group of twelve 
United Nations agencies – including the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 
the World Health Organization, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime and UNICEF – released a 
joint statement calling for the closure of all compulsory drug detention and rehabilitation 
centres, where many such abuses have been documented.35  The UN Special Rapporteur on 
torture has also raised specific concern about ‘a number of areas where torture and ill-
treatment occur as a direct or indirect result of current approaches to drug control’,36 
18
32 See generally, Lines, ‘A “Most Serious Crime”?’ (n 29).
33 Emma Bonino, ‘Crimes without Victims: Appropriate Policy Responses to Drug 
Use’ in Protecting the Human Rights of Injection Drug Users: The Impact of HIV 
and AIDS (Open Society Institute 2005) 17.
34 See generally, Elliott, Lines and Schleifer (n 21).
35 International Labour Organisation; Office of the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights; United Nations Development Programme; United Nations Educational, 
Scientific and Cultural Organisation; United Nations Population Fund; United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees; United Nations Children’s Fund; United 
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime; United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and 
the Empowerment of Women; World Food Programme; World Health Organisation; 
and Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS, ‘Joint Statement: Compulsory 
drug detention and rehabilitation centres’ (March 2012). 
36 UN Human Rights Council, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on torture and other 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, Manfred Nowak’ (14 January 
2009) UN Doc No A/HRC/10/44, para 17 (Nowak Report).
including the use of the death penalty.  In his 2009 report, the Special Rapporteur noted with 
concern that ‘the international drug control system has evolved practically detached from the 
United Nations human rights machinery’.37 Clearly the gap in law and practice that currently 
exists between drug control and human rights is one that needs to be bridged.
The disengagement evident at the UN level between human rights and drug control is also 
reflected in the literature. Writing in 1996, Professor Norbert Gilmore of McGill University 
noted that ‘little has been written about drug use and human rights.  Human rights are rarely 
mentioned expressly in drug literature and drug use is rarely mentioned in human rights 
literature.’38  Almost twenty years later, the literature examining drug control issues through 
the lens of international human rights law has grown, but the total body of peer reviewed 
commentary and analysis in the area would barely rank the issue as a footnote in the broader 
human rights lexicon.  The relative dearth of legal scholarship in the area of human rights and 
drugs stands in sharp contrast to the many human rights issues engaged by drug control, and 
the litany of documented human rights abuses resulting from drug enforcement practices.  
While some of the more recent literature seeks to close this gap, others seek to reinforce it.  
For example, a 2009 article in Human Rights Quarterly makes the case that the death penalty 
for drug offences is not actually a drug control issue at all, but rather one related to broader 
rule of law concerns. In an interesting example of the Professor Hunt’s concept of ‘parallel 
19
37 ibid para 51. 
38 Norbert Gilmore, ‘Drug Use and Human Rights: Privacy, Vulnerability, Disability, 
and Human Rights Infringements’ (1996) 12 Journal of Contemporary Health Law 
and Policy 355, 356.
universes’ in action, it argues that ‘the death penalty [for drugs] issue is not so much of a drug 
control issue as much as it is an issue of human rights’.39
1.2 Scope and Objectives
1.2.1 Bridging the ‘Parallel Universes’ of Drug Control and Human Rights
International legal instruments on drug control date back more than 100 years, to the 
International Opium Convention of 1912.40 Since that time, eight other treaties on drugs have 
been agreed under the auspices of the League of Nations and later the United Nations, and 
drug control has been the subject of more than one hundred resolutions of the UN General 
Assembly.41  The international law of drug control therefore predates by several decades the 
modern system of international human rights law that has emerged since 1948, and the 
numerous United Nations and regional human rights treaties that have been ratified 
subsequently. The lessons of the fourth stage of drug control, and the impacts of these 
‘parallel universes’ on human rights as described above, clearly demands a new paradigm, 
one that closes the gaps in law and practice, and prevents human rights violations occurring 
due to drug control and enforcement activities. 
20
39 Saul Takahashi, ‘Drug Control, Human Rights, and the Right to the Highest 
Attainable Standard of Health: By No Means Straightforward Issues’ (2009) 31 
Human Rights Quarterly 748, 761.
40 International Opium Convention (signed 23 January 1912) 1922 LNTS 189 (1912 
Convention).
41 UN General Assembly, ‘Resolutions’ <http://www.un.org/documents/resga.htm>  
accessed 15 May 2014.
Despite their differing histories, drug control and human rights treaties today exist as part of a 
larger common body of public international law.  As described by McLachlan, ‘treaties are 
themselves creatures of international law. However wide their subject matter, they are all 
nevertheless limited in scope and are predicated for their existence and operation on being 
part of the international law system.’42  Within this larger body of international law, the 
concomitant obligations between the drug control and human rights regimes interact with one 
another at various times and in various ways. In many cases, the human rights violations 
linked to drug control activities are driven by domestic and/or international efforts to meet the 
obligations enshrined within the three United Nations drug control conventions, creating a 
situation where seeking to fulfil the requirements of the drug treaties encourages or justifies 
policies and practices that violate international human rights law.  The question, then, is how 
are States (or international organisations) to resolve situations in which efforts to control 
drugs come into conflict with obligations to protect and promote human rights? How are 
these conflicts, whether potential or actual, to be resolved in a manner that is consistent with 
the obligations of States Parties under both treaty regimes, yet at the same time ensure human 
rights are protected? Addressing these questions raises issues of treaty interpretation, and the 
appropriate balancing of obligations within the two legal regimes.  
Questions of treaty interpretation, conflict of laws, and of what has come to be known as the 
‘fragmentation’ of international law,43 are of increasing interest among international legal 
21
42 Campbell McLachlan, ‘The Principle of Systemic Integration and Article 31(3)(c) 
of the Vienna Convention’ (2005) 54 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 
279, 280.
43 International Law Commission, ‘Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties 
Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law - Report of the 
Study Group of the International Law Commission’ (13 April 2006) UN Doc No A/
CN.4/L.682, 208, para 414 (Fragmentation Report).
scholars and practitioners.  The appropriate application of Articles 31-33 of the Vienna 
Convention of the Law of Treaties on interpretation, and the specific application of rules of 
treaty interpretation within world trade law in order to balance trade obligations with human 
rights and/or environmental concerns, are but two of the areas that have seen increased 
academic attention in recent years.44  In particular, the work of the Study Group on the 
Fragmentation of International Law of the International Law Commission has highlighted the 
complications arising from the ‘manifold’ growth in specialised multilateral treaties over the 
past fifty years,45 and the increasing likelihood that two or more rules or principles of 
international law will be applicable in respect to specific situations, necessitating a process to 
determine the relationship between them.  However, despite the multiple areas in which drug 
control laws and activities engage human rights, and the slow yet growing attention among 
human rights monitors to these concerns, the question of treaty interpretation in this context 
is largely unaddressed.  The primary scholarly works written in the area of international drug 
control law46 do not address the question of interpretation in any detail, if at all. Some 
attempts have been made in the health and human rights literature to bridge these ‘parallel 
22
44 See, for example, Joost Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms in Public International Law: 
How WTO Law Relates to Other Rules of International Law (Cambridge University 
Press 2003).; Rudiger Wolfrum and Nele Matz, Conflicts in International 
Environmental Law (Springer Verlag 2003).; Seyed-Ali Sadat-Akhavi, Methods of 
Resolving Conflicts between Treaties Brill Academic Publishers 2003).; Richard K 
Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation (Oxford University Press 2008).
45 Fragmentation Report (n 43) 10, para 7.
46 Neil Boister, Penal Aspects of the UN Drug Conventions (Kluwer 2001).; Syamal 
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universes’, either through recourse to Article 103 of the Charter of the United Nations,47 or 
through conceptualising human rights law as a ‘“normative counterweight” to those harmful 
aspects of the international legal regime of drug control’.48 However, despite their value in 
advancing discourse on this question, these proposals remain either unsatisfactory or 
incomplete attempts to address the complexities of treaty interpretation in this context.  Other 
attempts have been made in the public international law literature to grapple with these 
questions in the context of a single case.49 However, such case studies are, by definition, 
narrow in focus, making them of little general use in assessing broader interpretive questions 
between the two regimes.  As a consequence, the issue of treaty interpretation in the context 
of human rights and drug control constitutes a significant gap in the literature, one which 
impedes the development of human rights-based approaches to drug law and policy.
1.2.1 Towards a ‘Fifth Stage’ of Drug Control
This thesis poses the question of how the international law of drug control should be 
interpreted within the context of international human rights law. It will examine the interplay 
between the fourth stage of international drug control law and the concomitant development 
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of the regime of international human rights law during the same period. Tracing the evolution 
of international drug control law since 1909, it will explore the historic tensions within the 
regime between its often stated humanitarian aspirations on the one hand, and its drive to 
suppress a common human behaviour as a form of ‘evil’ on the other. Drawing from this 
history, it will explore the object and purpose of the United Nations drug treaties, and adopt a 
teleological approach to the question of treaty interpretation.  Building upon this approach, as 
well as those of the International Court of Justice and of international human rights courts 
and treaty bodies, it will make the case that international drug control law must be interpreted 
in an evolutive or dynamic fashion that considers treaty obligations in light of present day 
conditions and developments in international law.  In doing so, this thesis posits the 
development of what it calls a ‘fifth stage’ of drug control, a dynamic, human rights-based 
interpretative approach emerging from the engagement between the two regimes.  Drawing 
upon illustrative examples from the jurisprudence or proceedings of domestic, regional and 
international legal bodies, it concludes by exploring basic principles for resolving tensions 
and conflicts between the two regimes in a manner that safeguards human rights. 
1.3 Overview of this Thesis
Chapter two reviews the evolution of the international law of drug control through the ‘three 
stages’ described by Wright, with a particular focus on the treaties and supervisory organs 
that define the fourth stage United Nations regime. Beginning with the findings of the 
Shanghai Opium Commission of 1909 and the subsequent adoption of the International 
Opium Convention in 1912, it traces the normative development of the drug control regime 
through the League of Nations period and into the United Nations era. Not intended as a 
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detailed historical or legal analysis, it instead reviews the normative evolution of the regime 
in broad terms, focussing on key developments in structure and law, and providing a context 
to the challenges of defining a ‘fifth stage’ of international drug control that will be explored 
later.  
Following from the legal development of the modern drug treaties, chapter three explores the 
two related yet ultimately contradictory paradigms that have historically defined the 
evolution of the international drug control regime.  The first is that ‘addiction’ to drugs is a 
form of ‘evil’ constituting a threat not only to individuals but to the fabric of society as a 
whole, creating a moral obligation on States to suppress drug cultivation, manufacturing, 
trafficking and use.  The second is that coordinated international drug control activities, 
which by definition are morally demanded to fight this ‘evil’, represent a collective 
humanitarian mission by the international community. The interplay between these paradigms 
creates and perpetuates an atmosphere of human rights risk, in which the global cause of drug 
control is framed in a manner in which abusive practices and policies are not only considered 
necessary, but are morally justified by the righteousness of the humanitarian end goal itself.  
Chapter four begins an exploration of consequences of these conflicting paradigms, namely 
the human rights violations related to drug control and enforcement emerging during the 
United Nations era.  Drug control’s fourth stage has three main elements distinguishing it 
from its predecessors.  The first two are the increased international obligations to use penal 
sanctions as tools of drug suppression, and near universal ratification of the regime itself, 
resulting in this penal approach becoming domestic law in almost every country of the world.  
However, this increasingly punitive and universal approach to drug enforcement sits 
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uncomfortably alongside the third unique element of this fourth stage: the fact that the United 
Nations drug control regime has developed in parallel to an increasingly robust system of 
international human rights treaty law.  Using several case studies, the chapter illustrates the 
often strained nature of the relationship between these two legal regimes, highlighting 
examples of tensions and conflicts between the obligations within the two systems.  
Building from the examples of regime tensions and conflicts examined in chapter four, 
chapter five begins an exploration of the challenges of treaty interpretation within the context 
of international drug control law. Using guidance provided within the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties, as well as other legal and historical sources, the chapter examines the 
object and purpose of the international law of drug control, which will be critical to later 
questions of treaty interpretation and adjudication of regime conflicts.  It adopts an approach 
that considers the object and purpose as a single term, yet one embodying two separate 
concepts. The first of these concepts is the immediate or utilitarian object and purpose of the 
treaty, which chapter five concludes is to limit controlled drugs to medical and scientific 
purposes. The second concept is the ultimate goal or telos of the treaty, the state of affairs the 
treaty hopes to achieve.  Chapter five concludes that this telos is to promote the health and 
welfare of humankind.  
Chapter six examines the question of treaty interpretation.  Exploring various interpretive 
approaches, and drawing on both the object and purpose identified in chapter five as well as 
the jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice, it makes the case that a teleological 
approach, often described as ‘dynamic’ or ‘evolutive’ interpretation, is the most appropriate 
to apply in this context, particularly in instances where drug control activities engage human 
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rights obligations. Furthermore, it makes the case that this evolutive interpretation must be 
driven by human rights considerations, and at minimum be consistent with, and at best 
advance, core human rights principles and obligations.
Having proposed the development of a dynamic, human rights-based approach to treaty 
interpretation, chapter seven considers where such a process should take place, and how it 
might be applied. In short, what might a ‘fifth stage’ of international drug control law look 
like in practice. It reviews the key international and domestic fora through which a dynamic 
interpretation of drug control law might take place. It also considers how a dynamic human 
rights-based interpretation of international drug control law might proceed, using illustrative 
examples from domestic, regional and United Nations case law, offering guidance on 
resolving regime tensions and conflicts in a manner that promotes human rights. 
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Chapter Two - The ‘Fourth Stage’ of Drug Control: 
Development, Structure and Law
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter will review the evolution of international drug control through the ‘three stages’ 
described by Wright, with a particular focus on the treaties and supervisory organs that define 
the ‘fourth stage’ United Nations regime.  It is not intended as a comprehensive historical or 
legal analysis of the development of drug control under the League of Nations and the UN, as 
this work has been done by others.50 Rather, this chapter seeks to review the historical and 
normative evolution of the regime in broad terms, focussing on key developments in structure 
and law, and provide a context to the challenges in defining a ‘fifth stage’ of international 
drug control that will be explored later. 
As described in 1957 by the former Chief of the League of Nations Drug Control Service, the 
international drug control regime ‘represent[s] the first concerted attempt by governments to 
regulate a single industry throughout the world, from the point at which the raw materials 
enter the international trade to the point at which they finally reach the legitimate 
consumer....Nothing similar or as far-reaching in international cooperation has ever been 
attempted.’51  To pursue this goal, international drug control law established a system of 
28
50 See Bertil A Renborg, International Drug Control: A Study of International 
Administration by and Through the League of Nations (Carnegie Endowment for 
Peace 1947).; Chatterjee (n 46).; Boister, Penal Aspects (n 46).
51 Bertil A Renborg, ‘International Control of Narcotics’ (1957) 22 Law and 
Contemporary Problems 86, 110.
indirect control, under which multilateral treaties define the laws and administrative practices 
that States are required to implement within their own territories, as well as creating 
supervisory organs to monitor and assist State progress in fulfilling these obligations.  
Although the modern regime of international drug control law has evolved over the course of 
one hundred years, the functional aspects of the commodity control system were established 
at an early stage. These primarily include (a) internal domestic controls limiting distribution 
and consumption to medical and scientific needs, (b) controls on international trade, and (c) 
international limitations on domestic manufacturing.  However, as the regime developed in 
the United Nations era, an important second element emerged alongside the commodity 
control function of the regime: the use of strict domestic penal sanctions to suppress illicit 
production, manufacturing, trafficking and possession. Indeed, as drug control’s fourth stage 
progressed, the regime increasingly became defined as a system of law enforcement and 
penal sanction, rather than as a system of commodity control.  Although both elements of the 
system have potential human rights implications, it has been the emergence and expansion of 
the penalisation regime, implemented in the context of the system of indirect control allowing 
States wide latitude to pursue the general aim of drug suppression, that has fueled most of the 
human rights abuses related to drug control documented around the world in the modern era.  
2.2 Early Development of the Multilateral Regime
Prior to the twentieth century, drug control was seen as primarily a domestic concern, and the 
earliest attempts at suppressing opium during the first stage of drug control in the 18th and 
19th centuries were primarily national or bilateral in scope.  However, at the dawn of the new 
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century, it ‘became apparent that the problem would have to be treated on a universal basis’.52  
Popular agitation for international action on ‘the opium question’ had been growing in the 
United States,53 and Chatterjee notes that ‘[b]y coincidence, the anti-opium movement started 
at a time when the idea of internationalism itself was gaining momentum’.54  The existence of 
large and well financed domestic opposition movements to other ‘moral vices’, such as 
alcohol consumption and ‘white slavery’, also meant that the anti-opium cause found itself in 
a receptive political environment, and attracted the attention of both the U.S. President and 
Secretary of State.55  Boister notes that a mix of ‘international morality shaped by the anti-
opium lobby consisting of missionaries, anti-opium societies and welfare organisations’ 
coupled with the ‘foreign policy and commercial imperatives’ of the United States were 
central to driving this early stage of drug control.56  The anti-opium movement fit neatly with 
broader U.S. foreign policy and trade objectives at the time, and in particular provided a 
strategic opportunity to expand political and economic ties with China while isolating Great 
Britain, which had a long and controversial history of exporting opium to the country.57   
Beginning in 1773, the British East India Company had enjoyed a monopoly trade in 
opium,58 and attempts by China to stop British opium imports resulted in two Opium Wars 
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being fought between them in the mid-1800s.59  The combination of these factors resulted in 
the initiative of the United States to convene the first international conference to ‘study...the 
opium problem throughout the world’.60  The International Opium Commission, comprised of 
thirteen States representing major opium producing and consuming nations of the day, met in 
February 1909.61  This meeting represented the first truly international initiative on opium 
suppression, and marks the beginning of what Wright terms the second stage of drug control, 
the early multilateral era.62  
As a commission of inquiry, the conference was mandated to make recommendations rather 
than produce law.  After four weeks of deliberation, the Opium Commission agreed nine 
unanimous Resolutions, which have been described as ‘the foundation of today’s world-wide 
drug control effort’.63  In the process, the Commission proposed the creation of two new 
obligations of international law.   The first, under Resolution 4, was that it was ‘the duty of all 
countries to adopt reasonable measures to prevent at ports of departure the shipment of 
opium, its alkaloids, derivatives and preparations, to any country which prohibits the entry of 
any opium, its alkaloids, derivatives and preparations’.64  Chatterjee states that ‘[t]he word 
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“duty” in this resolution denotes “obligation”’.65 The second, in Resolution 5, ‘urge[d] 
strongly on all governments that it is highly important that drastic measures should be taken 
by each government in its own territories and possessions to control the manufacture, sale 
and distribution of this drugs, and also of such other derivatives of opium as may appear on 
scientific inquiry to be liable to similar abuse and productive of like ill effects’.66  In effect, 
these two resolutions established the principles that the control and suppression of drugs were 
both the ‘duty’ of individual states and the shared responsibility of the international 
community.  As described in an editorial of the American Journal of International Law at the 
time, ‘by the joint action of the interested governments the opium problem had been raised 
from a national to an international plane’,67 in the process reframing drug control efforts from 
being primarily a domestic concern to a shared global responsibility.  The recommendations 
also broadly described the approach to internal and external commodity controls that would 
underpin the international legal regime for the next century. 
These non-binding Resolutions were given the force of international law three years later 
when, following a proposal of the U.S., these same thirteen governments convened a second 
International Opium Commission in May 1911 at The Hague in order to incorporate the 
recommendations into an international treaty.  The resulting International Opium Convention, 
the first multilateral treaty on drug control, was adopted the following year on 23 January 
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1912.68  As described by Bevans, the Hague Convention ‘embodied a number of general 
principles that have remained the foundation and mainspring of all drug control’.69 
Import or export was to be made only by duly authorized persons. Exportation to 
countries prohibiting the import of raw opium was to be prevented and export to 
countries which desired to limit its import was required to conform to the regulations 
of such countries. The manufacture, internal traffic, and use of prepared opium were 
to be gradually suppressed, and imports and exports were to be prohibited. The 
manufacture, sale, and use of morphine, cocaine, and their derivatives, were to be 
controlled and limited to medicinal and other legitimate uses only. Legal and 
statistical information was to be exchanged by the parties.70
The new Convention contained six chapters and twenty-five articles.  The ratification process 
of the new treaty was slow, as many States were reluctant to voluntarily submit to the new 
regime. The process all but ground to a halt with the advent of the first World War in 1914.71  
A major step towards expanding the regime was made at the end of the war, however, when 
the victorious powers inserted Article 295 into the Treaty of Versailles. This article committed 
all High Contracting Parties who were not already parties to the Opium Convention to ratify 
it within one year, and specified that the signing of the Treaty of Versailles would itself ‘be 
deemed in all respects equivalent to the ratification of the Convention and to the signature of 
the Special Protocol...for bringing the said Convention into force’.72 Similar clauses were 
also inserted into the other peace treaties at the conclusion of the war.73 
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2.3 The League of Nations Era and an Enhanced System of  Control
The third stage of drug control, as described by Wright, begins with the foundation of the 
League of Nations in 1920.  One of the shortcomings observed of the 1912 Opium 
Convention was that it established no permanent structures through which drug control 
efforts could be progressed and monitored.74  Governments sought to rectify this within the 
League of Nations, and the period is marked by an increased commitment to international 
cooperation in drug control, and the creation of a ‘permanent international control 
machinery’.75  This increased commitment is reflected in the foundational document of the 
organisation, the Covenant of the League of Nations, Article 23(c) of which ‘intrust[s] the 
League with general supervision over the execution of agreements with regard to traffic 
in...opium and other dangerous drugs’.76 Later, this third stage sees the expansion of 
multilateral drug control efforts, including the creation of an Advisory Committee on the 
Traffic in Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs by the Council of the League of Nations, the 
adoption of new resolutions and a growing number of States entering into the regime.  It is 
also marked by the adoption of new treaties that expanded the scope of international legal 
obligations in this area, and the creation of new control organs, which would later come to 
form the foundations of the United Nations regime. As characterised by one State 
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representative in 1925, ‘the drug question has entered upon a new period. It is now caught in 
the day-to-day machinery of the League of Nations. It cannot escape.’77  
In the two decades following the foundation of the League, three major and two minor drug 
treaties were adopted. In describing the progress of the legal regime during this period, 
Renborg explains that, 
The League of Nations could not advance quicker or further [on drugs] than 
governments and public opinion were prepared to go. And they  were not prepared to 
go the whole way  at once...The League had to proceed slowly and gradually, 
attacking the most important problems first. The various important steps were 
marked by different conventions concluded one after the other.78 
The first of the major treaties was the 1925 International Opium Convention,79 which in 
effect implemented the proposals put forward in Resolution 4 of the International Opium 
Commission in 1909.80 Although this Convention established some greater domestic controls 
on the manufacture, sale and transport of drugs than those found in the 1912 opium treaty,81 
its primary contribution to international drug control law was to create systems to regulate 
international trade in controlled substances.  This included requiring mandatory government 
import and export authorisation certificates for all international transactions of drugs covered 
within the treaty,82 a development ‘[p]redicated on the assumption that it would be much 
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more difficult to misuse narcotics if each act of importation and exportation were subject to 
government approval’.83 The 1925 Convention also established a process allowing the scope 
of international drug control to evolve, based upon advances in medical and scientific 
knowledge.  Through this process, new substances could be included within the treaty, or 
currently controlled substances removed, based upon the recommendation of the Health 
Committee of the League of Nations, and an assessment of whether the drug in question was 
‘liable to similar abuse and productive of similar ill-effects’ as other drugs in the treaty.84
Perhaps the most significant element in terms of the development of the regime as a whole 
was the establishment of the Permanent Central Board (also referred to as the Permanent 
Central Opium Board) as a new supervisory organ, comprised of eight independent experts.85 
The Board was empowered to oversee a new system of ‘estimates’, under which each 
Contracting Party was required to submit ‘estimates of the quantities of each of the 
substances covered by the Convention to be imported into their territory for internal 
consumption during the following year for medical, scientific and other purposes’.86  Parties 
to the Convention were also obligated to submit statistics on domestic production of raw 
materials (for example, raw opium or coca leaves), domestic manufacture and consumption 
of substances covered by the treaty and a report stocks on hand.87 In addition to this data 
collection function, the Board was bestowed with powers of enforcement. If, based on the 
statistical data collected, the Board suspected that a State was producing or importing drugs 
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in excess of its estimated legitimate consumption requirements, and that therefore there was 
‘a danger of the country becoming a centre of...illicit traffic’, the Board was empowered to 
take actions of varying severity, from requesting additional information of the Government in 
question, to raising concerns to the Council of the League of Nations to even recommending 
an international embargo on further exports to the offending State.88 
With new controls and regulations established on international trade in controlled drugs, the 
next step taken by the League was to create a system to limit the levels of international 
manufacturing of drugs strictly to that necessary for medical and scientific purposes.  
Following a similar logic to that underpinning the 1925 Convention, it was considered that 
controlling production solely to that needed for ‘legitimate’ need would limit the amount of 
drugs being diverted into illicit markets.  As described by the U.S. Department of State at the 
time, ‘It is foreign overproduction, i.e., total production over and above the amount needed 
for medical and scientific purposes, which supplies the illicit international traffic.’89 To this 
end, the Convention for Limiting the Manufacture and Regulating the Distribution of 
Narcotic Drugs was adopted in Geneva on 13 July 1931.90  This treaty operationalised the 
restrictions on production and manufacture found in the International Opium Commission’s 
Resolution 5.91  Like the 1925 Convention, the controls in the 1931 Convention were based 
around a system of estimates of domestic consumption of drugs for medical and scientific 
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purposes.92 However, unlike the non-binding estimates system established in 1925 
Convention, ‘under the 1931 Convention estimates were required for total consumption and 
were binding’.93 The Convention also created a second international control organ, a 
Supervisory Body (often called the Drug Supervisory Body) under Article 5.94 A critical new 
feature of the approach of the Convention was that ‘[l]imitation could never be effective if 
there were parts of the world to which the estimate system did not apply’, and therefore that 
drug control must be universal in application in order to be successful.95 To address this, 
Article 2 of the Convention instructed that the Permanent Central Board ‘shall request 
estimates for countries and territories to which this Convention does not apply’,96 in other 
words from non-Parties to the treaty. According to Renborg, this represented ‘a rather unusual 
feature which is a novelty in international legislation. Non parties to a convention are 
requested to perform a certain act although they have not undertaken an obligation to do 
so.’97 The 1931 Convention went beyond merely requesting information from non-Parties.  It 
also created a mechanism subjecting all States to the controls within the treaty, whether they 
had ratified the instrument or not.  This power was found in Article 2, and mandated that in 
cases where States or territories failed to provide voluntary estimates to the Permanent 
Central Board,  ‘the Supervisory Body shall itself, as far as possible, make the estimate’.98  
Estimates carried equal legal authority, whether they were submitted voluntarily by a State or 
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were produced independently by the Supervisory Body.  They were also equally binding on 
the treaty obligations of other States, as the estimates would be the basis for authorising 
importing/exporting controlled drugs to/from other Parties to the treaty.  As a consequence, 
‘non-parties, who have accepted no obligations whatsoever, are nevertheless limited in their 
drug supplies by the estimates made by the Supervisory Body’.99  This development was 
described by Renborg as being ‘probably the most radical feature of the convention’.100 The 
Convention also increased the powers of the Permanent Central Board in this regard.  Under 
the 1925 Convention, the power to impose an import/export embargo on an offending State 
was vested in the Council of the League of Nations, with the Board only having the authority 
to recommend an embargo for the Council to consider.101 Under Article 14 of the 1931 
Convention, however, the Board was given power to directly impose an embargo itself, 
without requiring the Council’s approval, and to communicate this decision directly with the 
High Contracting Parties.102
The 1925 and 1931 Conventions defined a normative framework that reflected Resolutions 4 
and 5 of the International Opium Commission in 1909, and as such represented significant 
developments in international drug control law, both in terms of State obligations and the 
scope of international supervisory bodies. Taken together, the treaties establish the principles 
and control measures that still define the commodity control pillar of the regime today. 
However, as described by Boister, one of the outcomes of codifying a system for limiting the 
manufacture and trade in drugs to medical and scientific purposes was that it ‘marked the line 
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between licit and illicit traffic, thus inviting the international community to endeavour to 
suppress the illicit traffic’.103 This created the impetus for the development of a new 
convention, one establishing State obligations to strengthen the severity of penal sanctions 
within domestic criminal law, leading to the third and final major drug convention of the 
League of Nations era,104 the Convention of 1936 for the Suppression of the Illicit Traffic in 
Dangerous Drugs.105  Prior to the 1936 convention, few provisions within the previous 
instruments dealt with the question of the domestic criminal laws of Contracting Parties,106 
and the 1936 treaty was the source of many of the penal approaches that underpin the 
punitive approach of the modern ‘war on drugs’, in essence making illicit drug trafficking a 
crime under international law. The preamble states that the objective of the convention is ‘to 
strengthen the measures intended to penalise offences contrary to the provisions’ of the 
previous drug treaties, and ‘to combat by the methods most effective in the present 
circumstances the illicit traffic in the drugs and substances covered by the...Conventions’. 107 
To pursue these outcomes, the convention obligated Contracting Parties to enact a strict, 
penal-focussed approach to drugs within their domestic legislation, with a view towards 
increasing the severity of punishments for drug offences, and harmonising national criminal 
laws related to drugs in much the same way the previous conventions harmonised domestic 
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administration and control practices.  Article 2 created an obligation ‘to make the necessary 
legislative provisions for severely punishing, particularly by imprisonment or other penalties 
of deprivation of liberty’ of a wide range of acts including the manufacture, possession, 
distribution, purchase and sale, transport, import and export of illicit drugs, as well as 
participation in such offences or conspiracy to commit them.108 The Convention also included 
provisions on extradition,109 and mandated the creation of centralised police offices ‘for the 
supervision and co-ordination of all operations necessary’110 to prevent or prosecute the 
offences enumerated under Article 2. However, few States ratified the treaty, and the 1936 
convention was largely seen as a failure, as ‘many states with negligible or nonexistent illicit 
narcotic drug traffic have not felt it incumbent on them to ratify a convention that would 
involve them in complicated legislation and administrative measures’.111
2.4 The United Nations Era: The ‘Fourth Stage’ of Drug Control
The advent of the second World War had a significant impact on the international drug 
control machinery.  Although the League of Nations drug supervisory bodies continued to 
function, in reality the regime had largely broken down as a result of the hostilities.112 The 
Permanent Central Board and the drug Supervisory Body continued to operate, although in 
many cases national mechanisms ceased to function, and the Advisory Committee on Traffic 
41
108 ibid art 2.
109 ibid arts 7-9.
110 ibid art 11.
111 Renborg, ‘International Control of Narcotics’ (n 51) 102.
112 Boister, Penal Aspects (n 46) 40.
in Opium and other Dangerous Drugs did not meet after 1940.113 Therefore, one of the first 
tasks of the newly formed United Nations was to re-establish the international systems of 
control that had deteriorated or collapsed during the war.
2.4.1 International Drug Control, from Covenant to Charter
As described above, the Covenant of the League of Nations specifically invested the 
organisation with a drug control mandate under Article 23(c).114  When the Charter of the 
United Nations was drafted in 1945, this specific reference to drug control was not included. 
However, it would be incorrect to assume that the elimination of specific reference to drugs 
in the Charter represented, or was intended by States to be, a weakening of the mandate of the 
new UN organisation in the area drug control. In fact the opposite was the case, as this choice 
of language did not represent a fundamental shift away from the international community’s 
concern for drug control, nor of the central role of international organisations in that effort.  
Rather, it reflected what was largely seen as the ‘unsatisfactory’ ability of the League to 
coordinate international activities on drugs and other areas of social and economic 
cooperation that encouraged the desire for stronger mechanisms under the United Nations.115 
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To address these concerns, the Charter adopted language allowing for a new, more rigorous 
and robust system of international oversight and control of drugs to be put in place.
The UN Charter effectively takes the old Article 23 of the Covenant and expands it into six 
more detailed provisions, Articles 55—60 under Chapter IX,116  with the result that the 
specific activity areas identified under Article 23 were subsumed in the more general 
language of ‘international economic, social, health and related problems’ under Article 55.117  
This did not represent a shift in concept or content, as under the Covenant drug control was 
already included within a subset of bilateral and multilateral activities that could be described 
as relating to social, health and economic needs.  Article 23 was not solely concerned with 
the control of narcotics, but more broadly addressed the improvement of the social and 
economic welfare of the populations of Member States.  For example, in addition to clause 
(c) on drugs, other clauses addressed issues including fair and humane labour standards,118 
just treatment of aboriginal peoples,119 preventing trafficking of women and children,120 arms 
control121, commerce122 and public health.123 In essence, the UN Charter does not remove 
drug control as a matter of international concern, but rather enshrines a more flexible 
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formulation of wording that allows not only for the inclusion of drug control, but also for new 
and additional areas, as deemed necessary over time by the General Assembly. Indeed, in 
1959 the General Assembly specifically recognised that the UN ‘exercises responsibilities in 
the field of narcotic drugs’ under Chapter IX of the Charter.124
Furthermore, the operational language of Article 23 of the Covenant did little more than 
mandate States to abide by the terms of existing international instruments, requiring only that 
Members act ‘in accordance with the provisions of international conventions existing or 
hereafter to be agreed upon’.125 As such, the Covenant created no new obligations towards 
drug control, other than symbolising the particular significance attributed by the League to 
this and other identified areas of social and economic activity, and encouraging Members to 
meet their treaty obligations in this regard.  Indeed, when the inclusion of a clause on 
narcotics control was proposed by the British delegation, there was specific agreement among 
the High Contracting Parties that naming these areas of activity in the Covenant would not 
create legal obligations upon the States that had not ratified the relevant treaties.126  The 
British delegation’s minutes of the meeting note that ‘President Wilson replied that their only 
obligation would be to see to it that subscribing States kept their obligations thereunder’.127 
Therefore, the clause on drugs had little or no binding legal significance, as it created no new 
obligations for Member States, whether or not they were party to the relevant drug 
conventions.  It also did not create any new supervisory bodies under the League as an 
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organisation.   As noted by Simma, the Covenant ‘did not establish a connection between the 
promotion of...social well-being and the maintenance of international peace and security; 
consequently it did not provide the League of Nations with the machinery necessary for 
dealing with social and economic matters.’128 
The UN Charter, however, commits that ‘[a]ll Members pledge themselves to take joint and 
separate action in cooperation with the Organization for the achievement of the purposes set 
forth in Article 55’.129 In this context, article 57 establishes a mechanism allowing the UN to 
create ‘specialized agencies’ with ‘wide international responsibilities’ to deal with the 
economic, health and social matters identified by the Organization,130 these 'specialized 
agencies' to fall under the authority of the newly created Economic and Social Council.131   
These Charter provisions are a reflection of the proposals that emerged from the 1944 
Washington Conversations on International Peace and Security Organization, known as the 
‘Dumbarton Oaks Proposals’, where the major powers agreed the framework for a new 
international organisation to take the place of the League. Part of that new framework was 
agreement that ‘solutions of international economic, social and other humanitarian problems 
and promot[ing] respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms’ was necessary for ‘the 
creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and 
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friendly relations among nations’.132 In order to promote these aims, the Washington 
Conference proposed the creation of ‘specialized economic, social and other organizations 
and agencies that would have responsibilities in their respective fields’,133 a proposal that was 
directly incorporated into the Charter. 
Despite the existence of four major, and two minor, multilateral drug control treaties at the 
time of the San Francisco Conference, and the specific mention of drug control efforts within 
the Covenant, there was surprisingly little discussion of drugs during the drafting of the 
Charter. While Mexico proposed a list of twelve specific areas in which the Economic and 
Social Council should establish ‘permanent organizations’, drug control was not included 
among them.134 The drafting committee did however, by unanimous vote, accept a proposal 
that the language of the draft Article ‘includes international traffic in, and abuse of, opium 
and other narcotics and dangerous drugs’,135 a decision that was also reflected in the 
Rapporteur’s report of the drafting committee’s proceedings.136 The specific discussion of 
drug control in this context appears to have been pushed most vigorously by the United 
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States, which issued the only specific document on drug control during the Conference, 
stating that ‘drug control raises issues that can best be met not by an international health, 
economic and social agency’ but instead by ‘specialized agencies’.137  It proposed that the 
new international organisation ‘be entrusted with supervision over the execution of existing 
or future international agreements’ related to drugs, and that there ‘be established an advisory 
body to advise directly the Economic and Social Council in these matters.’138  The U.S. 
statement received support from China, Canada and India.139
Therefore, the new structures created under the Charter reflect not a retreat from a 
prioritisation of drug control, but rather an evolution in the scope of international cooperation 
and collaboration on social, health and economic issues. In 1946, the first sessions of both the 
General Assembly140 and the Economic and Social Council141 considered resolutions to 
incorporate the League’s drug control instruments under UN authority, a fact suggesting the 
importance placed upon the issue had not diminished.  In fact, the adoption of the UN Charter 
represents a significant evolution of the normative nature of international drug control. Under 
Article 1 of the Charter, which sets out the four purposes of the United Nations, paragraph 
three states that a purpose of the organisation is , ‘[t]o achieve international cooperation in 
solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, 
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and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for 
all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion’.142 The drafters regarded Article 
55 as a reinforcing and implementing provision for Article 1, in particular Articles 1(2) and 
1(3).143 Simma refers to Articles 55 and 56 as the ‘operative parts of the Charter to which Art. 
1(3) refer’.144 Significantly, Article 55 states that promoting ‘solutions of international 
economic, social, health, and related problems’ as well as ‘universal respect for, and 
observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms’ are ‘necessary’ for ‘the creation of 
conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations 
among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of 
peoples’.145  The Charter of the United Nations therefore established the framework for the 
creation of the legal and administrative tools necessary to enable the new organisation to take 
a more robust approach to international drug control than was previously possible. The next 
section will explore the development of the modern, fourth stage, drug control regime that 
developed under the UN system.
2.4.2 The United Nations Treaty Regime
2.4.2.1 The Pre-Treaty Period: Protocols of 1946, 1948 and 1953
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Under the League of Nations, the development of the international legal regime on drugs had 
‘proceed[ed] slowly, step by step’.146 The pace of this evolution reflected the evolving 
‘technical, medical, and social knowledge of the nature of the problem’, the slow nature of 
international treaty-making processes and the lack of enthusiasm of many States to 
voluntarily enter the new legal regime.147  As a result, at the time of the founding of the 
United Nations, the body of international law addressing drugs consisted of an assortment of 
instruments built up over the course of thirty years.  The task before the United Nations was 
therefore to incorporate these existing norms into a modern, unified and simplified treaty, 
supported by the supervisory and technical bodies required to carry out the necessary 
functions.  The work on this objective was begun by the Economic and Social Council in 
September 1946, which set about to prepare a protocol entitled ‘Transfer to the United 
Nations of the powers exercised by the League of Nations in connexion with Narcotic 
Drugs’.148 The ‘Lake Success Protocol’, as it was known, was adopted by the General 
Assembly during its first session in November,149 and served as a model for other UN 
instruments similarly transferring previous League of Nations powers and functions.150 Under 
the protocol, the United Nations assumed supervisory responsibility for all previous 
conventions and protocols on drugs. Although maintaining the functions of the Permanent 
Central Board and Supervisory Body, the protocol shifted all other responsibilities to the 
newly established UN drug control machinery.  The role of the Council of the League of 
49
146 Renborg, ‘International Control of Narcotics’ (n 51) 94.
147 ibid.
148 UN Economic and Social Council (n 141) 28.
149 UN General Assembly, ‘Transfer to the United Nations of powers exercised by 
the League of Nations under the International Agreements, Conventions and 
Protocols on Narcotic Drugs’ (n 140).
150 May (n 7) 505.
Nations was taken over by the Economic and Social Council; that of the Advisory Committee 
on Traffic in Opium and other Dangerous Drugs was taken over by the UN Commission on 
Narcotic Drugs; that of the Health Committee of the League was taken over by the World 
Health Organization.151
Two years later in 1948, a second protocol was adopted by the General Assembly. The ‘Paris 
Protocol’,152 which entered into force on 1 December 1949,153 extended controls to new drugs 
and precursors not covered by the 1931 convention, in order to address ‘the progress of 
modern pharmacology and chemistry’, which had ‘resulted in the discovery of drugs, 
particularly synthetic drugs, capable of producing addiction’.154  This resulted in twenty new 
substances coming under international control by 1954,155 a number that increased to over 
thirty by 1956.156 A third protocol was agreed in 1953 on limiting and regulating the 
cultivation of poppies, and the manufacture and trade in opium.157  Under the protocol, only 
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seven countries were authorised to produce opium for export (Bulgaria, Greece, India, Iran, 
Turkey, Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union).158 The protocol also bestowed the Permanent 
Central Board with with strong regulatory powers.159 Described by one source as containing 
‘the most stringent drug-control provisions that had ever been embodied in international 
law’,160 Boister notes that these terms were ‘a more difficult legal pill to swallow and [the 
protocol] did not enter force until 1962. This lack of enthusiasm can to some extent be 
explained by the simultaneous development of...the 1961 Single Convention [on Narcotic 
Drugs]’,161 the first of the UN drug treaties.
2.4.2.2 The United Nations Drug Conventions
The need for a new drug convention that would amalgamate the complicated set of 
instruments agreed over the previous three decades, and also to update and expand the regime 
to meet contemporary challenges, had been under consideration since the very earliest years 
of the UN.162 As described by one observer at the time, ‘[b]ecause they were drafted at 
different times under different sets of circumstances and ratified by different combinations of 
states in each case, the several [pre-existing] international agreements amounted to a 
patchwork of obligations and commitments which was not wholly satisfactory.’163 This 
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process was begun in 1948 with a request from the Commission on Narcotic Drugs to the 
Economic and Social Council to invite the Secretary-General to initiate the drafting.164 
Formal efforts began in 1949, with the objective to ‘simplify and improve the existing 
international instruments...on narcotic drugs’ as well as to ‘contain provisions for the 
limitation of the production of raw materials’.165  The task, therefore, was to bring together 
the content of the pre-existing international drug control instruments, as well as to address 
new areas of concern, in one single international instrument (hence the title, the Single 
Convention).166 
The Single Convention was adopted on 30 March 1961, and entered into force on 13 
December 1964.167  Its fifty-one articles focus primarily on the control of plant-based 
narcotics: opium, cannabis, cocaine and their derivatives. It enshrines the basic principles of 
the League of Nations regime, namely that of limiting the availability and use of controlled 
drugs solely to medical and scientific purposes through administrative controls placed on 
manufacture, import, export and distribution.  The treaty contextualises this mission in the 
52
164 May (n 7) 519.
165 HJ Anslinger, ‘Report of Progress in Drafting the “Single Convention”, a 
Proposed Codification of the Multilateral Treaty Law on Narcotic Drugs’ (1958) 13 
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Law Journal 692, 692.
166 The Single Convention was intended to replace the following agreements: 
International Opium Convention 23 Jan 1912 and subsequent protocols; Opium 
Agreement and Protocol and Final 11 Feb 1925; Convention, Protocol and Final Act 
19 Feb 1925 and later protocol; Convention for Limiting the Manufacture and 
Regulating the Distribution of Narcotic Drugs 13 July 1931; Opium Agreement and 
Final Act 27 Nov 1931; Convention for the Suppression of Illicit Traffic in 
Dangerous Drugs 26 June 1936; Protocol to bring under international control drugs 
outside the scope of the 1932 convention.
167 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961 (30 March 1961) 520 UNTS 151 
(1961 Convention).
preamble as being because the Parties are ‘[c]oncerned with the health and welfare of 
mankind’, because ‘adequate provision must be made to ensure the availability of narcotic 
drugs’ for medical purposes and ‘the relief of pain and suffering’ and because ‘addiction to 
narcotic drugs constitutes a serious evil for the individual and is fraught with social and 
economic danger to mankind’ and therefore ‘require[s] co-ordinated and universal action’.168 
To pursue these goals, the treaty adopts the approaches developed under the earlier 
conventions, including that of indirect control, giving States themselves primary 
responsibility for implementing control measures,169 and establishes supervisory bodies to 
monitor progress and treaty implementation.  Measures carried forward from the League 
include the system of import/export authorisation (Article 31), the estimates system (Article 
19), licensing regulations (Article 29) and the limitation on manufacturing (Article 21). The 
Single Convention includes penal provisions under Article 36, obligating that ‘each Party 
shall adopt such measures as will ensure that’ a list of offences related to drug cultivation, 
production, manufacture, possession, distribution, purchase, sale and trafficking ‘shall be 
punishable offences...and that serious offences shall be liable to adequate punishment 
particularly by imprisonment or other penalties of deprivation of liberty’.170 The penal 
provisions contained in Article 36 represented a compromise position, and were deemed too 
mild by some States.171 However Bewley-Taylor argues that, in its mandatory penalisation of 
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certain behaviours, based upon a prohibition of drug use, ‘the Single Convention redefined 
the normative order of the international drug control system’.172
The Single Convention also introduced several new provisions that expanded and refined the 
scope of international drug control law.  For example, it represented the first time that 
controls on the planting, cultivation and harvesting stages of drug production were included 
in international law.173  The Convention also marked the first time that the provision of drug 
treatment for what it terms ‘addicts’ is codified. Under Article 38, ‘[t]he Parties shall give 
special attention to the provision of facilities for the medical treatment, care and 
rehabilitation of drug addicts’, and that, subject to economic resources, ‘it is desirable that 
[States] establish adequate facilities for the effective treatment of drug addicts’.174 The Single 
Convention also established a system of ‘scheduling’, which divided controlled substances 
into four different categories, each category subject to differing levels of control under Article 
2. As was the case with the 1925 convention, a process was established to enable changes to 
be made to the schedules based upon advances in medical and scientific knowledge about the 
substances in question, and recommendations from expert bodies.175  One particularly 
significant development was the decision to consolidate the two League of Nations drug 
supervisory bodies into a single organ.176  As a result, the Permanent Central Board and the 
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Supervisory Body were dissolved and their respective functions amalgamated into an eleven 
member International Narcotics Control Board.177 
The Single Convention was amended by a protocol in 1972.178 The 1972 protocol did not 
modify the terms of the convention in any dramatic way, although it did make a number of 
changes to the scope of the International Narcotics Control Board.179 The protocol increased 
the membership of the Board from eleven to thirteen seats,180  and increased the term of 
office from three to five years181 on the basis that longer terms of office would contribute to 
its independence.182 In addition, Article 6 of the protocol amended Article 14 of the Single 
Convention to bestow the Board with enhanced monitoring and enforcement functions.183 
The Protocol also significantly amended Article 38 of the convention on the provision of drug 
treatment services, increasing the scope of the treaty to create an obligation to take ‘all 
practicable measures for the prevention of abuse of drugs and for the early identification, 
treatment, education, after-care, rehabilitation and social reintegration of persons 
involved’.184
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The second drug convention adopted under the United Nations system was the 1971 
Convention on Psychotropic Substances.  The purpose of the treaty was to bring under 
international control the increasingly diverse group of synthetically-produced, non-plant 
based drugs, the use of which had become particularly prevalent in the 1960s.185  These 
included synthetically produced stimulants, barbiturates,  tranquilizers and hallucinogens, all 
of which fell outside the scope of the 1961 Convention. Like the Single Convention, the 1971 
Convention sought to limit the use of psychotropic substances to medical and scientific 
purposes,186  and to pursue this its thirty-three articles largely reflect the template used in the 
earlier treaty.  Like the Single Convention before it, the 1971 Convention codifies a four-
tiered system of scheduling (Article 2), import and export regulations (Article 12), limitations 
on manufacture (Article 5), the provision of treatment and rehabilitation (Article 20) and 
penal sanctions (Article 22). The treaty also falls under the supervision of the International 
Narcotics Control Board.187  However, unlike the Single Convention, the 1971 Convention 
does not employ a system of estimates. According to Cohrerrsen and Hoover, this reflected 
the fact that, unlike narcotic drugs, the medical use of psychotropic drugs at the time was 
relatively new, and therefore ‘the necessary experience for making estimate projections [was] 
not available’.188  However, both Jelsma and McAllister note that during treaty negotiations, 
Western States with powerful pharmaceutical industries played a key role in ensuring the 
structures for control of psychotropic substances were weaker than that those created under 
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the 1961 Convention for narcotics.189  As described by Boister, the 1961 and 1971 
Conventions ‘do not...in any significant way depart from the basic assumption upon which 
the international drug control system by this time had come to rest, viz.: that the best way of 
dealing with the drug problem was prohibition’.190
Similar to the League of Nations evolution, once the administrative systems of commodity 
control had been established, States sought to create a universal approach to suppressing drug 
trafficking by harmonising domestic criminal laws and penalties.  The first attempt at this, the 
1936 convention, was largely deemed unsuccessful.191  Few States ratified the treaty, and the 
objective of creating a universal approach to domestic criminal law was far from being 
achieved. However, with increased international concern about international drug trafficking 
in the 1980s,192 as well as increasing political pressures being exerted by the United States,193 
there was renewed momentum among Member States to conclude a trafficking convention.  
The result was the adoption in December 1988 of the Convention against Illicit Traffic in 
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Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, which entered into force on 11 November 
1990.194  As described in Article 2(1), which defines its scope,  
The purpose of this Convention is to promote co-operation among the Parties so that 
they  may address more effectively the various aspects of illicit  traffic in narcotic 
drugs and psychotropic substances having an international dimension. In carrying 
out their obligations under the Convention, the Parties shall take necessary measures, 
including legislative and administrative measures, in conformity with the 
fundamental provisions of their respective domestic legislative systems.195
The convention’s thirty-four articles ‘provide the structure for an extensive legal regime for 
the suppression of the illicit drug traffic’,196 one that creates a universal penal approach to 
drugs worldwide.  As described by one commentator, the 1988 Convention represents an 
‘internationalizing of the war on drugs’,197 while another calls it ‘the general extension of 
international drug control law into every corner of the globe’.198  According to the Official 
Commentary, the convention requires that States ‘establish a modern code of criminal 
offences relating to various aspects of illicit trafficking and to ensure that such activities are 
dealt with as serious offences by each State’s judiciary and prosecutorial authorities’.199 
Central to this goal is Article 3,200 which proscribes a wide range of drug offences at every 
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stage, from cultivation, to production and manufacture, to transport and traffic, to distribution 
and sale, to purchase and possession, including possession for personal use.201 Significantly, 
unlike the previous UN conventions, the Article 3 obligates States to makes these acts 
‘criminal offences’,202 rather than the rather more vague and flexible terms ‘distinct 
offence’203 and ‘punishable offence’204 employed in the two previous treaties, and applies 
them to ‘any narcotic drug or any psychotropic substance contrary to the provisions’ of the 
1961 and 1971 Conventions.205  In effect, the 1988 Convention criminalises the entire market 
chain, including not only offences related to controlled substances, but also to precursors and 
money laundering.206  In this process, the 1988 Convention also has the effect of 
criminalising large groups of individuals involved in the illicit industry, from farmers and 
growers, to producers and manufacturers, to large scale traffickers and small scale couriers, to 
individual retailers and consumers.  
The 1988 Convention represents the third leg of the stool of modern international drug 
control law, augmenting the largely commodity-based controls of the 1961 and 1971 treaties 
with strict penal laws and sanctions for those infringing those controls.207 In addition to the 
increased focus on penal sanctions, a second significant feature of the fourth stage of drug 
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control is the near universal ratification of the United Nations regime. Whereas the League of 
Nations drug control system was marked by differing combinations of States ratifying 
different instruments,208 and very few States at all agreeing to enter into the 1936 convention 
on penal sanctions,209 the United Nations instruments have received broad support: the Single 
Convention (as amended by the 1972 Protocol) has been ratified by 184 States; the 1971 
Convention has been ratified by 183 States; and the 1988 Convention has been ratified by 
188 States.210  This has the effect of creating international obligations to domestically 
implement a largely uniform and punitive approach to drug suppression and control. 
2.4.3 The United Nations Machinery
During the League of Nations period, two different kinds of bodies were established to 
progress international drug control: a policy-making body comprised of Member States (the 
Advisory Committee on the Traffic in Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs), and two 
independent expert bodies with authority to monitor State practice and criticise Governments 
where necessary (the Permanent Central Board and the Supervisory Committee).211  This 
basic structure was incorporated into the drug control machinery of the United Nations. This 
section will review the three primary United Nations organs mandated to supervise and 
progress international drug control: the Commission on Narcotic Drugs, the International 
Narcotics Control Board and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime.  The following 
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section will summarise the roles and mandates of each of these bodies, as each plays an 
important role in the question of human rights in the fourth stage of drug control, as well as a 
part in shaping drug control’s fifth stage.
2.4.3.1 The Policy Making Body: Commission on Narcotic Drugs
The primary policy making body with the United Nations is the Commission on Narcotic 
Drugs.  The Commission also functions as the governing body of the United Nations Office 
on Drugs and Crime, which will be discussed below.  At the first session of the Economic and 
Social Council of the United Nations in February 1946, the Council established the 
Commission on Narcotic Drugs as one of the ‘specialized agencies’ described under Article 
55 of the Charter. The Commission thereby replaced the Advisory Committee on the Traffic 
in Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs, and was established as the main policy-making organ 
of the UN on drug issues.212  According to the resolution establishing the Commission, in 
addition to carrying out the functions of the former Opium Advisory Committee, its mandate 
includes assisting the Council in supervising international drug control conventions and 
agreements, advising the Council on all matters pertaining to drug control, drafting 
international drug conventions and advising on any necessary changes to the UN drug control 
machinery.213 As an advisory body to the Economic and Social Council, Commission 
decisions must be confirmed by the Council, except in those cases where the drug 
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conventions bestow specific authority on the Commission.214 When founded, the 
Commission was limited to fifteen members serving terms of three years, to be comprised of 
States that were ‘important producing or manufacturing countries or countries in which illicit 
traffic in narcotics constitutes a serious social problem’.215 However, the membership has 
expanded over time, alongside the growth of the UN itself, to fifty-three members, with a 
specific regional distribution.216
The Commission has been described by the General Assembly as ‘the principal United 
Nations policy-making body on drug abuse control’.217  It meets annually at the United 
Nations headquarters in Vienna, where Member States take to opportunity to publicly review 
their progress towards meeting domestic and international drug control goals, and debate and 
ratify resolutions on various related topics. In addition to its policy-making role, the 
Commission is also mandated with normative functions under the UN drug control treaties, 
the most significant of these being the authority to make changes in the listing of substances 
under international control. This authority is exercised through a treaty provision enabling it 
to amend the schedules to the 1961 and 1971 Conventions, in effect empowering the 
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Commission to modify the terms of the treaties.218  Based upon recommendations from the 
World Health Organization,219 the Commission has the authority to include a new drug under 
international control by adding it to the schedules, or change the nature of the controls 
applied to a currently scheduled substance by raising or lowering its categorisation within the 
schedules.  The 1971 and 1988 Conventions also bestow the same powers on the Commission 
regarding preparations and precursor chemicals.220  As the substances included within the 
schedules of the 1961 and 1971 Conventions are also those to which domestic criminal 
sanctions must be applied under Article 3 of the 1988 Convention, these powers also directly 
affect State obligations under that treaty.  As a consequence, the Commission may on its own 
authority list a new substance within the schedules of the 1961 or 1971 Convention, therefore 
requiring Parties to the 1988 treaty to criminalise it under domestic drug law, without all 
States Parties explicitly consenting to that treaty amendment and subsequent legislative 
change. These are the only powers the Commission exercises autonomously, outside of its 
mandate from the Economic and Social Council, and are ones the Commission exercises 
routinely at its annual session.221  
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The powers given to the Commission are highly unusual, effectively authorising a 
subcommittee of the UN to amend the terms of the treaties themselves, without requiring the 
consent of a conference of States Parties.  A useful comparison in this regard is the 
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, a treaty 
that creates similar systems of control to regulate imports and exports of protected species 
between and among States Parties, and a system of licensing for such trade.222  Like the 1961 
and 1971 drug conventions, which contain four schedules that list and categorise substances 
under international control, the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species 
contains three appendices of species covered under the treaty, ‘afford[ing] different levels or 
types of protection’ to each of the three groups.223  These controls vary from the most 
rigorous under Appendix I, covering species threatened with extinction, the trade in which is 
controlled in all countries, to the least restrictive under Appendix III, which covers species 
protected in at least one State, the government of which has requested the co-operation of the 
other Parties in curtailing international trade.224 Unlike the autonomous powers given to the 
Commission on Narcotic Drugs in relations to scheduling, Appendix I and II of the 
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species, which list species subject to the 
tightest controls, may only be amended at a Conference of State Parties, and then by a two-
thirds majority of votes cast.225 Unlike the drug conventions,  States may also enter individual 
64
222 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and 
Flora (signed 3 March 1973, amended 22 June 1979)(CITES).
223 ‘The CITES Appendices’, Convention on International Trade in Endangered 
Species of Wild Fauna and Flora website <http://www.cites.org/eng/app/index.php> 
accessed 10 May 2013.
224 CITES (n 222) art II(1-3).
225 ibid art XV.
reservations to any of the specific species listed in all three appendices, a practice which is 
quite widely used among States Parties to the convention.226 The 1961 and 1971 drug 
conventions do not allow States to enter reservations on individual substances listed within 
the treaty schedules.  
2.4.3.2 The Treaty Body: International Narcotics Control Board
The 1925 and 1931 League of Nations Conventions established separate organs to supervise 
State compliance with their treaty obligations, the Permanent Central Board and the 
Supervisory Committee. The 1961 drug convention consolidated these two bodies into a 
single organ, the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB).227  As described under 
Article 9(4), 
The Board, in co-operation with Governments, and subject to the terms of this 
Convention, shall endeavour to limit the cultivation, production, manufacture and 
use of drugs to an adequate amount required for medical and scientific purposes, to 
ensure their availability  for such purposes and to prevent illicit cultivation, 
production and manufacture of, and illicit trafficking in and use of, drugs.228
The Board was first appointed in 1968.229 As a body of independent experts, the Board fulfills 
a similar role to that of treaty bodies within the UN human rights system, engaging with 
Governments to ensure their compliance with treaty obligations and monitoring State 
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progress in that regard.230 Its members, expanded from eleven to thirteen under the 1972 
Protocol, sit in an independent capacity, and ‘shall be persons who, by their competence, 
impartiality and disinterestedness, will command general confidence’.231  Members of the 
Board are elected by the Economic and Social Council, with ten seats filled by persons 
nominated by States, and three seats filled by candidates proposed by the World Health 
Organization.232
The Board’s functions largely mirror those previously fulfilled by the two League of Nations 
organs, including responsibility for administering the systems of estimates and statistical 
returns used to establish national projections of quantities of controlled drugs needed for 
medical and scientific uses.233  As was the case under the League of Nations, should the 
Board feel ‘there exists evidence of a serious risk that it may become, an important centre of 
illicit cultivation, production or manufacture of, or traffic in or consumption of drugs’,234 it 
has various powers, ranging from opening communications with the Government in question 
to recommending to States Parties that they impose import/export embargoes on the 
offending country.235 This merging of the separate roles of the two previous organs into a 
single body was not without potential concern. Under the previous system, the Supervisory 
Body was responsible for overseeing the system of estimates and determining the permitted 
66
230 See generally, Damon Barrett, ‘Unique in International Relations?: A Comparison 
of the International Narcotics Control Board and the UN Human Rights Treaty 
Bodies’ (International Harm Reduction Association 2008).
231 1961 Convention amended (n 203) art 9(2).
232 ibid art 9(1).
233 ibid arts 12, 13.
234 ibid art 14(1)(a).
235 ibid arts 14(1), 14(2).
national and international limits on drug manufacture and stockpiling, while the Permanent 
Central Board had the power to impose sanctions should States violate these limits. As 
described by one commentator, by consolidating both these mandates into a single entity, 
‘[t]he International Narcotics Control Board would, thus, in a manner, function as both 
prosecutor and judge’.236
As was the case with the 1931 convention, the 1961 Convention vests the treaty body with 
the power to set estimates, and propose sanctions, even on States that have not ratified the 
treaty.  This provision was the source of tension in the drafting, as the ‘Soviet bloc delegates 
pressed the view that international law is violated when nonparties are made the prospective 
objects of board actions to which they have never given their consent’.237 However, a vote on 
the question supported the continuation of the former legal regime established under the 1931 
convention.238
In addition to these technical functions, the Board has what Chatterjee describes as a 
‘remedial and preventive’ role,239 in the sense that it is authorised to take measures where ‘the 
Board has objective reasons to believe that the aims of [the 1961] Convention are being 
seriously endangered by reason of the failure of any Party, country or territory to carry out 
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the provisions of [the] Convention’.240 These measures are essentially communicative in 
nature, and include raising issues of concern with Governments directly, or, if the matter is 
not resolved to the Board’s satisfaction, ‘it may call the attention of the Parties, the 
[Economic and Social] Council and the Commission [on Narcotic Drugs] to the matter’.241 
Part of this communicative role is achieved via the production of annual reports of the Board, 
of which the treaties specify that ‘[t]he Parties shall permit their unrestricted distribution’.242 
As discussed by Bewley-Taylor, over time these annual public reports have become a major 
source of the Board’s political influence, and ‘are one of the key mechanisms deployed by the 
INCB to affect state behaviour and attempt to ensure what it perceives to be compliance to 
the conventions’.243
The Board is mandated with additional functions under both the 1971 and 1988 Conventions. 
Under the 1971 Convention, the Board holds similar powers as under the 1961 treaty,244 with 
the exception of an estimates system, which the 1971 Convention does not create for 
psychotropic substances.  These functions include gathering statistical information, preparing 
annual reports and engaging with States.245 As with the Single Convention, the 1971 treaty 
68
240 1972 Protocol (n 178) art 6(1)(a).
241 ibid art 6(1)(d). 
242 1961 Convention amended (n 203) art 15.; 1971 Convention (n 186) art 18.; 1988 
Convention (n 194) art 23.
243 Bewley-Taylor, International Drug Control (n 172) 224.
244 Boister, Penal Aspects (n 46) 47.
245 1971 Convention (n 186) art 18(1).
also empowers the Board with the authority to take various actions against offending States, 
up to and including recommending import/export embargoes.246 
The Board’s mandate under the 1988 Convention is less extensive than in the previous 
treaties, and its technical mandate confined to some limited authority to monitor and 
comment on the control of precursors by States.247 The degree to which its mandate extends 
beyond these explicitly technical matters is the source of some debate in the literature. 
Bewley-Taylor, for example, argues there is ‘no mandate...given to the INCB to monitor 
implementation of the 1988 Convention’,248 while Boister concludes ‘that the INCB does 
have general scrutiny powers in respect to the 1988 Convention in areas in which it is 
competent in other conventions’.249 The latter perspective finds stronger support within the 
convention text itself.  Article 22(1)(a) states that if ‘the Board has reason to believe that the 
aims of this Convention in matters related to its competence are not being met’,250 it is 
mandated to undertake in a variety of communicative measures.  This provision has the effect 
of providing the Board with a mandate to monitor the overall implementation of the treaty’s 
broader provisions on suppressing illicit traffic.251  While the scope and breadth of this 
mandate is be open to debate and interpretation, as is the question of what is and is not within 
the Board’s ‘competence’, the language of Article 22 clearly allows scope for the Board to 
comment on issues beyond purely technical matters.
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2.4.3.3 The Secretariat: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
The final major component of the United Nations drug control machinery is the UN Office on 
Drugs and Crime, housed with in the Secretariat. In 1959, the General Assembly passed a 
resolution establishing ‘a continuing programme of technical assistance in narcotics control 
within the regular budget of the United Nations’.252  This resolution initiated the development 
of formal programme of activities aimed at supporting States, particularly developing 
countries, to meet their international drug control obligations. This effort was expanded in 
1970 with the creation of the United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control, a fund comprised 
of voluntary contributions from Members States and others to support such technical 
assistance activities.253 In 1990, the General Assembly requested that the Secretary-General 
create a single UN drug control programme, to be called the United Nations International 
Drug Control Programme.  This new body would bring together the previously separate 
activities of the United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control, the secretariat of the 
International Narcotics Control Board and the functions of the Division of Narcotic Drugs.254  
This same resolution requested the creation of a new senior UN official at the rank of Under-
Secretary-General to lead the newly amalgamated Programme.255 
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Established in 1997, the Office on Drugs and Crime was created through a merger of the 
United Nations International Drug Control Programme256 and the Crime Prevention and 
Criminal Justice Programme.257 As part of the United Nations Secretariat, the Office was 
‘established to implement the Organization’s drug programme and crime programme in an 
integrated manner’,258 and carries out various activities as directed by the Commission on 
Narcotic Drugs, the Economic and Social Council and the General Assembly. The Office 
‘[s]erves as the central drug control entity with the exclusive responsibility for coordinating 
and providing effective leadership on all United Nations drug control activities’.259  
2.5 Conclusion
This chapter has provided an overview of the historical and normative development of one 
hundred years of international law in the area of drug control, with a particular focus on the 
legal instruments and machinery of the fourth stage United Nations era.  This history reveals 
several unusual features of international drug control law as a legal system, including the 
establishment of treaty obligations for non-Parties, the creation of a mechanism to amend the 
terms of the treaties outside of a Conference of Parties and the near universal ratification of 
the treaty regime as a whole.  This history also illustrates the increasing use of penal 
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sanctions as a tool of drug control, and the use of international law to harmonise a universal 
domestic criminal law approach in the area of drugs.  It also summarised the roles and 
mandates of the three main drug control bodies within the UN system. All of these factors 
and actors influence the emergence of the negative unintended consequences of the drug 
control regime in the UN era, as well as considerations of the development of a fifth stage of 
drug control.  
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Chapter Three - Humanitarian or Stigmatising? - The Contradictory 
Paradigms of International Drug Control
I extend to the Commissioners to-day  assembled my good wishes and conviction that 
their labours will be of the greatest importance towards the general suppression of 
the opium evil throughout the world.260
President Theodore Roosevelt
1909
3.1  Introduction
Writing in 1934 of the League of Nations drug control machinery, Quincy Wright described 
the international treaty regime of the time as representing 'the first attempt at a world plan for 
any economic commodity’.261 Ten years later, another noted commentator described ‘the  
international opium administration’ as ‘one of the most advanced examples of international 
control and cooperation in respect of an article of commerce’.262 However, past and current 
international attitudes towards drugs and drug use inevitably mean that attempts at regulation 
occur in a context markedly different than that of most other economic commodities. Indeed, 
although the controls established in international law during the second and third stages of 
the regime, incorporated into and expanded during the fourth stage, are in many ways dry and 
technical systems of licensing production, estimating need, limiting manufacture and 
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controlling imports and exports, the rationales justifying them have been anything but dry 
and technical.  As discussed in chapter two, the origins of the the anti-opium movement were 
situated in a context of popular agitation against other perceived ‘moral vices’ such as alcohol 
use and ‘white slavery’.263 It is perhaps unsurprising that the subsequent historical 
development of international drug control has been intertwined in a complicated mixture of 
fear and aspiration; of threat and responsibility. It is this mix of apparently conflicting drives 
that form the context for the human rights abuses evident in the fourth stage of drug control, 
and forms the basis of challenges in forging a fifth stage of drug control that remedies or 
prevents these abuses.
In reviewing that past one hundred years of international drug control law, it is clear that 
efforts to control drugs evolve from interplay between two related yet ultimately 
contradictory paradigms.  The first of these is that ‘addiction’ to drugs is considered a form of 
‘evil’, one that constitutes a threat not only to individuals but indeed to the fabric of society 
as a whole. As a result, States have a moral obligation to suppress drugs.  The second 
paradigm is that coordinated international drug control activities, which by definition are 
morally demanded to fight this ‘evil’, represent a collective humanitarian mission by the 
international community, rather than simply an exercise in commodity control or law 
enforcement.  As described by Wright, ‘The international conventions to control the use of 
opium and narcotic drugs have been of interest to the United States...primarily from the 
standpoint of their efficiency in combating an acknowledged evil.’264 The relationship 
between these two paradigms is illustrated in the comments of an Iranian delegate during the 
74
263 Ansley (n 55) 106.
264 Wright, ‘The Narcotics Convention of 1931’ (n 261) 475.
drafting of the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, who stated that ‘drug addiction 
was like a contagious disease: no country could be certain that it would be spared...when a 
country like Iran at great cost prohibited the cultivation of the poppy to abolish that evil, it 
was in fact eliminating a source of danger to the health of the whole world and benefiting all 
mankind’.265  From the perspective of the international drug control regime, these two 
paradigms are not only copasetic, they are in fact mutually reinforcing, flowing logically one 
into the other. Because drug addiction is considered an evil to the individual, and because that 
evil is a risk of spreading throughout societies like a disease, the shared effort to suppress this 
‘contagion’ is not merely a policy objective of an individual government, it is a moral and 
altruistic mission of the world community, one pursued for the greater good and protection of 
humankind. 
However, when considered from the perspective of human rights, the assessment is very 
different, and must take into account the effects on State practice of defining various human 
activities (drug use, cultivation, manufacturing, trafficking, etc.) and, by extension, the people 
who engage in these activities, as being ‘evil’ and comprising an existential threat to the 
greater good.  This is particularly relevant as the basis for the operation of international drug 
control has always been one of indirect control, based around the domestic laws and 
administrative practices of States, with the role of the international regime being to 
standardise and make universal those laws and practices enshrined in the treaties.266 As a 
result, these paradigms create and perpetuate an atmosphere of human rights risk, in which 
the global cause of drug control is framed in a manner whereby abusive practices and policies 
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are not only considered necessary, they are indeed morally justified by the righteousness of 
the end goal itself.  While Wright’s 1934 perspective of the drug control regime as 'the first 
attempt at a world plan for any economic commodity' is illuminating, in the current period it 
must be acknowledged that the ideological underpinnings of this plan are the stigmatisation, 
discrimination and demonisation of certain elements of society, and in many cases of 
individuals who are already vulnerable to exploitation and human rights abuse.  This is the 
challenge facing the development of a fifth stage of drug control.
3.2 The Humanitarian Drive for Drug Control
Although perhaps not obvious in the modern context of the ‘war on drugs’ - and its 
association with policing, incarceration and even military action - multilateral efforts to 
control narcotics have, from the beginning, been framed as a humanitarian mission, rather 
than an exercise in law enforcement or commodity regulation.  This humanitarian paradigm 
has been a consistent feature of the framing of international drug control from the foundation 
of the regime.  For example, during the proceedings of the first International Opium 
Commission in 1909, the global effort to suppress opium were openly described as being the 
contemporary equivalent of the great humanitarian movement of the previous century, that to 
abolish slavery.267 In his closing address to the conference delegates, for example, the  
Commission President, Bishop Charles Brent, stated, 
Just as slavery  reached a point when among its opponents it was no longer a mere 
question of morals or academic theory  but ‘an actual perplexing problem continually 
appearing in every direction and in various forms,’ so has it come to be with the evil 
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before us, and we have, we trust, not wholly failed in carrying the problem a stage 
nearer to its final solution.268
Speaking on behalf of the delegation of the United States, Dr Hamilton Wright described the 
growing international consensus in support of the suppression of opium.
The slavery question agitated the civilised world for a century. No more emotion was 
expended, no greater misconception of facts occurred, no greater stubbornness of 
opinion was shown in the initial stage of the solution of that problem, than has been 
shown in the initial stages of the opium question...During the last few years our 
people have watched with admiration a repetition of history.269
The nobility of the cause of opium suppression found expression in international law three 
years later in the International Opium Convention of 1912, which was drafted to embody in 
law the resolutions emerging from the 1909 Commission.   The convention conceptualised 
drug control as a noble enterprise, and measures of control as tools for promoting the greater 
public good, the preamble describing ‘the gradual suppression of the abuse of opium, 
morphine, and cocaine’ and their derivatives as a ‘humanitarian endeavour’.270  
This humanitarian paradigm also influences the development of the third stage of drug 
control.  The Covenant of the League of Nations, under Article 23(c), invested the League 
with ‘the general supervision over the execution of agreements with regard to the traffic 
in...opium and other dangerous drugs’.271 This clause was inserted at the request of the 
British delegation, and was described by David Hunter Miller, in his definitive 1928 account 
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of the drafting history of the Covenant, as being ‘in the line of extending the humanitarian 
activities of the League’.272  In fact, ‘Humanitarian Activities of the League’ is the 
characterisation Miller uses to describe Article 23 and its subclauses.273 The subsequent drug 
Convention of 1925 similarly describes international cooperation to control the trade in and 
use of narcotics as a ‘humanitarian effort’.274  
This humanitarian framing of drug control is also evident from the foundations of the fourth 
stage United Nations drug control regime. Unlike the Covenant of the League of Nations, the 
Charter of the United Nations does not explicitly reference drug control within its text.  The 
Charter in effect expands the mandate of the League under Article 23 into five related 
articles, 55-60, under Chapter IX on International Economic and Social Cooperation.275 The 
basis for Article 55, which gives the United Nations a mandate to ‘promote...solutions of 
international economic, social, and health related problems’276 originates in the Dumbarton 
Oaks Proposals, which laid the foundational framework for the Charter and served as the 
basis for the drafting debates.  Chapter IX, Section A of the Proposals, entitled ‘Arrangements 
for International Economic and Social Cooperation’, proposed that 
With a view to the creation of conditions of stability  and well-being which are 
necessary  for peaceful and friendly  relations among nations, the Organization should 
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facilitate solutions of international economic, social and other humanitarian 
problems and promote respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.277
The structure of what evolved into the UN drug control regime can be seen in these original 
documents, as Chapter IX proposed the creation of ‘various specialized economic, social and 
other organizations and agencies [that] would have responsibilities in their respective 
fields’.278 These ‘specialized organizations and agencies’ were to be coordinated by, and were 
to report to, an Economic and Social Council under the authority of a General Assembly.279 
One of the first of these new ‘specialized agencies’ to be created by the new United Nations 
was the Commission on Narcotic Drugs.280 Therefore, although not specifically named within 
the text of the Charter, the fourth stage of international drug control clearly continues to 
address drugs within the context of the humanitarian activities of the organisation.
The influence of this humanitarian ethos is more explicit within the work of the United 
Nations drug control bodies themselves. For example, during the first session of the 
Commission on Narcotic Drugs held in Lake Success, New York in 1946, the French delegate 
to the Commission made a rather grand statement to this effect.
Confucius...had advocated the establishment, under the name of the ‘Great Union’ of 
a vast association of peoples who ‘would extend the conception of welfare not  only 
to include all nationals, of which each State was inclined to cherish its own, but also 
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all individuals without distinction.’ Twenty-five centuries had passed. The “Great 
Union” so earnestly  desired by Confucius had been brought into being, not at 
Peking, but at Geneva and later at  Lake Success and now its first care had been to 
fight the scourge of opium which afflicted above all the populations of the Far East. 
The dream of Confucius had thus become a reality.281
During the preliminary drafting stages of the Single Convention of Narcotic Drugs in 1950, 
the UN Secretary-General specifically suggested that the new treaty highlight these same 
principles, asking that ‘[i]f it is decided that the new single convention should have a 
preamble it might refer…to the social and humanitarian motivation of international co-
operation in the field’.282 This humanitarian drive to establish an effective international drug 
control regime was reiterated throughout the 1961 Plenipotentiary Conference that concluded 
the drafting of the Single Convention.  For example, the representative of Lebanon stated 
that, ‘one of the purposes of the United Nations was to achieve international co-operation in 
solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural or humanitarian character; the 
control of narcotic drugs was one of the most important of those problems’.283 Ghana,284 the 
USSR,285 Czechoslovakia286 and the United States287 all made reference to the ‘humanitarian 
purpose’ of the new Convention, while India spoke of the ‘great humanitarian objectives’ of 
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the treaty.288  Bulgaria expressed its belief ‘that the Convention had been drafted on the basis 
of humanitarian principles’289 and that ‘every step towards the elimination of that social evil 
was regarded by [the] government as having great humanitarian importance’.290 The 
representative of Afghanistan noted how that country’s ‘interest in narcotic drugs had…
always been humanitarian rather than commercial’.291 The representative of the Vatican 
expressed that ‘[t]he Holy See, which had always been concerned with the welfare of 
mankind and of civilization, was therefore happy to lend its moral support to the 
humanitarian aims of the Conference’.292 The delegate of the United Arab Republic stated 
that ‘[e]very country was under a moral obligation to make the Convention an effective 
instrument serving the interests of the entire world. On behalf of mankind, therefore, his 
delegation urged all States to give it their full and whole-hearted support.’293  For some 
delegations, the humanitarian imperative driving drug control was so significant as to limit 
national self-interest. China, for example, encouraged others delegations to agree that, ‘[f]or 
humanitarian reasons, every State should be willing to make greater sacrifices of national 
sovereignty and to co-operate more closely with others in preventing the abuse of 
narcotics’.294 Guatemala argued that ‘[p]rogress in the control of narcotic drugs would only 
be made if the international and humanitarian aspects of the problem were given precedence 
81
288 ibid 156.
289 ibid 162.
290 ibid 12.
291 ibid.
292 ibid 216.
293 ibid 6.
294 ibid 13.
over national interests’.295  The humanitarian paradigm evident during the drafting conference 
was eventually reflected in the opening lines of the preamble of the 1961 Single Convention 
on Narcotic Drugs.
The Parties,
Concerned with the health and welfare of mankind,
Recognizing that the medical use of narcotic drugs continues to be indispensable for 
the relief of pain and suffering and that adequate provision must be made to ensure 
the availability of narcotic drugs for such purposes296
When States met again in 1971 to conclude the drafting of the Convention on Psychotropic 
Substances, the second of the three UN drug treaties, this humanitarian purpose was again 
reiterated by some. The USSR noted that its support for international narcotics control 
measures was based on ‘humanitarian reasons’,297 while Mexico noted ‘the humanitarian 
purposes to be served by the proposed international instrument’.298 The preamble to the 
Convention on Psychotropic Substances reaffirms the concern for the health and welfare of 
mankind expressed in the Single Convention, while also ‘[n]oting with concern the public 
health and social problems resulting from the abuse of certain psychotropic substances’.299
3.3 The Concept of ‘Evil’ in International Drug Control Law
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This notion that the international control of drugs was an historic humanitarian mission, 
rather than a technical exercise in commodity control, was made possible only by the second 
paradigm driving the development of the regime: that drugs constitute a form of ‘evil’, and 
that the activities related to their use, cultivation, manufacture and trade constitute a tangible 
threat to health, morality and stability of society.  As stated by Bishop Charles Brent, 
President of the 1909 International Opium Commission, ‘[b]ehind the raw statistics and cold 
sentences of our deliberative language and of most of our resolutions stand the pitiable army 
of moral slaves, in whose behalf we have been labouring in order that they may gain the 
greatest of all gifts - moral freedom’.300 In this context, international efforts to suppress drugs 
become part humanitarian mission, part protective intervention and part moral crusade, all 
underpinned by an international legal framework.  Absent this context of a moral campaign, 
drug control looks a rather uninspiring and technical system of licensing, manufacturing/
import/export controls and law enforcement measures.  The concept of a common 
humanitarian purpose, shared by all countries of the world for the betterment and protection 
of the world community, also had a functional outcome. The sense of shared purpose was 
critical to expanding support for the regime, particularly in the early stages of the 
international system when States, many of which did not themselves have any domestic 
interest or concern in drug issues, were being asked to voluntarily enter a new legal regime 
and submit their domestic systems to international control.  As described by one League of 
Nations official, as ‘the drug smuggler has no respect for national frontiers...only concerted 
international action could bring any hope of eradicating drug smuggling or reducing it to a 
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minimum and thereby gradually eliminating drug addiction as a social evil’.301  In 1950, the 
United Nations Bulletin of Narcotics described
the close interdependence of nations and the need of their association for the 
accomplishment of an object of importance to each one of them separately, and 
therefore to all of them as a group. It is because no one country could protect itself 
against the evils of addiction that they found it necessary  to associate themselves in 
limiting the spread of a habit  which all regarded as an evil. There was thus the strong 
motive of a national interest which moved the governments and which has held them 
together in the fight against one of the great curses of the human race.302
A particularly insightful perspective in this regard is offered by May, who observed in 1951 
that ‘the national interest of the various countries in the maintenance of international control 
of narcotic drugs is not equally strong’.303 As a result, the sense of shared common purpose 
was critical to the maintenance of the regime. 
There is a definite danger that if an organization separate from the United Nations 
were charged with such control a considerable number of countries might fail to join 
it. The cooperation of states which believe that they have a comparatively minor 
interest in narcotic drugs, can, however, be secured within the framework of the 
United Nations if this Organization is charged with the campaign against the drug 
evil. It is, therefore, vital that international control of narcotic drugs be entrusted not 
to a separate organization but to a general international organization such as the 
United Nations, representing mankind as a whole.304
In her review of anti-narcotic campaigns in the United States between 1920—1940, Susan 
Speaker finds that the characterisation of drugs as an ‘evil’, a ‘menace’ or a threat was 
standard fare within the propaganda of the U.S. anti-drugs movement of the period.  
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According to Speaker, ‘After about 1918...these negative images expanded enormously: drug 
use was increasing characterized…as a monstrous, immensely powerful, civilization-
threatening evil, perhaps the worst menace in all history.’305 She continues,
During the 1920s and 1930s, newspaper and magazine accounts of the ‘narcotics 
problem’…consistently used the same stock images and ideas to construct an 
intensely fearful rhetoric about drugs. Authors routinely  described drugs, users, and 
sellers as ‘evil’ and often implied that there was a sinister conspiracy at  work to 
undermine American society  and values through drug addiction....According to most 
of these accounts, addiction was spreading rapidly and would soon engulf the 
country...Such was the danger to civilization that there could be no compromise 
measures: drug use and drug trafficking would have to be completely eradicated, no 
matter what it cost or how long it took.306
While the use of such ‘apocalyptic’ language, to use Speaker’s assessment,307 is perhaps 
understandable and expected within the realm of social or political agitation, it becomes of 
more serious concern when that same language moves outside of popular media and anti-
drugs campaigning literature, and becomes reflected in broader discourse. However, this is 
precisely the case with drugs, and the use of this type of language was common in the 
professional legal and medical literature of the time.  A 1909 article in the American Journal 
of International Law, for example, described the ‘widespread evil’ of opium smoking,308 and 
a 1911 editorial in that same journal welcoming the second International Opium Conference 
stated:
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It may  be said that there is no such thing as an evil wholly national in its incidence. 
Where an evil appears amongst one people, it is generally the reflex or concomitant 
of a similar evil amongst other peoples. This being so, few evils can be eradicated by 
national action alone. National action may be incentive, but finally  there must be 
international action. The suppression of the opium and allied evils has on these 
principles been raised from the plane of sporadic national effort to the higher and 
more certain ground of international cooperation. The honor roll of international 
action for the settlement of the opium and allied problems is as follows: America, 
Austria-Hungary, China, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, 
Persia, Portugal, Russia and Siam.309  (n.b. the thirteen countries at the first 
International Opium Convention in 1909)
The medical literature of the era was also rife with similar characterisations. The British 
Medical Journal, for example, published many articles describing drugs, drug use or drug 
trafficking as ‘evil’ in the 1920s and 1930s.310
Apocalyptic language and provocative analogies about drugs are also evident in the work of 
some modern legal scholars. Professor Yehuda Z Blum, for example, in his comparative 
analysis of extradition for terrorism and drug trafficking, includes drug offences among those 
categories of crimes that ‘represent an attempt…to subvert the existing social order’. These 
crimes ‘are aimed at the fundamental human rights of life and liberty of a person, as well as 
his physical integrity. As such, they must be viewed as violating not only the domestic laws 
of the target State but also as being directed against mankind in general’.311 Blum therefore 
argues that drug crimes constitute delicta juris gentium. In a similar vein, Professor Cherif 
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Bassiouni has proposed, in discussing codification of international offences, that ‘drug 
offences’ should be included in the same category of ‘seriousness’ as slavery and slave-
related practices, torture, unlawful human experimentation, aircraft hijacking, taking of 
civilian hostages and theft of nuclear weapons.312
The language of drugs as ‘evil’ can be found in the the discourse of States in the early stages 
of fashioning domestic approaches to drug control. For example, an Imperial Decree of the 
Chinese Government published in the Peking Gazette on 6 September 1906 stated
The opium smoker wastes time and neglects work, ruins his health, and impoverishes 
his family, and the poverty and weakness which for the past  few decades have been 
daily increasing amongst us are undoubtedly attributable to this cause. To speak of 
this arouses our indignation, and, at a moment when we are striving to strengthen the 
Empire, it behooves us to admonish the people, that all may realize the necessity of 
freeing themselves from these coils, and thus pass from sickness into health. 
It is hereby commanded that within a period of ten years the evils arising from 
foreign and native opium be equally and completely eradicated.313
In China, the language of evil moved quickly from the realm of political pronouncement to 
the realm of domestic law when Article 1 of the eleven measures published in November of 
that same year to implement this edict described its objective as being, ‘[t]o restrict the 
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cultivation of the poppy in order to remove the root of the evil’.314 A Second Imperial Decree 
issued in February 1907 similarly noted that ‘it is even more necessary to forbid the 
cultivation of the poppy, in order to sweep away the source of evil’.315 In September 1908, 
the King of Siam declared it to be ‘unquestionable that opium had an evil effect upon its 
consumers and casts degradation upon every country where the inhabitants are largely 
addicted to the habit of opium smoking. There is no reason to doubt that the most earnest 
desire of nearly every country in the world is to suppress this noxious habit.’316
This language is omnipresent in the work of international drug control organs, and within the 
drafting of international instruments, dating back to the first International Opium 
Commission when a telegram from U.S. President Theodore Roosevelt extended to delegates 
‘my good wishes and conviction that their labours will be of the greatest importance towards 
the general suppression of the the opium evil throughout the world’.317 Throughout the 
official record of the Commission’s work, the characterisation of opium as an ‘evil’ features 
regularly among the statements of various delegations,318 although this language is not 
ultimately reflected in the resolutions that emerged from the meeting.  The codification of 
this language in law would not occur until drug control’s fourth stage.
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3.4 The Legacy of Language on Law: ‘Evil’ and the Fourth Stage  of 
Drug Control
It would be tempting to dismiss such use of language as a relic of a previous time, and not 
relevant to the modern era where medical knowledge of drugs and drug use is advanced, and 
international law in this realm exists on a contemporary footing.  However, to do so would 
ignore the legacy of such language in the historical development of international drug control 
law, its currency in the modern legal regime and its continuing influence on the human rights 
violations occurring in this fourth stage.  Indeed, one of the main justifications for punitive, 
prohibitionist policies towards drugs - including strict enforcement measures and severe 
punishments - has been on the ‘moral’ grounds319 that drug use is intrinsically wrong, 
evidence of moral inadequacy and should therefore be harshly penalised.320 From this context  
emerges the discourse that is now common to the drugs debate around the world, where 
pronouncements are made about the ‘social evil caused by drug trafficking’321 and the ‘global 
menace’ of the drug trade.322 Persons involved in the drug trade are ‘merchants of death’,323 
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‘engineers of evil’324 or ‘peddlers of death’.325 In a major address on drugs in June 2014, 
Pope Francis stated that ‘[d]rug addiction is an evil, and with evil there can be no yielding or 
compromise’.326
As is evident from Pope Francis’s comments, the end of the League of Nations did not mean 
an end to the morality-based paradigm of drug control, and the language of drugs as ‘evil’ 
common to the second and third stages of drug control also carries over into the fourth. Such 
language is evident in the very first session of the UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs in 
1946, which was presented with a resolution of the United States Congress speaking of 
‘freeing the world of an age-old evil’, noting that ‘the only effective way to suppress the 
demoralizing use of opium and its derivatives (heroin, morphine, and so forth) was to control 
the source of the evil by limiting cultivation of the poppy plant’.327 Speaking at 
Commission’s second session, the Chairman noted that ‘addicts derived real pleasure from 
inducing others to follow the same vice; in this way they increased the number of their 
potential sources of supply. A criminal addict was no more useful to the community than a 
case of smallpox.’328 The third session of the Commission in 1948 went so far as to agree a 
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resolution to the Economic and Social Council stating ‘that narcotic drugs constituted, and 
may constitute in the future, a powerful instrument of the most hideous crime against 
mankind’ and urging the Council to ‘ensure that the use of narcotics as an instrument of 
committing a crime of this nature be covered by the proposed Convention on the prevention 
and punishment of genocide’.329 This attempt by a UN drug control body to have drug 
offences codified alongside the most heinous of international crimes was seen again half a 
century later in 1996, when the International Narcotics Control Board urged the inclusion of 
drug trafficking within the remit of the International Criminal Court.330 The language of 
‘evil’ remains a common feature of drug policy political discourse within the Commission on 
Narcotic Drugs in the 21st century.331 
While the characterisation of drugs as ‘evil’ has been omnipresent throughout the era of 
international drug control at a rhetorical level, the fourth stage of drug control is unique and 
significant for the fact that it is within the United Nations period that the language of evil 
moves from the realm of political discourse or newspaper editorial to that of codification 
within the core international legal instrument.  The preamble of the 1961 Single Convention 
on Narcotic Drugs reads,
91
329 UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs, ‘Summary Records of the Third Session 
Lake Success New York, 3-22 May 1948’ (16 February 1949) UN Doc No E/CN.
7/155, 161.
330 International Narcotics Control Board, ‘Report of the International Narcotics 
Control Board for 1996’ (1997) UN Doc E/INCB/1996/1, para 14.
331 See, for example, Antonio Maria Costa, ‘Speech by Antonio Maria Costa, 
Executive Director of UNODC, to the 50th Session of the Commission on Narcotic 
Drugs, Vienna’ (12 March 2007).; Zhanat Suleimenov, ‘Statement by Mr. Zhanat 
Suleimenov, Chairman of the Anti-Drugs Control Committee of the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs of Kazakhstan, at the high-level segment of the Fifty-Second Session 
of the UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs’ (11 March 2009), 2.
Recognizing that addiction to narcotic drugs constitutes a serious evil for the 
individual and is fraught with social and economic danger to mankind,
Conscious of their duty to prevent and combat this evil,
Considering that effective measures against abuse of narcotic drugs require co-
ordinated and universal action332
In the context of international treaty law, this wording is notable for a number of reasons, all 
of which have the effect of undermining, if not outright conflicting with, the parallel 
humanitarian aspirations of the regime. Whatever the intended appeal to a greater 
humanitarian mission expressed in the Single Convention’s opening line, ‘Concerned with 
the health and welfare of mankind’, such sentiments are compromised, if not negated, by 
those describing ‘addiction to narcotic drugs’ as a form of ‘evil’. As the international drug 
control regime necessarily regulates human activities - whether those be drug production, 
manufacturing, cultivation, trafficking, selling/purchase or use - the Single Convention 
labels, by extension, those who engage in these activities as being, if not evil themselves, 
then at least purveyors of evil deeds or collaborators in the threat drugs pose to States.   It is 
useful here to consider Conor Gearty’s thoughts on the use of similar language in the context 
of the ‘war on terror’, where human rights violations also occur in the name of, and are often 
justified by, the drive to suppress an existential ‘evil’ or ‘threat’. In assessing the negative 
impact of anti-terrorism rhetoric on public and political discourse, Gearty notes,
There are many things worryingly wrong about this perspective when viewed 
through a human rights lens. First, it reintroduces into international affairs the 
language of evil, when one of the primary achievements of the international legal 
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order has been to remove such tendentious and highly inflammatory  absolutist talk 
from the conduct of nation states.333
 
However, in the context of drug control, the international legal order, rather than ‘remov[ing] 
such tendentious and highly inflammatory absolutist talk’, actually enshrines it within the 
core international instrument.  The use of such language, as Gearty notes, is highly unusual, 
and the unique nature of its use is particularly glaring when considered alongside other 
treaties addressing matters that the international community considers abhorrent.  For 
example, neither slavery,334 apartheid335 nor torture336 are described as being ‘evil’ in the 
relevant international conventions that prohibit them. Nuclear war is not described as being 
‘evil’ in the treaty that seeks to limit the proliferation of atomic weapons, despite the 
recognition in the preamble that ‘devastation that would be visited upon all mankind’ by such 
a conflict.337  The closest one finds to the language contained in the preamble to the Single 
Convention to describe drugs is that found in international instruments in the context of 
genocide. For example, in describing the crimes committed during the Second World War, the 
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Universal Declaration of Human Rights uses the term ‘barbarous acts’,338 while the Genocide 
Convention uses the term ‘odious scourge’.339
The framing of drugs in this manner is not without broader legal impacts, and is found 
replicated in the reasoning of domestic constitutional courts, and even international human 
rights mechanisms, the bodies charged with upholding and defending the rights of individuals 
against the State. For example, drugs have been characterised as a ‘social evil’340 by the 
Supreme Court of Singapore.  Persons involved in the drug trade have been described as 
‘engineers of evil’ by the former Chief Justice of the Malaysian Supreme Court.341 The House 
of Lords in Great Britain has characterised drug trafficking as a ‘notorious social evil’342 and 
the Irish High Court has described ‘the growing evil associated with drug dealing’.343  In a 
2006 speech, the then Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of India stated 
Drug abuse is a social evil...Just as any virus, use of drugs and drug trafficking 
knows no bonds or limitations.  It spreads all over a country; from nation to nation; 
to the entire globe infecting every civilized society irrespective of caste, creed, 
culture and the geographical location.344 
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Even the European Court of Human Rights has talked of ‘the scourge of drug trafficking’.345
The presence of such ‘tendentious and highly inflammatory absolutist talk’, to use Gearty’s 
phrase, within discourse of both UN drug control bodies as well as domestic courts is not 
only worrying, but contributes to an environment in which human rights violations in the 
name of drug control flourish.  It can be argued that this rhetoric of ‘evil’ goes so far as to 
provide ideological justification for, and defence of, such abuses.  As noted by Room, it is 
this language of drugs as ‘evil’ that ‘serves as a justification of the…Convention regime of 
control and coercion’.346
In addition to enshrining drugs as evil within its core international instrument,  a second 
element observed in the fourth stage of drug control, one again with an impact on the human 
rights environment, is the evolution of the notion of drugs as ‘evil’ to drugs as ‘threat’.  As 
discussed earlier, the concept of drug use as a threat to the individual and the fabric of society 
has always been a component of what one might call the ‘morality-based’ paradigm of the 
regime.  As noted by Speaker, at the birth of the League of Nations era ‘negative images 
expanded enormously: drug use was increasingly characterized as not just a serious medical 
or social problem, but as a monstrous, immensely powerful, civilization-threatening evil, 
perhaps the worst menace in all history’.347 During the drafting of the 1961 Single 
Convention, Harry J Anslinger, chairman of the U.S. delegation, notably stated that 
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‘[n]arcotic drugs have taken more lives than hydrogen bombs ever would’, a statement to 
which one observer noted  ‘[n]one of the other 72 delegations in the meeting voiced any 
exception’.348  However, from the early 1970s onwards, it is possible to observe a tangible 
shift in the emphasis of the language UN system, with a decreasing emphasis on drugs as a 
moral or subversive ‘evil’, which dominated the discourse in the second and third stages of 
drug control, to an emphasis on drugs as a real and present danger to the State and the 
international community as a whole, one that if not suppressed vigorously threatens the future 
of humankind.  The political context for this shift was the U.S.-driven ‘war on drugs’, 
announced by President Richard Nixon in 1969.349  The U.S. has always been a leading force 
driving international drug control, dating back to the beginnings of the regime when the 
Opium Commissions of 1909 and 1912 were convened at the urging of the United States.350 
However, under the new ‘war on drugs’ approach, the United States, ‘sceptical about the 
international community’s willingness and ability to implement strict drug prohibition’,351 
took an increasing active unilateral role in pressing a supply reduction and law enforcement-
centred approach to drug control, through actions including financial support and training to 
foreign States and the concluding of thirty bilateral treaties on drug control.352  As described 
by Boister, this U.S.-led agenda influenced the UN to follow a similar approach, if for no 
other reason than the desire of many States to try and reign in the unilateral actions of the 
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United States.353 As a result, ‘[t]he UN was the agent for the transformation of this new 
approach into general international consciousness’.354
This transformation is apparent when reviewing the work of the UN General Assembly. Prior 
to 1970, language typically adopted in General Assembly resolutions on drug control tended 
to be of a more technical and less rhetorical nature. However, beginning around 1970 there is 
a noticeable shift. For example, General Assembly resolutions passed in 1970 state that ‘on 
the whole addicts in all countries constitute a danger to society at large’355 and note ‘with 
grave concern the spread of drug abuse in many parts of the world and its disastrous impact 
on individuals and nations’;356  in 1971 ‘that the abuse of dependence-producing drugs 
represents an especially serious threat to the youth of the world’;357 in 1972 that drugs 
represent a ‘threat to human dignity and society’;358 in 1974 that ‘the abuse and illicit traffic 
in narcotic drugs has transcended national boundaries and affect the well-being and health of 
mankind as a whole...[and] that the misuse of narcotic and psychotropic substances presents 
an actual as well as a potential danger to the health and future of mankind’;359 and in 1975 
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‘the growing threat caused by the spread of drug abuse in certain parts of the world’360 and 
‘the continuing serious menace of drug abuse’.361  Although such language would seem 
commonplace today, viewed in its historical context these early 1970s resolutions 
demonstrate a subtle shift in the paradigm, one which would become more extreme over the 
following decade.  
UN General Assembly Resolution 32/124, adopted in 1977, was the first detailed example of 
the lengths to which the shift to a threat-based paradigm had progressed, and an indication of 
where it would develop in the future.  Rather than individual references to danger, as was 
evidenced in the resolutions noted above, Resolution 32/124 describes a worldview in which 
drugs are a central menace threatening all aspects of society.  
Recognizing the growing threat  caused by  the spread of drug abuse in many  parts of 
the world, the impact of this situation on social and economic development, 
agriculture and many other areas, and the resultant increase in crime and corruption,
Aware that drug abuse has serious adverse effects on the quality of life of individuals 
and upon the societies in which they live,
Concerned by the fact that drug trafficking exploits every individual with which it 
comes into contact, 
Realizing that  the concerted effort of States is required in dealing with this problem, 
and that the international effort in this respect should be strengthened,
...
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Recognizing the urgent need to make individuals and Governments more aware of 
the dangers of drug abuse and the need for increased attention in the field of 
prevention, treatment and rehabilitation362
To examine the content of this resolution in its constituent parts, the first two sentences paint 
drugs as a threat to social and economic development, agriculture and the environment, 
community safety and good governance, the life and health of individuals and the fabric of 
society. Sentence three characterises this threat as being contagious, affecting ‘every 
individual with which it comes into contact’.  Importantly for the threat-based paradigm, 
sentence four indicates the need for ‘strengthened’ international efforts, while sentence five 
highlights ‘the urgent need to make individuals and Governments more aware of the dangers 
of drug abuse’. Taken together, these sentences suggest an international response that is 
insufficiently robust, and an international community that is largely blind to, and therefore 
vulnerable from, the menace confronting it.  In essence, the resolution describes a threat that 
is growing and spreading, that threatens essentially every aspect of life and society, to which 
the international response is insufficient, and States not properly aware of the danger facing 
them.  In 1998, this threat based paradigm would find ultimate expression in the opening 
preamble of the UN Political Declaration on the world drug problem.
Drugs destroy lives and communities, undermine sustainable human development 
and generate crime. Drugs affect all sectors of society in all countries; in particular, 
drug abuse affects the freedom and development of young people, the world’s most 
valuable asset. Drugs are a grave threat to the health and well-being of all mankind, 
the independence of States, democracy, the stability of nations, the structure of all 
societies, and the dignity and hope of millions of people and their families.363
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In 2012, the annual General Assembly resolution on ‘International cooperation against the 
world drug problem’ stated that ‘the world drug problem continues to constitute a serious 
threat to public health and safety and  the well-being of humanity...and to the national 
security and sovereignty of States’.364  In the contemporary context, the only area of 
international concern in which language approximates this is found in the context of the ‘war 
on terror’. Consider, for example, the language of the 1998 Political Declaration mirrors that 
found in UN Security Council Resolution 1377 in 2001, which ‘[u]nderlines that acts of 
terrorism endanger innocent lives and the dignity and security of human beings everywhere, 
threaten the social and economic development of all States and undermine global stability 
and prosperity’,365 or that of the Council of Europe in 2002, that ‘terrorism seriously 
jeopardises human rights, threatens democracy, and aims notably to destabilise legitimately 
constituted governments and to undermine pluralistic civil society’.366 Given this parallel, 
Gearty’s work on terrorism and human rights again provides useful insights when considering 
the impact of such a threat-based approach to public policy-making. 
[T]his approach asserts that the danger facing our democracies and our culture of 
human rights is so great, so evil that we are entitled, indeed morally obliged, to fight 
back, and that in defending ourselves in this way it may  well be that we ourselves 
have to commit evil acts, to commit harms that run counter to our fundamental 
principles, but  that these actions are nevertheless justified, both as necessary (to save 
ourselves) and as less evil than what our opponents do.367
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Although writing in the context of terrorism, Gearty’s analysis slips easily into a discussion 
of international drug control, where the ‘evil threat’ posed by drugs is similarly a driving 
rationale for the international response, and the use of extreme measures in waging that 
response.  For example, in 2006 Malaysian Prime Minister Datuk Seri Abdullah Ahmad 
Badawi defended the use of death penalty for drug offences because it was the ‘right kind of 
punishment’ given the menace that drugs pose to society.368  
3.5  Conclusion
When considering a framework for the development of a fifth stage of drug control, 
unpacking the implications of this evolution is critical, as the reality, or perhaps the 
unintended consequence, of the UN era is that the two historical paradigms that have driven 
drug control have gone from being mutually reinforcing to being in open conflict. At the 
heart of this conflict is human rights. As Boister writes, ‘most commentators ignore the fact 
that the drug conventions fail to adequately protect the human rights of those individuals 
subject to the system, whether they are offenders, alleged offenders or innocent third 
parties’.369  However, as this chapter has illustrated, the drug control regime not only fails to 
fulfil a protective human rights function, it contributes to a political and legal environment 
that heightens human rights risk, and leads to human rights violations.
Although the similarities explored above between the discourse on drug control and that on 
terrorism are illuminating, there is at least one clear point difference in the approach that is 
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relevant in this context.  From the very early years of the most recent ‘war on terror’ post 11 
September 2001, the international community has recognised and understood the risk that the 
threat-based paradigm poses to human rights.  Beginning in 2003, the General Assembly has 
adopted a resolution each year on the ‘Protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms 
while countering terrorism’, stating in its preambular section that the General Assembly 
‘[d]eeply deplor[es] the occurrence of violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms 
in the context of the fight against terrorism, as well as violations of international refugee and 
humanitarian law’, and that ‘all measures used in the fight against terrorism...must be in 
compliance with obligations of States under international law, including international human 
rights, refugee and humanitarian law’.370 The resolution continues in its operational 
paragraphs to urge States to comply with human rights obligations in specific areas including 
the right not to be subjected to torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment;371 the rights of persons deprived of liberty;372 the rights of due process;373 the 
right to privacy;374 the protection of economic, social and cultural rights;375 and non-
refoulement.376 
When the threat of drugs is painted in the type of extreme terms described above, a threat not 
only to the individual but to the nation itself, it creates an atmosphere where the risk of 
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abusive measures against people involved in these activities is heightened.  As described by 
Boister, ‘the drug conventions...provide a broad framework and introduce a no-holds-barred 
ethos into domestic drug control’.377 The paradigm that paints drug suppression as a 
collective campaign against an evil threat has had the effect of creating a legal and policy 
environment in which millions of people worldwide are stigmatised and criminalised, and 
their vulnerability to both health problems and human rights abuses increased as a 
consequence. It has served to justify the application of abusive laws and policies, and the 
imposition of severe penalties, resulting in the incarceration of millions of people for drug 
offences,378 often in overcrowded and inhumane conditions, and the execution of perhaps one 
thousand people annually for drug crimes.379   Although the violations identified in the 
General Assembly resolution human rights and terrorism have been documented in the 
context of drug control, there has yet to be a similar resolution on protecting human rights 
and fundamental freedoms while countering drugs. 
Although the threat-based discourse used in drug policy and terrorism is similar, there is still 
little official recognition of the human rights impacts of this in the area of drug control. Such 
negative human rights outcomes cannot be considered anything other than a direct 
contradiction to the historical claim to a humanitarian basis of the international drug control 
project. Indeed, it is fair to say that in the modern reality of efforts to suppress drugs, the 
threat paradigm has become the sole driving force behind the regime, to the point that few 
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would imagine that an expressly humanitarian paradigm exists in the regime at all.  
Developing a framework for a fifth stage of drug control can only occur if this situation is 
reversed, and promoting ‘the health and welfare of mankind’ becomes the engine of drug 
policy, to the extent that the moralistic paradigm of ‘evil’ is abandoned as an historical 
curiosity.
104
Chapter Four  - Drug Control and Human Rights: 
Tensions and Conflicts between Regimes
4.1 Introduction
The previous chapter explored the historic internal tensions peculiar to the development of 
international drug control law: the competing drive to pursue humanitarian objectives on the 
one hand, while viewing drug use and the drug trade as an ‘evil’ to be suppressed and 
eradicated on the other hand.  During the United Nations era, the inherent strains between 
these two moral and philosophical concepts have been amplified, in both law and in practice, 
in the engagement between international drug control law and international human rights law.  
As mentioned previously, there are three key elements of the fourth stage, United Nations era, 
of drug control that differentiate it from its predecessors. The first is the increased use of 
penal sanctions as a tool of drug suppression.  As described by Bewley-Taylor, 
While the pre-1961 foundational treaties were in essence ‘restrictive commodity 
agreements’, the Single Convention [on Narcotic Drugs] was a stricter and wider-
ranging multilateral instrument which, although still addressing the concerns of its 
predecessors, became more prohibitionist in tenor; including an increased focus upon 
individual drug users.380 
The second element is the near universal ratification of the core drug control instruments. 
While the pre-United Nations drug control regime was characterised by a patchwork of 
treaties and numbers of States Parties to them, the modern conventions have achieved near 
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unanimous support, resulting in this penal-focussed approach to drug control being 
incorporated into domestic law in almost every country of the world.  The increasingly 
punitive nature of drug control has contributed to what the United Nations Office on Drugs 
and Crime calls the negative ‘unintended consequences’ of the regime. As described in a 
2008 report from its Executive Director, ‘[l]ooking back over the last century, we can see that  
the control system and its application have had several unintended consequences – they may 
or may not have been unexpected, but they were certainly unintended’.381  The unintended 
consequences identified by the Executive Director include the creation of ‘a huge criminal 
black market’, the prioritising of law enforcement in government policy and expenditure at 
the expense of public health and the destabilising effects of the drug trade on producer and 
transit countries.382  The notion that there are unintended negative consequences resulting 
from punitive approaches to drug control is not a new one.  Writing of the domestic situation 
in the United States almost fifty years earlier, Makowski observed,
It is evident...that present controls leave much to be desired. International attempts 
have failed to stifle illicit drug traffic at its sources. In spite of severe penalties and 
spirited enforcement existing domestic policies have failed to weaken a billion-dollar 
American black market in drugs. Narcotism in America remains an embarrassing 
social problem. This dark state of affairs has cast doubt not only upon present 
legislation but also upon the entire fabric of concepts and attitudes which gave rise to 
it...Severe penalties where the addict  has no legal access to drugs merely  elevates 
black market prices rendering it impossible for him to alleviate his suffering by 
lawful means. Such penalties even where rendered fall heavily only upon ‘pushers’ 
and other unimportant violators many  of whom are addicts themselves driven to such 
employment by the high cost of drugs...Incarceration of addicts has proved entirely 
without merit.383
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The third element differentiating the fourth stage of drug control from those that came before 
is that the modern legal instruments developed in parallel to an increasingly robust system of 
international human rights treaty law. This international legal terrain has led to another 
negative unintended consequence of the fourth stage of international drug control, one 
alluded to by Makowski, namely the multiple human rights violations documented around the 
world occurring as a result of drug enforcement efforts. In many cases, these human rights 
violations are excused or justified on the basis that the abusive policies or practices are 
supported under international drug control law, or are implemented as part of fulfilling drug 
treaty obligations. This has created, in effect, a situation where one branch of international 
law is used as a rationale to ignore or erode the effect of another - the phenomenon of 
‘parallel universes’ described by Paul Hunt.  
This chapter will explore the engagement between these two legal regimes, and the negative 
human rights consequences that often emerge as a result of the parallel universes. It is not 
intended as a comprehensive listing of the multiple areas in which human rights are affected 
by drug control, nor an exhaustive treatment of any one particular issue. Rather, the purpose 
is to illustrate the often strained nature of the relationship between these two legal regimes, 
highlighting examples of tensions and conflicts within this broader field of concern.  In doing 
so, this chapter will lay the foundations for a later discussion of treaty interpretation, and the 
development of an approach that bridges the parallel universes in a manner that ensures 
protection and fulfillment of human rights.
4.2 Historical Tensions in the Fourth Stage
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In February 1946, the First Session on the UN General Assembly was held in London.  On 
the agenda during that inaugural meeting of the UN’s highest policy-making body was the 
question of the new organisation’s relationship with Spain.  While the defeat of the Axis 
powers less than twelve months earlier had precipitated the fall of fascist regimes across 
Europe, the government of General Franco was an anomaly. Franco had seized power in 
Spain some ten years earlier in a military coup, overthrowing a democratically elected 
civilian government, and throwing the country into civil war. Franco’s victory in the civil war 
was in no small way attributable to the assistance of both Hitler’s Germany and Mussolini’s 
Italy.  Franco, in turn, was an active supporter of the Axis powers during World War II, 
although, unlike in Germany and Italy, the Allied victory did not result in toppling his regime. 
At the very first session of the UN General Assembly, Panama put forward a resolution 
proposing that the UN and its Member States have no relations with General Franco’s 
government, and neither diplomatically recognise nor support the regime.384 The Panamanian 
proposal was based upon positions agreed at the Potsdam Conference at the end of World 
War II, and at the San Francisco Conference that led to the drafting of the Charter of the 
United Nations.385  At those meetings, it was agreed that membership ‘cannot apply to States 
whose regimes have been installed with the help of armed forces of countries which have 
fought against the United Nations, so long as these regimes are in power’.386 As explained by 
the delegate of Panama in proposing the resolution, ‘all the members of the San Francisco 
108
384 UN General Assembly, ‘Relations of Members of the United Nations with 
Spain’ (12 December 1946) UN Doc No A/RES/39(I).
385 ibid para 1.
386 Official Records of the First Part of the First Section of the General Assembly, 
Plenary Meetings of the General Assembly Verbatim Record (10 January—14 
February 1946), para 352. (Official Records: First Section).
Conference who approved this resolution had in mind exactly the country to which it really 
was referring; that is, the regime now in power in Spain’.387 The resolution specifically 
recommended that Franco’s Spain be ‘debarred from membership in international agencies 
established by or brought into relationship with the United Nations’. It further recommended 
that it be banned from ‘participation in conferences or other activities which may be arranged 
by the United Nations or by these agencies’.388
The Panamanian resolution received wide support from other Member States.  Speaking in 
support of the resolution, the delegation of Czechoslovakia noted that ‘[t]he United Nations 
are met in London to lay the foundations of a just and democratic world order’. Franco’s 
regime ‘came into power through crimes against humanity and justice, such are to-day on 
trial in Nuremberg’.389 The delegate continued,  ‘[n]either democracy in Czechoslovakia, nor 
the democratic system in any other countries, can consider itself safe so long as, even in a far 
distant country, the fact of being a democrat means prison or the concentration camp.  Not 
only is peace indivisible, but liberty and democracy too.’390 The delegation of Mexico 
expressed its belief that the Franco regime should ‘not be granted, by this Organization nor 
by any one of our countries, the international status of a government representing the Spanish 
nation. Our only demand is that we should refrain from having diplomatic relations with a 
spurious regime.’391 Uruguay stated that ‘if we are not to be in flagrant opposition to the 
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origins and purposes of our Organization…this resolution should be carried with the whole-
hearted and unanimous support of the Assembly’.392 The Byelorussian Soviet Socialist 
Republic concurred, stating that the people of Spain were ‘still under the yoke of a 
dictatorship’.393 According to the Byelorussian delegate, ‘[t]hat situation is like a nightmare. 
There is terror; there is bloodshed; there are no laws.  This is entirely in contradiction with 
the principles adopted by the United Nations…The Franco regime must not enjoy any help or 
support whatever from the States Members of the United Nations.’394  Other governments 
speaking in support of the resolution included France, Norway, Venezuela, Yugoslavia and 
the United Kingdom.  When put to the General Assembly for a decision, the resolution was 
passed by a vote of forty-six to two.395  
Just over six months after the General Assembly’s decision that the newly formed United 
Nations would neither recognise nor have diplomatic relations with fascist Spain, the UN 
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) convened its Third Session in Lake Success, New 
York.  At its ninth meeting on 26 September 1946, ECOSOC members heard a report from 
the Drafting Committee on Narcotic Drugs. The Committee had been tasked by ECOSOC 
and the General Assembly to draft a new protocol that would ‘transfer to the United Nations 
the activities, powers and functions formerly exercised by the League of Nations in the field 
of narcotics control’.396  At this meeting, the question of UN relations with Spain was again 
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on the agenda for debate. At issue was a proposal put forward jointly by the governments of 
China, Czechoslovakia and the USSR that the new protocol on drug control include a clause 
which would have the effect of excluding Franco’s Spain from being invited to become a 
party to the new narcotics treaty, this based upon the resolution of the General Assembly in 
February and the previous decisions made at Potsdam and at the San Francisco Conference.  
According to the Soviet delegate who presented the proposal, ‘to invite Franco to sign the 
Protocol would be contrary to the decisions taken regarding Spain’.397
Despite the clear direction from the General Assembly that the UN and its Member States 
should neither recognise nor engage with the fascist regime in Spain, the proposed clause to 
the new drugs protocol provoked surprising debate among ECOSOC members.  For some, 
the crimes of the Spanish regime and the resulting General Assembly decision should not 
prevent the UN from embracing Franco when it came to matters of narcotics control.   The 
United Kingdom, which had spoken in favour of the General Assembly resolution seven 
months earlier, ‘did not want to exclude Franco from the Protocol’, arguing that to prevent 
Spain from becoming a party to the Protocol ‘could only weaken the international [drug] 
control system’.398  Canada, which had also voted in favour of the General Assembly 
resolution excluding Spain, reasoned that the objective of narcotics control demanded a 
different approach.  According to the Official Records of the session,
As regards Spain, the representative of Canada realized that the advantages and 
privileges of the United Nations should not be accorded to a nation which was not 
qualified to enter the Organization, but found it difficult to exclude a signatory  to the 
[drug] Conventions from control, whoever he might be.  In [Canadian delegate] Mr. 
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Martin’s opinion, no political problem was involved in this case, and he therefore 
declared himself against the exclusion of Spain.399
Other States argued in favour of the exclusion clause.  Czechoslovakia, one of the proposal’s 
co-sponsors, stated simply that ‘[t]he principle of entertaining no relations with Franco had 
been admitted.  To accept the participation of the Franco Government in the Protocol would 
mean denying that principle.’400  Similarly, Chile ‘was in favour of excluding Franco Spain 
on the basis of the attitude adopted at San Francisco and London’.401  The Ukrainian Soviet 
Socialist Republic argued that ‘if the Secretary-General sent an invitation to Franco in order 
to settle any problem whatever, it would be tantamount to recognizing Franco’s signature’.402 
Therefore, Spain should be excluded from the protocol. In the end, the proposal to exclude 
Franco’s Spain was adopted by ECOSOC.  Only the United Kingdom voted against the 
proposal.  Five others – Canada, Colombia, France, Greece and Peru – abstained from the 
vote.403 Interestingly, all six of these countries had voted in favour of the General Assembly 
resolution against UN engagement with Franco earlier that same year.404 
This history is interesting not only for the light it sheds on the politics of international 
relations in the months following the end of the Second World War, and the emerging East-
West factionalism that would come to define much of the UN’s work during the ensuing 
decades of the Cold War.  It also reveals the tensions within the United Nations between 
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concern for human rights on the one hand and the desire to control illicit drugs on the other, 
and the question of whether human rights violations may be overlooked, or even condoned, 
when occurring in the context of fighting drugs.  Although set in a specific historical context, 
the debates over the UN’s relations with fascist Spain on drug control are not at all unique in 
either content or reasoning.  Rather, they provide a vivid illustration that these tensions and 
conflicts within the United Nations system are as old as the institution itself, and have 
remained at the heart of the international community’s approaches to human rights and drug 
control over the next seventy years.
4.3 Complementarities, Tensions and Conflicts
In his work, General Theory of Norms, Hans Kelsen argues that norms in international law 
reflect four general functions - commanding norms, permitting norms, derogating norms and 
empowering norms.405 Pauwelyn summarises these four categories of norms as being: 
1. Those that  impose upon a State an obligation to do something, that is, to take 
some form of action – norms that impose positive obligations.
2. Those that impose an obligation on a State not to do something, that is, norms that 
impose negative obligations.
3. [Those that] grant the right  to States not to do something, also known as an 
exemption [derogation] obligation.
4. [Those that] grant the right to a State to do something, or permissive norms.406
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Types 1 and 2 impose obligations on States, and from these obligations other States or 
individuals derive rights.  Types 3 and 4 grant rights to States, and therefore create 
obligations on other States or individuals.407  
In general terms, a norm of international law can interact with another, separate norm, in one 
of two ways. The norms can either accumulate or they can conflict.408  Norms accumulate 
when the rights or obligations contained within them complement each other, therefore 
adding to or reinforcing the normative content of each.  They may also have an accumulative 
relationship where the rights or obligations of one norm confirms that of the other, without 
creating any additionality in terms of content.409   In general, norms accumulate or are 
complementary where they either deal with different subject matters, or where they do not 
share any common States Parties.410 However, norms may also form a complementary 
relationship when they share common subject matter and/or States Parties where one norm 
adds new rights or obligations to the existing norm without contradicting it.411   
It is also possible for two norms to be in conflict. According to Jenks, in his influential 1953 
treatise on the subject, ‘[a] conflict of law-making treaties arises only where simultaneous 
compliance with the obligations of different instruments is impossible’.412 There are a 
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number of preconditions that must be met in order for a conflict of norms to exist.  Therefore, 
one of the key issues in considering conflicts of norms between human rights and drug 
control, and therefore resolving them, is to ascertain whether the preconditions for a conflict 
exist to begin with.  This territory is not uncontested, particularly by mechanisms of the 
international drug control regime, which have traditionally been reluctant to embrace the 
relevance of human rights within their mandates.413 
There are a number of preconditions that must be met in order for a conflict of norms to exist 
- an overlap of ratione personae,414 ratione materiae and ratione temporis.415 In essence, in 
order for a conflict to exist, the norms in question must overlap in terms of States concerned, 
the subject matter involved and must exist at the same point in time (whether a single unique 
event or a over a prolonged period).  There can be little doubt that the thresholds of both 
ratione personae and ratione temporis are met in this case. Given that nearly all States have 
ratified at least one of the three drug conventions, it would be highly unusual that a State 
Party to any human rights treaty would not also be Party to at least one drug convention.  
Similarly, the obligations placed upon States by both the drug conventions and the UN human 
rights treaties exist contemporaneously. One set of obligations does not switch on, and 
another switch off. Therefore, in assessing any potential or actual conflicts of norms, the 
threshold of ratione temporis is also clearly established. On the third question of ratione 
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materiae, there is little to suggest that there is not at least some overlap - and indeed in some 
cases significant overlap - between the human rights and drug control regimes.  Even if one 
were to consider drug control a purely technical matter, and that the subject matter in that 
sense does not overlap with that of human rights, the activities that States undertake to fulfill 
their obligations under the drug control regime - whether those be related to matters of supply 
reduction, demand reduction or treatment - clearly overlap with or engage human rights 
norms.  Subjects addressed within the drug treaties - such as health, law enforcement, 
incarceration and extradition, to name but a few - all engage elements of international human 
rights law.  Therefore, the necessary preconditions exist to enable a consideration of conflicts 
between the two regimes.
Examples of complementary norms within international narcotics control law are common, 
for example between provisions of the 1961 and 1971 Conventions.  In large part, the 1971 
Convention simply expands the control measures established for plant-based narcotics under 
the 1961 Convention to also include synthetic psychotropic substances.  Therefore, for 
example, Article 5 of the 1971 Convention, which calls upon States to limit to medical and 
scientific purposes of the psychotropic substances listed in that treaty, complements the 
General Obligation in Article 4(c) of the 1961 Convention ‘to limit exclusively to medical 
and scientific purposes the production, manufacture, export, import, distribution of, trade in, 
use and possession of drugs’.416 In this context, the 1971 treaty provision complements that 
of the 1961 Convention by expanding the scope and nature of the norm to include a new class 
of drugs. Norms may also be considered to be accumulating when one norm confirms the 
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rights or obligations of another, pre-existing norm without adding to or expanding it.417 For 
example, Article 17(1) of the 1988 drug convention, which stipulates that ‘[t]he Parties shall 
co-operate to the fullest extent possible to suppress illicit traffic by sea, in conformity with 
the international law of the sea’,418 confirms Article 108(1) of the 1982 UN Convention on 
the Law of the Sea, which creates obligations upon States to ‘cooperate in the suppression of 
illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances engaged in by ships on the high 
seas contrary to international [drug] conventions’.419 
Complimentary or accumulating norms are also evident in the relationship between 
international drug control law and international human rights law. One clear example is found 
in the issue of access to controlled drugs for medical purposes. As stated within the preamble 
of the 1961 Single Convention, the Parties 
Concerned with the health and welfare of mankind,
Recognizing that the medical use of narcotic drugs continues to be indispensable for 
the relief of pain and suffering and that adequate provision must be made to ensure 
the availability of narcotic drugs for such purposes420
Here the preamble engages concepts central to modern discourse on economic, social and 
cultural rights, specifically Article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights.421  The Single Convention's context of ‘the health and welfare of mankind’ 
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suggests that the treaty and its provisions are intended to advance, or be considered within, 
this broader concept of the right to health.   The specific recognition in the preamble of the 
importance of the ‘adequate provision’ of medicines, and the need for States to ‘ensure the 
availability of narcotic drugs’ for the purpose of ‘the relief of pain and suffering’, further 
engages State obligations vis-à-vis the right to health. For example, the Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights considers that the fulfillment of the right to health 
involves the provision a number of elements, including access to essential drugs.422  Indeed, 
the Committee includes such access among the Core Obligations of States under Article 
12.423 The failure of States to provide access to medicines to alleviate pain and suffering has 
prompted critical comment from the UN Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.424  The recognition by the States Parties to 
the Single Convention of the importance of ensuring access to medicines clearly engages the 
obligation ‘to take positive measures that enable and assist individuals and communities to 
enjoy the right to health’.425  Similarly, ensuring access to controlled drugs for medical 
purposes is a core element of the mandate and activities of the International Narcotics 
Control Board.426 Therefore, the State obligation to ensure access to essential medicine is one 
that is duplicated in, and reinforced between, the two legal regimes.  
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In addition to the complimentary and conflicting norms described above, Barrett proposes a 
third category when considering the specific relationship between international drug control 
law and international human rights law, which he calls tensions.427 Tensions are instances 
where drug control policy, law or practice is implemented in a manner that undermines 
human rights protections.  However, unlike an outright conflict, a tension is not the 
consequence of explicit treaty obligation in the drug conventions, but rather results from the 
manner in which a State or other body interprets that obligation within domestic practice.  In 
effect, going further than is required under the drug control treaties to a point where the 
activities encroach on human rights safeguards.  Jenks proposes a similar category in general 
international law, which he terms ‘divergences’. He states that
A divergence between treaty provisions dealing with the same subject or related 
subjects does not in itself constitute a conflict. Two law-making treaties with a 
number of common parties may deal with the same subject from different  points of 
view or be applicable in different circumstances, or one of the treaties may  embody 
obligations more far-reaching than, but not inconsistent with, those of the other. A 
conflict in the strict sense of direct incompatibility  arises only where a party to the 
two treaties cannot simultaneously comply with its obligations under both treaties.428
Tensions or divergences comprise the vast majority of instances where human rights are 
violated in the name of drug control.   For the purposes of this analysis, complimentary/
accumulating obligations, by their very nature, do not present a significant risk of violating 
human rights norms, and will therefore not be examined further. Instead, this chapter will 
focus on the question of tensions and conflicts between them as these represent the areas 
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where human rights risk occurs, and where a process of interpretation is required in order to 
minimise or eliminate that risk. 
4.4 Regime Tensions
Tensions or divergences between the drug control and human rights regimes are common, 
and are at the root of some of the most widespread and egregious human rights abuses 
resulting from drug policy and enforcement.  As described above, a tension exists where the 
implementation of drug control law, policy or enforcement breach human rights protections, 
without an explicit treaty obligation to undertake such actions. In effect, it is where a State or 
an international body interprets the requirements of international drug control law as being 
broader or more severe than what is codified in the drug conventions, and the resulting 
outcomes exceed the requirements of treaty obligations.  This section will explore three 
illustrative examples of tensions or divergences between international drug control law and 
international human rights law.
4.4.1 Death Penalty for Drug Offences
One example of tensions between the regimes is the issue of the death penalty for drug 
offences.  In the mid-1980s, the death penalty for drug-related offences was in force in 
twenty-two States.  By 1995, this number had increased to twenty-six, and by the end of 2000 
at least thirty-four countries had enacted legislation providing for capital punishment for drug 
crimes.429 It is estimated today that as many as thirty-three countries and territories have 
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enacted capital laws for drug offences, and although most do not actually carry through the 
penalties allowed in legislation, it is still thought that as many as one thousand people 
annually are executed for drug offences.430  In a number of these States, drug offences can 
carry a mandatory sentence of death.431
The growth in the number of States applying the death penalty for drug offences, particularly 
in the years since the adoption of the 1988 drug convention, is remarkable for two reasons. 
The first is that it stands in stark contrast to the overall international trend towards the 
abolition of the death penalty.432   The second is that capital drug laws are not required under 
any of three drug conventions. In effect, the growth in the application of the death penalty for 
drug offences did not emerge as the result of a positive treaty obligation in the drug 
conventions to enact capital punishment laws, but instead by the manner in which States 
chose to implement the penal drug laws defined in those treaties, often based on the sense of 
existential threat or paradigm of ‘evil’ explored in chapter two.  The Government of 
Singapore, for example, has defended its use of capital punishment because ‘tough anti-drug 
laws have worked well in Singapore's context to deter and punish drug traffickers’ and are 
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‘necessary legislation to help us keep our country drug-free’.433 In a written statement made 
at the March 2009 session of the Human Rights Council, Singapore’s delegation defended 
itself from criticism over the use of the death penalty for drug offences by claiming that ‘[t]he 
death penalty has deterred major drug syndicates from establishing themselves in 
Singapore’.434 In 2006, the Malaysian Prime Minister Datuk Seri Abdullah Ahmad Badawi 
defended the use of death penalty is the ‘right kind of punishment’ given the menace that 
drugs pose to society.435
However, prescribing of the death penalty for drug offences raises serious human rights 
concerns. Under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the application of 
capital punishment, while not prohibited, is restricted in important ways.  One key restriction 
is found in Article 6(2), which states that, ‘[i]n countries which have not abolished the death 
penalty, sentence of death may be imposed only for the most serious crimes’.436  From the 
perspective of the UN human rights system, there is little to support the suggestion that drug 
offences meet the threshold of ‘most serious crimes’.   The Human Rights Committee, which 
holds the mandate to monitor State compliance with the Covenant, has stated definitively that 
drug offences do not meet this threshold. In its 2005 Concluding Observations on Thailand, 
the Committee noted ‘with concern that the death penalty is not restricted to the “most 
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serious crimes” within the meaning of article 6, paragraph 2, and is applicable to drug 
trafficking’.437  The Committee repeated this interpretation in its 2007 Concluding 
Observations on The Sudan, raising concern at ‘[t]he imposition in the State party of the 
death penalty for offences which cannot be characterized as the most serious, including 
embezzlement by officials, robbery with violence and drug trafficking’.438  The Special 
Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions has also stated that drug 
offences do not meet the threshold of ‘most serious crimes’, concluding in 1996 that:
[T]he death penalty should be eliminated for crimes such as economic crimes and 
drug-related offences. In this regard, the Special Rapporteur wishes to express his 
concern that certain countries, namely  China, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Malaysia, 
Singapore, Thailand and the United States of America, maintain in their national 
legislation the option to impose the death penalty  for economic and/or drug-related 
offences.439
The conclusion that drug-related offences fall outside the scope of ‘most serious crimes’ was 
reaffirmed in the Special Rapporteur’s 2006 Annual Report.440  The Special Rapporteur on 
torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment has also reached this 
same conclusion. As stated in his 2009 Report to the Human Rights Council, ‘drug offences 
do not meet the threshold of most serious crimes. Therefore, the imposition of the death 
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penalty on drug offenders amounts to a violation of the right to life, discriminatory treatment 
and possibly…also their right to human dignity’.441
Here then is a prime example of tension, where State interpretation of how it implements the 
drug control treaties creates a breach of international human rights law. This breach is not one 
created by virtue of an explicit drug treaty obligation to impose capital punishment, but 
instead how a Government chooses to interpret the offences and sanctions within the drug 
treaties.  Interestingly, this tension can be found even within the drug control regime itself. In 
recent years, the UN Office of Drugs and Crime has taken an unequivocal position that the 
death penalty is not a justifiable sanction.442 The International Narcotics Control Board, on 
the other hand, has until recently refused to take a position, traditionally stating that the 
‘determination of sanctions applicable to drug-related offences remains the exclusive 
prerogative of each State and therefore lies beyond the mandate...[of] the Board’.443  In a 
2014 case before the Indian Supreme Court, the Government cited the Board’s failure to 
reject to the death penalty for drugs as evidence that ‘the body mandated to ensure 
compliance of the UN Drug Conventions has no objection to the presence of capital 
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punishment...It is, therefore, wrong to say that such provisions are contrary to the UN 
Conventions’.444
4.4.2 Compulsory Detention in the name of ‘Drug Treatment’
As described in chapter two, the United Nations era marked the first time that the provision 
of drug treatment was codified as a State obligation in international drug control law. 
According to Article 38 of the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, ‘[t]he Parties shall give 
special attention to the provision of facilities for the medical treatment, care and 
rehabilitation of drug addicts’, and, subject to economic resources, ‘it is desirable that 
[States] establish adequate facilities for the effective treatment of drug addicts’.445 The 1972 
Protocol to the 1961 Convention significantly amended Article 38 in this regard, increasing 
the scope of the treaty to create an obligation to take ‘all practicable measures for the 
prevention of abuse of drugs and for the early identification, treatment, education, after-care, 
rehabilitation and social reintegration of persons involved’.446 Similar provisions on drug 
treatment are found at Article 20 of the 1971 Convention,447 while the 1988 Convention 
specifies that drug treatment is an acceptable alternative or additional sanction within the 
context of penal provisions for offences related to the possession of drugs for personal use.448
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However, while such obligations are clearly intended to introduce less punitive, health-based 
responses to drug offences into treaty obligations, some States’ approaches to providing drug 
treatment have created another regime tension, particularly the practice of the forcible 
detention and compulsory ‘drug treatment’ of people who use (or who are suspected of using) 
illegal drugs. This practice has been documented in numerous States including China, 
Vietnam, Cambodia, Thailand, Russia, Malaysia, Lao PDR and India.449 In total, it is 
estimated that perhaps half a million people worldwide are arbitrarily detained on any given 
day for the purpose of ‘drug treatment’, many of them held for months or even years at a 
time, without being charged with any criminal offence, being brought before a court or 
otherwise allowed to challenge the legality of their detention.450 In many cases, these 
‘treatment’ centres are run by military or police personnel rather than medical staff, and 
numerous investigations into the conditions of these centres include reports of physical and 
sexual abuse and humiliation, beatings, forced labour and denial of medical services.451  The 
situation clearly raises numerous human rights concerns, including questions of inhuman or 
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degrading treatment or punishment, the right to consent or to refuse treatment and of forced 
labour.  It also raises serious concerns about illegal or arbitrary detention, prohibition of 
which is integrally linked to the broader right to liberty.452  
As in the case of the death penalty, the question of compulsory drug detention exposes 
tensions within the drug control regime itself. While the UN Office on Drugs and Crime has 
been clear in rejecting compulsory detention for drug use,453 the International Narcotics 
Control Board is far more equivocal, and has at times commended countries with compulsory 
systems in its Annual Reports. The Board’s 2001 Report, for example, recognises without 
comment the ‘significant increase’ in the population of China’s compulsory drug detention 
centres to 360,000.454  It also ‘welcome[d]’ Vietnam’s approach to drug treatment, which 
includes widespread use of compulsory detention, while also ‘encourag[ing] the Government 
to reinforce and support existing facilities’.455  
Muddying the waters considerably in this context is the fact that the Board, although 
eschewing any suggestion its mandate should be responsive to human rights concerns,456 has 
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been vocal in its assertion that there exists a human right to be ‘free from drug addiction’.457 
As early as 1998, the President of the Board was stating in United Nations sessions that ‘[t]he 
right to be free of drug abuse and the right to be protected from drug abuse...should be 
respected by all people’.458  This claim to a right to be drug free, coupled with the State 
obligations within the drug conventions to provide drug treatment, creates a risky 
environment for human rights. As has been pointed out by one non-governmental 
organisation, such claims ‘could easily lead to a justification of forced treatment, claiming 
that it is aimed at the realisation of human rights’.459 This is not simply a theoretical risk, as 
this rationale underpins some defences of compulsory drug detention within parts of the 
human rights and medical literature. Takahashi, for example, advances the position in Human 
Rights Quarterly that ‘drug addiction…destroys—or at least suspends—the free will of the 
addict’,460 and therefore that ‘[i]t is disingenuous to pretend that the “decision” not to 
undergo treatment is an entirely free one…[as] [d]ecisions made under the influence of drugs 
are not decisions of free will’.461  A similar perspective is advanced by Zunyou Wu of the 
Chinese Centre for Disease Control and Prevention in a 2013 publication of the World Health 
Organization.  Like Takahashi, Wu questions the ability of people who are drug dependent ‘to 
make rational decisions, provide informed consent for treatment or participate completely in 
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their own due process’, in effect suggesting that the rights violations involved are either 
minimal, non-existent or legitimated as being done in the best interests of the individual.462  
He further argues that ‘the rights of entire communities’ [presumably to be drug free] need to 
be balanced with, or even take priority over, the rights of the individual in question.463 
Takahashi takes a similar position, stating that ‘[s]ociety has a strong interest in ensuring that 
persons who are addicted to drugs undergo treatment for their condition and…[t]o exclude 
completely the possibility of any level of coercion would be in many cases to exclude the 
possibility of the addict overcoming his addiction’.464
The issue of compulsory detention for drugs has become an increasing concern among non-
governmental organisations and United Nations human rights bodies.465 As described in 2013 
by the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture, 
Compulsory detention for drug users is common in so-called rehabilitation centres. 
Sometimes referred to as drug treatment centres or “reeducation through labor” 
centres or camps, these are institutions commonly  run by military  or paramilitary, 
police or security forces, or private companies. Persons who use, or are suspected of 
using, drugs and who do not voluntarily  opt for drug treatment and rehabilitation are 
confined in such centres and compelled to undergo diverse interventions.466
International human rights law also offers significant guidance specifically on the question of 
arbitrary detention in the context of drug treatment, none of it supportive of the notion that 
people who use drugs or are drug dependent surrender the right to liberty or security of the 
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person, or the right to informed consent.467 For example, in its General Comment on Article 9 
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Human Rights Committee 
notes that the protections enshrined in the treaty should not be narrowly interpreted to apply 
only to arrest and detention in the context of criminal cases.  Rather, Article 9 ‘is applicable 
to all deprivations of liberty, whether in criminal cases or in other cases such as, for 
example…drug addiction’.468  Similarly, the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention considers 
Article 9 protections to be engaged in matters related to drugs.  In its 2003 Report, the 
Working Group noted that it had been
[I]nformed by several sources that, in some countries, the disabled, drug addicts and 
people suffering from AIDS are detained in places that are incompatible with their 
state of health, sometimes without treatment and without it having been established 
that their detention is justified on medical or public health grounds. The Group is 
concerned because it is vulnerable persons that are involved, people who are often 
stigmatized by  social stereotypes; but it is concerned above all because often such 
administrative detention is not subject to judicial supervision.469
In his 2009 report to the General Assembly, the UN Special Rapporteur on the right to the 
highest attainable standard of health raised specific concerns about consent to treatment for 
people who use drugs, noting they ‘are often perceived as being dangerous to themselves and 
unable to make the “right” decision. Prohibitions against their behaviour threaten their ability 
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to refuse testing and treatment.’470 The Special Rapporteur’s report in 2010 was entirely 
dedicated to exploring issues of drug use and drug policy as they affect the right to health, 
and the report addressed the question of compulsory detention and treatment.471  In a clear 
rebuke of the position argued by Takahashi and Wu, he concluded that ‘[p]eople who use or 
are dependent on drugs do not automatically lack the capacity to consent to treatment. A 
presumption of incapacity based on drug use or dependence creates significant potential for 
abuse.’472 The Special Rapporteur also found that the type of mass detention and treatment 
described above were inconsistent with established human rights safeguards governing when 
such committal is legal. According to the report, ‘[d]ecisions regarding capacity and 
competence, and the need to obtain informed consent, must be made on a case-by-case basis. 
Treatment en masse prima facie fails to meet this requirement.’473 
4.4.3 Harm Reduction
A third example of tensions between the drug control and human rights regimes is found on 
the question of harm reduction.  ‘Harm Reduction’ is an approach to providing services to 
people who are active drug users that seeks to minimise the health harms related to their drug 
use, rather than end the use of drugs itself.474 Examples of harm reduction programmes are 
the distribution of sterile syringes and other injecting paraphernalia, on the basis that using 
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sterile equipment to inject minimises or eliminates the risk of the transmission of blood-borne 
viruses such as HIV among networks of people who inject as a result of sharing used 
syringes.475  Another example is the provision of opioid substitution treatments, such as 
methadone and buprenorphine. These prescribed medicines are ingested orally, enabling the 
heroin dependent individual to cease injecting and therefore end the need to acquire drugs 
from illicit sources. Although patients are still dependent on an opiate, evidence has 
demonstrated the numerous health and social benefits that emerge when people move from 
illicit injectable opiates onto pharmaceutical, non-injectable opiates administered through a 
physician.476  Within the drug control system, harm reduction interventions have often been 
seen as controversial because they do not abide by the dominant paradigm of abstinence from 
the ‘evil’ of drug ‘addiction’, and instead accept the reality of drug use and seek to design 
health interventions for people who choose to use illegal substances.  
Bewley-Taylor has written in detail on the tension over harm reduction within the 
international drug control system, in particular intense debates among Member States, and 
the strains the issue has created within and among the UN drug control bodies, especially 
within the UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs.477  He notes these debates ‘reflected 
divergent perspectives on the [drug control] regime’s fundamental principles and norms 
concerning punitive prohibition’.478  Much of this debate, at least from those States that 
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supported the harm reduction approach, was driven by public health imperatives in the face 
of a growing HIV crisis among people who injected drugs. However, given the centrality of 
human rights advocacy within the international response to HIV,479 it was inevitable that 
human rights concerns also became an element of the harm reduction debate.
The approach of the relevant UN bodies illustrates this tension.  Within the UN human rights 
system, harm reduction approaches have increasingly received explicit endorsement from key 
actors, including by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,480 the 
Committee on the Rights of the Child,481 the Office of the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights482 and the Special Rapporteurs on Health483 and on Torture.484  However, within the 
drug control regime, the situation is much different.   The International Narcotics Control 
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Board has historically been reluctant to enthusiastically embrace harm reduction approaches.  
At best, the Board has offered qualified acceptance of these programmes, for example stating 
in its 1993 Annual Report that,
The Board acknowledges the importance of certain aspects of ‘harm reduction’ as a 
tertiary  prevention strategy  for demand reduction purposes. The Board considers it 
its duty, however, to draw attention of Governments to the fact that ‘harm reduction’ 
programmes are not substitutes for demand reduction programmes.485
In 2000, the Board lamented that Government investment in HIV prevention services for 
people who inject drugs were, in its estimation, being diverting money from drug prevention 
activities, stating that
The fact that harm reduction programmes should constitute only one element of a 
larger, more comprehensive strategy to reduce the demand for illicit drugs has been 
neglected. The Board regrets that the discussion on drug injection rooms and some 
other harm reduction measures has diverted the attention (and, in some cases, funds) 
of Governments from important demand reduction activities such as primary 
prevention or abstinence-oriented treatment.486
In its 2004 Annual Report, the Board encouraged States to address the spread of HIV, yet at 
the same time qualified this statement with the caution that ‘[m]easures to prevent the spread 
of infectious diseases must not be seen as facilitating or even promoting drug abuse, which is, 
after all, the root of the problem’.487 Despite the fact that the Board’s mandate gives it 
responsibility for monitoring, and ensuring availability of, controlled opioid replacement 
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medicines for people who are heroin dependent, ‘the Board’s Reports and associated public 
statements have demonstrated at best a lukewarm support for the interventions and use of 
methadone and buprenorphine’.488  
At other times, the Board has expressed outright hostility to, and denunciation of, harm 
reduction programmes. The most glaring example of this is in the case of ‘safe injecting 
facilities’, or ‘drug injection rooms’ to use the Board’s own phrase.  These are health clinics 
established in some urban centres where people are allowed to bring drugs into the facility 
and inject under sterile, clinical conditions, and under the supervision of medical personnel.  
Although only established in a handful of countries, these facilities have proved very 
effective at not only reducing HIV transmission and fatal overdoses, but also in ensuring 
people are not injecting publicly, for example in parks and alleys, which has additional 
residual benefits for the individuals and the broader community.489
Safe injecting facilities have often been the source of some domestic controversy in the 
countries where they have been established. Most notably, the only such facility established 
in North America - ‘Insite’ in Vancouver, British Columbia - has been the cause of a series of 
court challenges in which the Federal Government of Canada sought to force the city and 
province to shut the clinic down.490  These challenges culminated in the Supreme Court in 
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2011, where the justices ruled unanimously in favour of Insite and against the attempts of the 
Canadian Government to close it.491 However, despite the verdict of the Supreme Court, the 
International Narcotics Control Board has vocally criticised both Canada and the Court in its 
reports, calling the existence of the facility and others like it a violation of international 
law.492  In a 2014 report to the Commission on Narcotic Drugs, for example, the Board stated 
that safe injecting facilities ‘promote social and legal tolerance of drug abuse and drug 
trafficking and therefore contravene the international drug control treaties’.493  The Board’s 
public criticism of Canada in this regard is in stark contrast with its approach on the death 
penalty for drug offences, where it refuses to take a position on the basis that it is an internal 
matter for States.494 It is also at odds with the drug control treaties themselves, which 
explicitly place constitutional caveats and exceptions for the obligation in question.495 Article 
3(1)(c) of the 1988 Convention, the subclause to which the Board is referring in its criticism, 
is expressly ‘[s]ubject to [the State’s] constitutional principles and the basic concepts of its 
legal system’.496 
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The Board’s public position is also at odds with its own internal legal advice on the matter. In 
2002, and at the specific request of the Board, the Legal Affairs Section of the UN Drug 
Control Program (the forerunner of the Office on Drugs and Crime) produced a restricted 
opinion on the legal position of harm reduction approaches under the international drug 
conventions.497  The conclusion of the Legal Affairs Section on the question of safe injecting 
facilities was that ‘the intention of governments is to provide healthier conditions for IV drug 
abusers, thereby reducing their risk of infection with grave transmittable diseases 
and...reaching out to them with counselling and other therapeutic options’.498 The opinion 
concluded that ‘[i]t would be difficult to assert that, in establishing drug-injection rooms, it is 
the intent of Parties to actually incite or induce the illicit use of drugs, or even more so, to 
associate with, aid, abet of facilitate the possession of drugs’, and therefore ‘it would...fall far 
from the intent of committing an offence as foreseen in the 1988 Convention’.499  Given this 
legal opinion from within the UN drug control system itself, as well as the constitutional 
caveats within the convention noted above, the Board’s criticism of Canada in this case 
appears less based on sound legal grounds, and more reflective of what Bewley-Taylor calls 
the Board’s ‘fears for the defence of the status quo regarding drug prohibition than any 
broader concerns for the “health and welfare of humankind” as laid out under the 
conventions’.500
4.5 Regime Conflicts 
137
497 Legal Affairs Section, UN Drug Control Program, ‘Flexibility of Treaty 
Provisions as Regards Harm Reduction Approaches’ (20 September 2002) UN Doc 
No E/INCB/2002/W.13/SS.5
498 ibid para 28.
499 ibid paras 27-28.
500 Bewley-Taylor, International Drug Control (n 172) 230.
Although human rights violations resulting from regime tensions are perhaps the most 
obvious and widespread, there also exist examples of clear conflicts between explicit treaty 
obligations within the drug control and human rights conventions, situations where fulfilling 
the obligation of one would necessarily cause a breach of the other.  As explained by Jenks, 
‘[a] conflict in the strict sense of direct incompatibility arises only where a party to the two 
treaties cannot simultaneously comply with its obligations under both treaties’.501 While few 
in number, these instances are also important to highlight as they will create a separate yet 
significant interpretive challenge.  
4.5.1 Traditional Uses of Coca 
The cultivation and use of the coca leaf has been a staple part of traditional indigenous 
communities in the Andean region of South America for hundreds of years.  Typically 
chewed or brewed into tea, coca acts as a mild stimulant, useful for suppressing hunger and 
fatigue, and overcoming the effects of living and working at high altitudes.  Coca is also 
considered a sacred plant within some indigenous cultures in the region.502  However, coca is 
also the plant that serves as the raw material from which cocaine is produced, and as such is 
considered among the ‘plants containing narcotic or psychotropic substances’,503 subject to 
the strictest controls of the 1961 drug convention.504  Article 49 of the convention recognises 
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the existence of traditional coca use in some States, and requires that ‘[c]oca leaf chewing 
must be abolished within twenty-five years from the coming into force of this Convention’.505 
The obligation contained in Article 49 of the 1961 Convention is perhaps the clearest 
example of regime conflict between the drug control and human rights legal systems, as it has 
the effect of creating a positive State obligation to eradicate a traditional practice of cultural 
significance to indigenous peoples. In 2007, for example, the International Narcotics Control 
Board called upon Bolivia to ‘initiate action without delay with a view to eliminating uses of 
coca, including coca leaf chewing’.506  While the 1961 Convention obligates States to 
eradicate the practice, multiple human rights instruments - including the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights,507 the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,508 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,509 the International 
Covenant on the Elimination of All forms of Racial Discrimination510 and the United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples511 - obligate States to protect the traditional 
cultural practices of indigenous peoples, creating a clear conflict of norms between the two 
regimes.  The UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues has called for ‘those portions of 
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the [1961 Single] Convention regarding coca leaf chewing that are inconsistent with the 
rights of indigenous peoples to maintain their traditional health and cultural practices...be 
amended or abolished’.512 Furthermore, as has been pointed out by Barrett, ‘[t]he ban on both 
coca chewing as a cultural practice and cultivation as an economic activity rooted in cultural 
heritage was implemented...without consultation with indigenous communities’, having the 
effect of undermining the principle of free prior and informed consent that is now widely 
accepted as a norm of international human rights law.513
This conflict has been brought into the open in recent years by Bolivia, where the country’s 
first indigenous President, Evo Morales, made the criminalisation of this cultural practice by 
the drug conventions a national priority issue in UN drug control fora, noting that the ban is 
not only in conflict with the State’s international human rights obligations, but is also in 
violation of Bolivia’s new constitution, ratified in 2009.  After failing to achieve an 
amendment to the 1961 Convention in 2011,514 the State took the unusual step in 2011 of 
denouncing the treaty effective January 2012,515 and re-acceding with a reservation on Article 
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49 twelve months later in January 2013.516  Indeed, Bolivia already had a similar reservation 
to a similar article on traditional uses of coca in the 1988 drug convention.517 Despite the 
objections of fifteen States Parties to this legal manoeuvre,518 and the outrage of the 
International Narcotics Control Board, which said the reservation ‘would undermine the 
integrity of the global drug control system’,519 the reservation stood and Bolivia again 
became a Party to the 1961 Convention.
4.5.2 Application of more severe measures
Traditionally, the concept of conflict of norms has been limited only to consideration of those 
norms that create either positive obligations or negative prohibitions520 -  instances in which 
it is impossible for a State to ‘simultaneously comply with...obligations under both 
treaties’.521  The other two categories of norms - exempting/derogating norms and permissive 
norms - have not been considered within this context.  However, Vranes argues that ‘[t]he 
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problem with this strict definition is that it does not recognize that a permissive norm may 
conflict with an obligation or a prohibition’.522  This point is of particular relevance to 
examining conflicts between drug control and human rights, as evidence of a conflict of 
obligations between the regimes is found in a permissive obligation common to all three drug 
treaties.
As was explored in chapter two, the UN drug conventions require the application of criminal 
law to the various categories of offences the treaties identify, as well as suggest a ‘minimum 
level of measures to be taken by all parties’ as sanctions for such offences.523  However, each 
of the three drug conventions also contains a specific article permitting States Parties to adopt 
‘more strict or severe measures’ than those required in the treaties themselves.524 For 
example, under Article 24 of the 1988 Convention, ‘[a] Party may adopt more strict or severe 
measures than those provided by this Convention if, in its opinion, such measures are 
desirable or necessary for the prevention or suppression of illicit traffic’.525 
According to the traditional perspective on conflict of laws described by Jenks, ‘[t]here is no 
conflict if the obligations of one instrument are stricter than, but not incompatible with, those 
of another, or if it is possible to comply with the obligations of one instrument by refraining 
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from exercising a privilege or discretion accorded by another’.526 However, in each of the 
three drug treaties, this article is enshrined without safeguards or limitations, in effect 
creating a permissive obligation that opens up scope for potential conflict with international 
human rights obligations.  This conflict is perhaps most clear in the matter of penal sanctions 
for drug offences, and the license it may appear to give to States to impose harsh punishments 
for drug offences that conflict with the protections the human rights treaties embody. 
This conflict is not simply theoretical, and the article has been cited to defend human rights 
violations in the name of drug control by a State. In 2007, the Indonesian Constitutional 
Court heard a case challenging the death penalty for drug offences.527 The Court invoked 
Article 24 of the 1988 drug convention as legal justification for the Government to impose 
this penalty, despite its clear illegality under human rights law. According to the judgment,
[I]f according to Indonesia, more severe measures are needed to prevent and 
eradicate such crimes, such measures are not contradictory  to but rather are justified 
and suggested instead by  the Convention. This means that Indonesia as a state party 
adopting the system of capital punishment against the certain Narcotics criminals has 
the right to determine capital punishment to the Narcotics criminals.528
Furthermore, the Court ruled that the 1988 drug convention held a higher status in law than 
did the UN human rights mechanisms’ jurisprudence on the question of ‘most serious 
crimes’.529  This example illustrates the limitations of the narrow construction of conflict of 
norms, at least when such conflicts are interpreted within a domestic high court, and 
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underlines the value of calls for ‘a broader definition of conflict in public international 
law’.530 Vranes,531 for example, supports Pauwelyn’s more flexible approach, where two 
norms are ‘in a relationship of conflict if one constitutes, has led to, or may lead to, a breach 
of the other’.532 Using this more flexible definition, it is clear that the permissive norms 
enshrined in the drug treaties above are in conflict with international human rights law.
4.6 Conclusion
Chapter four set out to explore the engagement between international human rights law on 
the one hand and international drug control law on the other.  As is evident above, there are 
multiple examples of tensions between the regimes, or conflicts of treaty obligations, where 
drug control efforts result in increased human rights risk, or outright human rights violations. 
The question then becomes how to resolve these tensions and conflicts, and determine an 
approach to interpreting the engagement between the legal regimes that ensures human rights 
abuses do not occur as the result of drug control activities.  These questions will be explored 
in the subsequent chapters.
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Chapter Five - The Object and Purpose of the 
International Drug Control Regime 
5.1 Introduction
The modern drug control regime is built upon more than a century of international treaty law, 
and its core norms and mechanisms pre-date not only the development of international human 
rights law, but the foundation of the United Nations itself.  The core UN drug control 
instrument, the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, is itself more than half a century 
old.  This has led some to question the relevance of the drug control regime in the context of 
twenty-first century challenges.533 Even the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, a 
staunch defender of the drug control status quo, has identified the need ‘to make the 
conventions fit for purpose and adapt them to a reality on the ground that is considerably 
different from the time they were drafted’.534  At the same time, the growing recognition of 
human rights violations linked to drug laws, policies and enforcement practices - some of 
which were explored in chapter four - raises the further question of how States should 
reconcile their concurrent obligations under these two international legal regimes, and what is 
to be done when the regimes, or their implementation by States, come into conflict.  How do 
these two treaty regimes engage with one another in cases of human rights violations linked 
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to drug policy or enforcement? How are real or apparent conflicts between drug control 
obligations on the one hand and human rights obligations on the other resolved in a manner 
in which a State maintains its adherence to both bodies of law?  In international law terms, 
the challenge becomes how ‘to redefine the meaning of a treaty without altering its nature 
[as]....[i]n many cases the very survival of the agreement and its applicability to present-day 
concerns are at stake’.535
Chapter five will begin an exploration of the challenges of treaty interpretation within 
international drug control law. Using guidance provided within the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties, as well as other legal and historical sources, it will explore the object and 
purpose of the international drug control law regime, which will be critical to later questions 
of treaty interpretation and adjudication of regime conflicts. 
5.2 Background to the Interpretation of Treaties
The process of interpretation of international treaties is one which has been characterised as 
‘occup[ying] a prime position on the crossroads between law and politics’.536 This is certainly 
an appropriate characterisation of the context of treaty interpretation in international drug 
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control law, a regime which, as explored in chapter three, has historically evolved through the 
interplay of two often conflicting paradigms.  General rules of treaty interpretation are found 
under Articles 31—33 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,537 which are seen as 
providing authoritative guidance in these matters.538 In particular, Articles 31 and 32 are 
generally agreed to reflect customary international law.539 Article 31(1) of the Vienna 
Convention states that '[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the 
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its 
object and purpose'.540 Therefore, a key initial challenge in any process of interpreting the 
international drug control conventions in the context of international human rights law is the 
identification of an ‘object and purpose’ test for the legal regime the drug conventions 
establish.   Identifying the object and purpose is an essential element when considering 
broader questions of legal interpretation, and is a key element in making an assessment of the 
‘ordinary meaning’ that is to be given to treaty terms.541 However, doing so is not a 
straightforward task for several reasons, both legal and political.  
147
537 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (done at Vienna on 23 May 1969, 
entered into force on 27 January 1980) UNTS vol 1155, p 331, arts 31-33 (Vienna 
Convention).
538 See, for example, Golder v United Kingdom App no 4451/70 21 (ECtHR, 21 
February 1975) paras 29-30.;Witold Litwa v Poland App no no. 26629/95 (ECtHR, 4 
April 2000) paras 57-64.; Johnston and Others v. Ireland (1986) Series A no 112, 
para 51.; Lithgow and Others v. the United Kingdom (1986) Series A no 102, paras 
47-48.
539 Fragmentation Report (n 43) 215, para 427.
540 Vienna Convention (n 537) art 31(1).
541 Mark E Villiger, ‘The Rules on Interpretation: Misgivings, Misunderstandings, 
Miscarriage? The “Crucible” Intended by the International Law Commission” in E 
Cannizzaro (ed) The Law of Treaties: Beyond the Vienna Convention (Oxford 
University Press 2011), 110 (Rules on Interpretation).; Gardiner, ‘Vienna Convention 
Rules’ (n 535) 480-81.
In legal terms, the first challenge is that a treaty’s object and purpose is itself open to 
interpretation. Many scholars agree that the concept is somewhat adaptable in practice, if not 
also in intent, as this provides some flexibility in international relations and in international 
law.542  As described by Klabbers, ‘the notion of object and purpose cannot have a single 
fixed meaning: its precise meaning in any given context must be determined on a case by 
case basis, depending on the treaty concerned and the circumstance in which the notion is 
invoked’.543  However, it would be incorrect to suggest, as have some commentators,544 that 
because the object and purpose test is open to interpretation that it is impossible or irrelevant 
in the context of the drug conventions. 
The second challenge is the nature of interpretation itself which, despite the rules articulated 
in the Vienna Convention, is very much a subjective process. As described by the 
International Law Commission in 1966, ‘the interpretation of documents is to some extent an 
art, not an exact science’.545 In discussing Articles 31 to 33 of the Vienna Convention,  
Gardiner notes that ‘the difficult part of the art of treaty interpretation involves going beyond 
the rules themselves, that is the evaluation and judgement required in applying the rules to a 
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particular treaty to produce an actual interpretation’.546  Villiger further notes that ‘the process 
of eliciting the different meanings - and in particular the “correct” meaning - from the terms 
of a treaty is altogether a creative process leaving room for extralegal considerations such as 
one’s personal or cultural background’.547 Gardiner concurs, noting that treaty interpretation 
is not a mechanical exercise, but one where ‘the person giving meaning to the terms of a 
treaty introduces elements of subjectivity and creativity. Thus judgement is a necessary 
component of the process.’548  
In political terms, a further complicating factor is that the international drug control regime is 
wedded in public consciousness, if not in domestic and international discourse and politics, to 
law enforcement, criminalisation and prohibition: the paradigm of drugs as ‘evil’ and ‘threat’ 
explored in chapter three. As a consequence, it is difficult to engage the question of the 
‘purpose’ of drug control in a context other than one in which prohibition and criminalisation 
are presumed to be the raison d'être of the regime.  Japan, for example, in a 2013 objection to 
a Bolivia’s reservation on traditional uses of coca to the 1961 Convention, stated its opinion 
that the object and purpose of the treaty was ‘to prevent the illicit production, manufacture 
and trafficking of cocaine’.549  Bewley-Taylor writes that respecting the object and purpose of 
the drug treaties requires that States ‘must adhere to the central prohibitive norm of the global 
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drug control system’.550 However, while the regime established under the conventions is 
clearly prohibitionist in nature, the matter of the object and purpose of the treaties is a more 
nuanced discussion, and on that must be anchored in the relevant interpretive sources.  
Modern legal discourse on the question of the object and purpose of international treaties 
begins in 1951 with the Advisory Opinion on Reservations to the Genocide Convention by 
the International Court of Justice.551  In that opinion, the Court’s assessment of object and 
purpose derives primarily from its consideration of ‘the objects pursued by the General 
Assembly and the contracting parties’, based upon General Assembly resolutions, as well as 
by reference to the treaty preamble.552 The European Court of Human Rights has also placed 
significance on the preambular section of a treaty, noting it ‘is generally very useful for the 
determination of the "object" and "purpose" of the instrument to be construed’.553
As it is used within the context of international law, the phrase ‘object and purpose’ is 
considered a single term.554 For example, the European Court of Human Rights takes an 
approach that under ‘the general rule of interpretation laid down in Article 31…the process of 
discovering and ascertaining the true meaning of the terms of the treaty is a unity, a single 
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combined operation’.555 However, this single term can be considered to refer to two separate 
concepts.  The first of these could be described as utilitarian, that is the normative content of 
the treaty, or the rights and obligations to which it gives expression.556 The second is what 
might be might be described as the ultimate aim(s) or goal(s) of the treaty, sometimes called 
the telos of the treaty.  As described by Linderfalk,
When two or more states enter into a treaty  relation with each other, concluding the 
treaty usually is not seen as an end in itself. Of course, ensuring respect for the 
various provisions laid down in the treaty text is considered important. But above 
and beyond that it is most  often a wish of the parties that some further state-of-affairs 
(or states-of-affairs) be attained - the telos (or teloi) of the treaty. From an extremist 
viewpoint it  could be argued that fulfilling this wish is what the treaty is all about; if 
a treaty is applied without its telos (or teloi) being attained, then the conclusion of 
the treaty may indeed be considered in vain.557
Although separate concepts, they are in fact integrally related, in the sense that it is through 
the implementation of the obligations created by the treaty that States seek to fulfill or 
achieve the its broader aim(s) or goal(s).  Article 31 of the Vienna Convention allows for such 
an approach. According to Villiger, ‘Article 31...entrenches the teleological or functional 
approach. It enables consideration of the different aims of particular types of treaties’.558 
Some scholars draw from the French origins of the concept of object and purpose, ‘objet et 
but’, and  elaborate ‘a distinction between “l’objet” of a legal act or instrument, that is what 
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it does in the sense of creating a particular set of rights and obligations, and “le but” as the 
reason for establishing “l’objet”’.559  Buffard and Zemanek, for example, note that it is ‘a 
stream of French doctrine which gives special attention to the distinction between object and 
purpose of a treaty’, while ‘most scholars in the German, Austrian and English tradition treat 
“object and purpose” of a treaty as a joint notion’.560 They note that,
According to this French doctrine the term ‘object’ indicates thus the substantial 
content of the norm, the provisions, rights and obligations created by the norm. The 
object of a treaty is the instrument for the achievement of the treaty’s purpose, and 
this purpose is, in turn, the general result which the parties want to achieve by the 
treaty. While the object can be found in the provisions of the treaty, the purpose may 
not always be explicit and be prone to a more subjective understanding.561
Similarly, Zoller suggests that the object and purpose describe separate concepts, the first 
being related to a treaty’s more immediate goal(s) and the second reflecting the treaty’s long 
term goal(s).562
An interesting example of this approach is found in the text of the  2103 Arms Trade 
Treaty.563  Article 1 of the Treaty, which is entitled ‘Object and Purpose’, breaks this concept 
down into two distinct components.  The first part of Article 1 defines the treaty’s functional 
‘object’ of establishing high international standards for regulating trade in conventional arms 
while preventing their diversion into illicit trade markets.  This ‘object’ is described as 
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intended to achieve the treaty’s more aspirational ‘purpose’, defined in the second part of 
Article 1 as ‘contributing to international and regional peace, security and stability’ and to 
‘reducing human suffering’.564  As will be explored below, the approach reflected in the Arms 
Trade Treaty has particular resonance when considering the object and purpose of the drug 
control regime.
5.3 The Object and Purpose of the International Drug Control  Regime
As mentioned above, given the strongly prohibitionist legal regime established under the 
international drug control treaties, many would likely consider the question of the object and 
purpose of the conventions to be a simple one: the prohibition of illicit drugs (cultivation, 
manufacture, trafficking, sale, use). However, the development of the regime suggests 
otherwise, or at least something broader.  Although the legal framework established by the 
drug treaties is clearly prohibitionist in both design and effect, this is a separate question to 
what that particular system of control is actually intended to achieve. Indeed, establishing the 
intended outcome of the drug control regime is critical to determining its object and purpose.  
A mere scrutiny of the structures and mechanisms of control is insufficient.  As stated in 1943 
by the Chief of the Drug Control Service of the Secretariat of the League of Nations, Bertil 
Renborg, activities to limit, supervise and regulate the availability of drugs were not the 
‘main object’ of the regime, but rather the ‘principal methods used’ towards achieving its 
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goal.565  This in many ways reflects the approach enshrined in the Arms Trade Treaty, where 
the structures of weapons regulation and control it establishes do not define the broader 
aspirations of the treaty, but rather are intended to contribute to achieving them. If the 
structures of control established in the drug control treaties are simply the methods to be used 
to achieve the goal of the regime, this suggests that testing the object and purpose must move 
beyond a focus on these control structures and mechanisms alone, and explore both the 
immediate or utilitarian object and purpose of the regime, as well as the telos, to identify 
what these structures are intended to achieve.
Following this approach, the object and purpose of the drug conventions will be considered to 
be a single term embodying two separate concepts, the first being immediate or utilitarian 
object and purpose of the treaty, and second being the ultimate goals or telos of the treaty, the 
state of affairs the treaty hopes to achieve. Three primary sources will be used to explore 
these concepts in the context of drug control, in order to construct what Thirlway calls the 
‘scaffolding for the reasoning on questions of treaty interpretation’.566  The first two elements 
of this scaffolding are the text and preambles of the three United Nations drug treaties, and 
the preparatory work and drafting histories of those conventions.  However, this analysis will 
augment those two sources with a third historical legal source: the multilateral instruments on 
drug control that existed before the foundation of the United Nations in 1946. Given that the 
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original intention of the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs was to bring together the 
normative content of the preceding fifty years of international treaty law into one ‘single’ 
treaty,567 the text and preambles of these earlier instruments will also be examined as an 
important historical legal source contributing to an understanding of the object and purpose 
of the modern international drug control regime. 
5.3.1  Utilitarian Object and Purpose: ‘Medical and Scientific Purposes’
Perhaps the most immediate entry point for consideration of object and purpose of any treaty 
is its title.  As described by Klabbers, in some cases consideration of a treaty’s name can in 
fact be a very valuable element in this determination.
[W]hile one of the objectives of the Chemical Weapons Convention, as listed in its 
preamble, is the desire to ‘promote free trade in chemicals as well as international 
cooperation and exchange of scientific and technical information...in order to 
enhance the economic and technological development of all States parties’, it can 
hardly  be maintained that this particular objective should qualify as the object and 
purpose of a treaty bearing the title Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their 
Destruction. Of course, the title of a treaty will only offer a presumption regarding 
the treaty's object and purpose, which will have to be substantiated by closer analysis 
of other factors, but it does not appear to be a presumption which will often be 
rebutted in practice. And where it will be rebutted, the treaty has been seriously 
misnamed.568
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However, as an interpretive source, there is little obvious direction provided in this regard 
from the drug conventions.  While the drafters’ intent can be presumed from the titles of such 
instruments as the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
or the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of 
Chemical Weapons and their Destruction, the relatively innocuous titles of Single Convention 
on Narcotic Drugs and the Convention on Psychotropic Substances offer little in the way of 
interpretive guidance, other than identifying the subject matter they address.  This is less so in 
the case of the 1988 Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances, where working to prevent or suppress illicit traffic is clearly suggested in the 
title.  However, given the title of the 1988 convention, it is of note that the titles of the 
previous two treaties are not the Convention Against Narcotic Drugs or the Convention 
Against  Psychotropic Substances.  This would suggest that while the object and purpose of 
the 1988 treaty may well involve preventing or prohibiting an activity, that of the 1961 and 
1971 Conventions are broader, different or at least more nuanced and open to interpretation. 
While the treaty titles themselves provide little guidance, a review of the other sources of 
interpretation lead to a conclusion that the immediate or utilitarian object and purpose of 
regime is to limit the production and use of controlled substances solely to ‘medical and 
scientific purposes’. 
Within the United Nations instruments on drug control, the concept of restricting drugs to 
medical and scientific purposes enters into use from a very early date, well before the 
adoption of the 1961 Single Convention.  It first appears in the preamble to the 1948 Protocol 
Bringing under International Control Drugs Outside the Scope of the Convention of 13 July 
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1931 for Limiting the Manufacture and Regulating the Distribution of Narcotic Drugs,569 the 
second ever instrument on drug control adopted by the UN General Assembly.570  Paragraph 
two of the preamble states
Desiring to supplement the provisions of the [1931] Convention and to place these 
drugs, including the preparations and compounds containing these drugs under 
control in order to limit by international agreement their manufacture to the world’s 
legitimate requirements for medical and scientific purposes and to regulate their 
distribution.571
Here the protocol clearly indicates that the object is to control drugs only for ‘legitimate’ 
purposes, with those purposes being defined as ‘medical and scientific’.  Article 1 of the 
protocol also uses the term medical and scientific purposes to describe the drugs of relevance 
to the instrument.572 The protocol itself is updating the obligations found within the 1931 
Convention for Limiting the Manufacture and Regulating the Distribution of Narcotic Drugs, 
a treaty that is clearly intended to limit drugs to medical and scientific uses, an objective 
repeated throughout the instrument. Various provisions in the treaty refer to ‘medical and 
scientific requirements’ (Article 4), ‘medical and scientific needs’ (Articles 5, 6, 10, 11), 
‘medical or scientific purposes’ (Article 11), ‘medical or scientific value’ (Article 11) and 
‘medical or scientific use’ (Article 18). Therefore, both the protocol and its link to the 1931 
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convention clearly bring this concept of controlling drugs for medical and scientific purposes 
firmly within the UN regime.
The concept of limiting drugs to medical and scientific purposes becomes increasingly visible 
as the UN drug treaty regime evolves. For example, the preamble of the 1961 Convention 
expresses the ‘[d]esir[e] to conclude a generally acceptable international convention 
replacing existing treaties on narcotic drugs, limiting such drugs to medical and scientific use, 
and providing for continuous international co-operation and control for the achievement of 
such aims and objectives’.573  Significantly, this preambular statement explicitly characterises 
‘limiting such drugs to medical and scientific use’ among the ‘aims and objectives’ of the 
treaty provisions.  The treaty’s General Obligations articulated at Article 4 state that ‘[t]he 
parties shall take such legislative and administrative measures as may be necessary...to the 
provisions of this Convention, to limit exclusively to medical and scientific purposes the 
production, manufacture, export, import, distribution of, trade in, use and possession of 
drugs’.574 Similarly, the 1971 Convention notes in its preambular section ‘that rigorous 
measures are necessary to restrict the use of such substances to legitimate purposes’ and 
further ‘[r]ecogniz[es] that the use of psychotropic substances for medical and scientific 
purposes is indispensable and that their availability for such purposes should not be unduly 
restricted’.575 The convention also includes a specific article (Article 5) entitled ‘Limitation 
of Use to Medical and Scientific Purposes’, which applies varying degrees of control to all 
substances scheduled under the treaty.576  In addition to the use of the specific phrase within 
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the texts of the 1961 and 1971 Conventions, the centrality of the desire to limit the use of 
drugs to medical and scientific purposes is evident in the mechanisms of control the treaties 
establish. Of particular significance is the scheduling system established under the 
conventions, essentially the lists of substances placed under international control, and 
therefore the subjects of the controls created in international drug control law. In both 
treaties, the drugs listed in the schedules, and the level of control placed upon each, is 
explicitly linked to health risks,577 in particular the likelihood of ‘abuse’ or of producing ‘ill 
effects’.578 In both treaties, changes to the substances included in the scheduling list are made 
following the recommendation of the World Health Organization, based upon its assessment 
of the relative health risks of the drug in question.579  This background is significant when 
considering the text of the 1988 Convention, which does not refer to medical and scientific 
purposes but rather to ‘licit’ and ‘illicit’ traffic and use.  However, the 1988 Convention 
defers to the two previous treaties for its definitions of both ‘narcotic drugs’580 and 
‘psychotropic substances’.581  Similarly, the 1988 Convention's primary operative provision, 
Article 3, which sets out the scope of ‘Offences and Sanctions’ required of States Parties for 
various offences, also cites the 1961 and 1971 Conventions as the sources of law for 
interpreting these provisions.582  Therefore, despite the lack of specific language on medical 
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and scientific purposes within the 1988 treaty, its references to the previous two conventions 
clearly suggest such an approach also encompass consideration of its provisions.
The overriding objective of States to limit drugs to medical and scientific purposes is evident 
in the drafting histories of the three conventions. During the plenipotentiary conference that 
concluded the text of the 1961 Convention, for example, numerous delegations made 
reference to this objective. China commented that ‘[s]teady progress had been made towards 
the goal of limiting the use of narcotic drugs to medical and scientific purposes’.583 The 
USSR described that ‘[c]areful supervision was also necessary to ensure that the drugs were 
used for medical and scientific purposes only’, and that ‘[t]he success of international 
narcotics control depended entirely upon strict national control measures’ to achieve this 
aim.584 However, in using the travaux preparatoires as an interpretative source, statements 
made by individual parties are of little value on their own. What is much more significant is 
where the travaux document a ‘common understanding’ among States of the significance of a 
particular term.585 One example of this is apparent when the plenipotentiary in finalising the 
treaty text took the step to move the commitment ‘to limit exclusively to medical and 
scientific purposes the production, manufacture, export, import, distribution of, trade in, use 
and possession of drugs’ from its original place as a basic treaty provision in draft Article 30 
to a General Obligation of all States Parties in Article 4 of the final convention.586   Even 
during the drafting conference of the 1988 Convention, the only UN drug treaty not to 
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explicitly reference medical and scientific purposes in the text, the delegates discussed that 
the objective of ‘the international drug control regime based on existing Conventions...was to 
limit the use of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances to medical and scientific 
purposes’.587
 
The objective of limiting the availability of controlled drugs to medical and scientific uses is 
not a modern concept. It dates back to the very dawn of the international regime, and has 
been central to the regime for a hundred years, providing further support for this concept as 
the object and purpose of the UN regime that emerged from the League of Nations system.  
The term is found in Article 9 of the 1912 Opium Convention, which not only created 
controls to suppress opium use but also speaks of the need ‘to confine to medical and 
legitimate purposes the manufacture, sale, and use of morphine, cocaine and their respective 
salts’.588 It is also found under Article 5 of the1925 International Opium Convention, which 
obligates States Parties to ‘enact effective laws or regulations to limit exclusively to medical 
and scientific purposes the manufacture, import, sale, distribution, export and use of the 
substances to which this Chapter applies’.589 Significantly, in the 1931 Convention for 
Limiting the Manufacture and Regulating the Distribution of Narcotic Drugs, this concept is 
found in the preamble, and notes the ‘desir[e] to....rende[r] by effective international 
agreement the limitation of the manufacture of narcotic drugs to the world’s legitimate 
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requirements for medical and scientific purposes’.590 This treaty was drafted at the 
Conference on the Limitation of the Manufacture of Narcotic Drugs, the official proceedings 
of which state that ‘[t]he object of the Conference is to embody in an international 
Convention a practicable scheme whereby the manufacture of narcotic drugs may be limited 
to the medical and scientific needs of the world’.591 
An unusual source providing further support for this conclusion is a 1933 memorandum 
prepared by the Secretary-General of the League of Nations for consideration during the 
Conference on the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments.  Entitled ‘Analogies between the 
Problem of the Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and that of the Trade in and Manufacture of 
Arms’,592 the document was prepared at the request of the Spanish delegation to determine 
what ‘results obtained in the supervision of the manufacture of and traffic in opium...might be 
material for the supervision of the manufacture of and trade in arms’.593 The memorandum 
begins by comparing and contrasting the aims of the two international regimes, so that 
similarities and differences in the international control regimes might be discerned. In the 
case of the international drug control system, the memorandum states that:
As regards narcotics, the aim pursued by regulation is always the same - namely, to 
prohibit substances not required for medical or scientific purposes and which would 
only serve to foster drug addiction, and, above all, to prevent certain substances 
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capable of being used both for medical and scientific purposes and for addiction 
from being employed for the latter purpose.594
This clearly indicates that the systems and structures of narcotics control created in the treaty, 
and codified in its articles, are merely the functional machinery put in place to achieve 
greater goals.  It also raises the question of whether this same case can be made for 
subsequent League of Nations, and even United Nations, drug treaties.
This conclusion also finds support among more modern sources. For example, the 
governments of Italy,595 the Netherlands596 and Ireland597 have all expressed the position that 
the object and purpose of the 1961 Convention is to limit the use of drugs to medical and 
scientific purposes. Neil Boister, one of the few international scholars who has done detailed 
critical legal analysis of the drug conventions, states that ‘the international multilateral 
conventions were established by the international community with the aim of preventing the 
non-scientific and non-medical production, supply and use of drugs while at the same time 
making them available for medical and scientific purposes’.598 Renborg also states his 
opinion that 
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The objectives of international control can be stated very simply: to prevent the 
abuse of narcotic drugs, while assuring their continued availability for medical and 
scientific purposes. To achieve these objectives, the international narcotic drug 
instruments not only prescribe rules in the international field, but also define the 
measures of control to be maintained within each country.599 
Clearly in Renborg’s estimation, the mechanisms of control are tools to advance the broader 
objectives of the regime. Therefore, the relevant legal and historical sources support a 
conclusion that the utilitarian object and purpose of the drug control regime is to limit 
controlled substances to medical and scientific purposes.  The next question then becomes 
what broader purpose does this aspire to achieve?
5.3.2 Telos - To Promote the Health and Welfare of Mankind
If the immediate object and purpose of the international drug control regime is to limit the 
production and use of controlled substances solely to medical and scientific purposes, this 
objective is pursued in order to achieve a broader goal, which is to promote ‘the health and 
welfare of mankind’.  This represents the telos of the regime, the state of affairs that is hoped 
to be achieved by the treaty, and is one explicitly expressed in the preambles of all three UN 
drug control treaties. It is also a concept that finds it roots in the pre-United Nations 
instruments.  
As detailed in chapter three, international legal instruments on drug control have articulated a 
core humanitarian mission since the foundation of the regime in the early 1900s, 
contextualising mechanisms and activities to control and suppress drugs as part of a 
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campaign to achieve a grander goal.  Under the League of Nations regime, this mission was 
not simply rhetorical but was also reflected in the law. An interesting and unique provision of 
the 1931 Convention Limiting the Manufacture and Regulating the Distribution of Narcotic 
Drugs enshrined a legitimate humanitarian limitation on the otherwise strict controls over the 
export of controlled drugs from one country to another, which was codified in the treaty.  The 
provisions of the 1931 Convention establish mechanisms through which States could estimate 
their legitimate need for controlled substances, as well as guidelines for monitoring imports 
and exports to ensure they did not exceed those approved levels. Article 14 established a 
notification system and consequences for States whose exports ‘to any country or territory 
exceeds the total of the estimates for that country or territory’.600  However, a subclause 
within Article 14 suspends these punitive consequences ‘[i]n exceptional cases where the 
export in the opinion of the Government of the exporting country is essential in the interests 
of humanity or for the treatment of the sick’.601 In effect, creating a derogation from the 
obligation.
The concept of derogation clauses that ‘provide legal avenues for states to break free of 
obligations that would normally constrain their actions’ is one common in international 
human rights treaties.602  In effect, the subclause found in Article 14 of the 1931 drug 
convention is a derogation to this provision of the treaty, allowing States the legal basis to 
avoid the punitive sanctions it otherwise imposes.  What makes this particular derogation 
significant is that it is a human rights-based derogation, allowing the State to opt out of the 
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drug control obligation on the basis of humanitarian or medical reasons. Interestingly, it 
enshrines a perspective almost exactly the opposite of that found in the human rights regime.  
Within many international rights treaties, States may derogate from particular human rights 
obligations on the basis of public emergencies, most typically being linked to public 
security.603  Unusually, in this drug treaty, the provisions of which might arguably fall within 
the realm of public security, allowed a derogation in order to respond to human rights or 
humanitarian emergencies. The derogation also links to Article 5, the main operative 
provision in the treaty. In this case, the operational aspects of drug control are made to be 
secondary to broader human rights demands.  The derogation in effect allows States to evade 
a central operative purpose of the treaty – to establish a system of estimates to regulate 
imports and exports – in circumstances where obeying those provisions would undermine 
humanitarian or medical responses. Although not replicated in modern international drug 
control law, this clause provides interesting historical legal support for the proposal that 
humanitarian objectives form the core aims of the regime, rather than strictly drug control, as 
in this instance humanitarian and medical needs legally trump one of the measures of control 
established by the treaty.  
The humanitarian ethos expressed in the League of Nations treaties also finds its way into the 
core United Nations drug control instruments, and is conceptualised in both the 1961 and 
1971 Conventions as a mission to promote ‘the heath and welfare of mankind’.  As described 
earlier, the preambular section of the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs begins
The Parties,
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Concerned with the health and welfare of mankind,
Recognizing that the medical use of narcotic drugs continues to be indispensable for 
the relief of pain and suffering and that adequate provision must be made to ensure 
the availability of narcotic drugs for such purposes,604
This opening statement on ‘the health and welfare of mankind’ is significant, suggesting that 
the treaty and its provisions are intended to advance broader health and humanitarian 
objectives.  Furthermore, the preamble appears to link the utilitarian object and purpose of 
limiting the use of drugs for medical and scientific purposes with the achievement of this 
broader humanitarian aim.  Indeed, the ‘[d]esir[e] to conclude a generally acceptable 
international convention replacing existing treaties on narcotic drugs, limiting such drugs to 
medical and scientific use’ expressed in the preamble comes only at the end of the section, 
also suggesting that this is an operational objective intended as a mechanism to realise the 
larger goals of drug control.605 
It is useful in this regard to consider the contributions of various Member States to the 
drafting of the 1961 Convention, during which the humanitarian objectives of the treaty were 
regularly cited.  Iran, for example, stated that ‘drug addiction was like a contagious disease: 
no country could be certain that it would be spared’. However, the delegate continued with 
‘when a country like Iran at great cost prohibited the cultivation of the poppy to abolish that 
evil, it was in fact eliminating a source of danger to the health of the whole world and 
benefiting all mankind’.606  Iran is therefore stating that the purpose of prohibiting poppy 
cultivation is to promote health and ‘benefit all mankind’. In other words, the prohibition 
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itself is not an ends, but a means.  Similarly, the United Arab Republic stated that ‘[e]very 
country was under a moral obligation to make the Convention an effective instrument serving 
the interests of the entire world. On behalf of mankind, therefore, his delegation urged all 
States to give it their full and whole-hearted support.’607 A particularly detailed exposition of 
this overarching humanitarian vision was evident in comments made by the Holy See.
[T]he Conference was to be congratulated on having drafted a convention which 
represented a substantial step forward in the moral and social welfare of mankind. 
His delegation attached great importance to the Convention, which would have a 
direct influence on the preservation of human dignity  and contribute to the full 
development of the human personality. At the same time, the Convention recognized 
the fundamental necessity of providing for the rational use of drugs for medical and 
scientific purposes. In addition to its social, economic and legal content, the 
Convention had a moral aspect. The Holy See, which had always been concerned 
with the welfare of mankind and of civilization, was therefore happy to lend its 
moral support to the humanitarian aims of the Conference.608
Just as this broader concern for the well-being of humanity did not start with the Single 
Convention, it also did not end there.  The preamble to the 1971 Convention reaffirms the 
concern for the health and welfare of mankind, while also linking the telos to the more 
immediate object and purpose by ‘[n]oting with concern the public health and social 
problems resulting from the abuse of certain psychotropic substances’.609  The preamble of 
1988 Convention modifies this common language to some extent, but still notes that the 
States are ‘[d]eeply concerned’ at the ‘serious threat to the health and welfare of human 
beings’ posed by drugs.610
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5.4 Conclusion
Based on the textual and historical analysis above, it is evident that an object and purpose test 
is not only possible in the context of the international drug control regime, but that such a test 
clearly reveals both a utilitarian object and purpose, and a larger more aspirational goal of the 
treaties.  Having identified these two layers, the next question is what is the import of this 
object and purpose test for the broader question of interpretation, and in particular 
interpretation of the drug conventions in a human rights context?  These questions will be 
explored in chapter six.
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Chapter Six - The Case for Dynamic Interpretation of the 
International Drug Control Conventions
All treaty provisions receive their force and validity from general law, and set up 
rights and obligations that exist alongside rights and obligations established by other 
treaty provisions and rules of customary international law. None of such rights or 
obligations has any intrinsic priority  against the others. The question of their 
relationship  can only be approached through a process of reasoning that makes them 
appear as parts of some coherent and meaningful whole.611
Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission
6.1 Introduction
As explored in chapter five, the utilitarian or immediate object and purpose of international 
drug control law is to limit controlled substances to medical and scientific purposes. This, in 
turn, is intended to pursue the larger overarching goal, or telos, of the regime, to promote the 
health and welfare of mankind. The systems of administrative and penal control that 
characterise the international drug control regime are therefore designed to pursue the object 
and purpose, or, as described by Renborg, are the ‘principal methods used’ to achieve the goal 
of the regime.612 What then are the implications for treaty interpretation when these 
administrative or penal mechanisms of drug control engage, or even violate, obligations 
under international human rights law? How are the competing yet concurrent obligations 
under the two regimes to be balanced, and potential conflicts interpreted and resolved, in a 
manner that maintains the integrity of both legal systems, while not violating human rights 
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protections?  This chapter will begin to explore this question by examining the application of 
a human rights-based interpretation of international drug control law. 
There are generally considered to be three main approaches to treaty interpretation: an 
‘objective’ approach, which focuses on the treaty text as an ‘authentic expression’ of the 
drafters’ intentions; a ‘subjective’ approach, which focusses on an assessment of the original 
intentions of the drafters, as a separate element from the text; and a ‘teleological’ approach, 
which interprets a treaty’s obligations in light of its object and purpose.613  A teleological 
approach, which is often described as ‘dynamic’ or ‘evolutive’ interpretation,614 is well 
established in international human rights law.615 However, as described by the International 
Law Commission in 2006, it is an approach ‘much more deeply embedded in human rights 
law than in general international law’,616 suggesting that its application in the context of 
international drug control law must be considered cautiously, not least because dynamic 
interpretation remains ‘[o]ne of the most contentious, disputed and discussed issues in treaty 
interpretation’.617 Drawing on the object and purpose of the drug control regime identified in 
chapter five, this chapter will argue that a teleological approach is most appropriate to apply 
in this context, and that the international drug conventions must be interpreted dynamically in 
instances where drug control activities engage human rights obligations.    Furthermore, it 
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will make the case that this evolutive interpretation must be driven by human rights 
considerations, and at minimum be consistent with, and at best advance, core human rights 
principles and obligations.
6.2 Dynamic Interpretation and International Human Rights Law
A teleological approach, or the process of ‘dynamic’ or ‘evolutive’ interpretation, ‘seek[s] the 
interpretation [of a treaty provision] that is most appropriate in order to realise the aim and 
achieve the object of the treaty, not that which would restrict to the greatest possible degree 
the obligations undertaken by the Parties’.618  In other words, the provisions of a treaty are 
interpreted in a manner consistent with, and so as to achieve, the overarching goals of the 
instrument itself, and not limited to a narrow textual assessment.  In doing so, a dynamic 
interpretation may ‘go beyond, or even diverge from, the original intentions of the parties as 
expressed in the text’.619  Dynamic or evolutive interpretation is perhaps most closely 
associated with international human rights law,620 in particular the jurisprudence of the 
European Court of Human Rights, which places a particular emphasis on interpreting the 
provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights in light of its object and purpose.621 
As first established in the case of Tyrer v UK, the Court views the Convention as ‘a living 
instrument which...must be interpreted in light of present day conditions’.622  Following this 
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approach, the European Court interprets treaty provisions in the context of contemporary 
social standards and norms, rather than those existing at the time of the treaty’s conclusion.623 
As described in the 1995 case of Loizidou v Turkey, the Convention’s ‘provisions cannot be 
interpreted solely in accordance with the intentions of their authors as expressed more than 
forty years ago’.624  
Although most closely associated with the European Court, other human rights
bodies have also adopted an evolutive approach to treaty interpretation.  The Inter
American Court of Human Rights, for example, takes the approach that ‘human
rights treaties are living instruments whose interpreters must consider changes over time and 
present-day conditions’, and ‘[t]hat evolutive interpretation is consistent with the general 
rules of treaty interpretation established in the 1969 Vienna Convention’.625 According to the 
Inter-American Court, 
[D]ynamic evolution has had a positive impact on international law in affirming and 
building up the latter’s faculty for regulating relations between States and the human 
beings within their respective jurisdictions. This Court, therefore, must adopt the 
proper approach to consider this question in the context of the evolution of the 
fundamental rights of the human person in contemporary international law.626
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The UN Human Rights Committee also ‘considers that the Covenant [on Civil and Political 
Rights] should be interpreted as a living instrument and the rights protected under it should 
be applied in context and in the light of present–day conditions’.627 For example, in the case 
of Roger Judge v Canada, the Committee found that ‘a broadening international consensus in 
favour of abolition of the death penalty’ was a sufficient basis to ‘review...the scope of the 
application of the rights protected’ under Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights.628 In finding Canada in violation of its obligations under Article 6 for 
deporting a prisoner to the United States without seeking assurances he would not be 
subjected to the death penalty, the Committee noted, 
As to the State party's claim that its conduct must be assessed in the light of the law 
applicable at the time when the alleged treaty  violation took place, the Committee 
considers that the protection of human rights evolves and that the meaning of 
Covenant rights should in principle be interpreted by reference to the time of 
examination and not, as the State party has submitted, by reference to the time the 
alleged violation took place.629 
However, the dynamic or evolutive approach is not without its detractors. As described by 
Fitzmaurice, ‘such an interpretative method was subject to much criticism...as overriding 
intention and the consent to be bound of Parties to the Convention and introducing the 
element of uncertainty to the Parties due to much more extensive interpretation of the 
provisions’.630  For its part, the International Narcotics Control Board, the treaty body 
established under the drug conventions, has traditionally adopted a static approach to 
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interpreting treaty provisions.  As described by Bewley-Taylor, the Board’s approach ‘is 
shaped more by fears for the defence of the status quo regarding global prohibition than any 
broader concerns for the “health and welfare of humankind” as laid out in the 
conventions’.631 Indeed, the Board’s often repeated description of itself as being the ‘guardian 
of the international drug control conventions’ suggests a static, preservationist conception of 
its mandate, rather than a dynamic one that sees the conventions as in any way ‘living 
instruments’.632 These concerns, combined with the general association of the evolutive 
approach to the human rights context, urge a cautious approach when applying the principle 
of dynamic interpretation to the international drug control regime.
6.3 Dynamic Interpretation and other Legal Regimes
The first consideration when seeking to apply an evolutive interpretation to the international 
drug conventions is to examine whether, and in what context(s), the principle has been 
applied to treaty regimes other that international human rights law.  After doing so, it is clear 
that a dynamic approach is not unique to human rights law, and has been adopted by courts 
and tribunals outside of the human rights regime to inform their interpretive approaches, and 
to advance the development of the relevant areas of law.  The fact that a dynamic approach 
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has been considered appropriate within other treaty regimes supports the legitimacy of 
applying it to the drug conventions. 
For example, in the case of Srl CILFIT and Lanificio di Gavardo SpA v Ministry of Health, 
the European Court of Justice adopted an evolutive approach in order to resolve a dispute 
between Italian wool importers and the Ministry of Health on a dispute over inspection levies 
imposed on wool imported from outside the then European Economic Community. According 
to the Court, ‘every provision of [European Economic] Community law must be placed in its 
context and interpreted in the light of the provisions of Community law as a whole, regard 
being had to the objectives thereof and to its state of evolution at the date on which the 
provision in question is to be applied’.633 In this case, the European Court of Justice 
considered not only that the relevant treaty must be interpreted evolutively, but also that the 
relevant provision could not be considered in isolation, but must be assessed within the 
broader context of relevant law.  Both of these conclusions are significant in the question of a 
human rights-based interpretation of the drug conventions.
The Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization has also adopted an evolutive approach 
in its jurisprudence.  A particularly useful case in this regard is Import Prohibition of Certain 
Shrimp and Shrimp Products,634 sometimes known as ‘US-Shrimp’, which considered a 
challenge by four Asian States to a US prohibition on the import of shrimp harvested by 
countries whose fleets did not take precautions to minimise the inadvertent killing of sea 
176
633 Case 283/81 Srl CILFIT and Lanificio di Gavardo SpA v Ministry of Health 
[1982] ECR 3415, para 20.  
634 World Trade Organization, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp 
and Shrimp Products – Report of the Appellate Body (22 October 2001) WT/DS58/
AB/R (US-Shrimp).
turtles, a protected species in US environmental legislation. The Appellate Body took a 
dynamic interpretive approach to address the question, noting that the disputed treaty 
provision under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, drafted fifty years earlier, ‘must 
be read by a treaty interpreter in the light of contemporary concerns of the community of 
nations about the protection and conservation of the environment’.635 In making this 
evolutive determination, the Appellate Body referred to the preambular section of the 1995 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization to inform its approach to reading the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, ‘not[ing] that the generic term "natural resources" 
in Article XX(g) is not "static" in its content or reference but is rather "by definition, 
evolutionary"’.636 Also of interest is the fact that, as part of the process of interpretation, the 
Appellate Body reached outside of world trade law into other international legal regimes - 
including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,637 the Convention on 
Biological Diversity 638 and the Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild 
Animals639 - to assist in its interpretation and inform its conclusions. Gardiner cites 
environmental law as an example showing there is ‘scope for evolutionary interpretation by 
reference to to developments in the law outside the immediate confines of a particular 
treaty’.640 In a conclusion of interest to the matter of international drug control law and 
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human rights, Gardiner states that ‘[s]uch [environmental] rules may need to be taken into 
account when interpreting treaties pre-dating these developments’.641
It is clear from above that the application of dynamic interpretation is not limited to 
international human rights law, and has indeed influenced the approaches of the adjudication 
bodies in other legal regimes. Therefore, the use of an evolutive approach to the interpretation 
of the obligations of other treaty regimes, such as international drug control law, is not in and 
of itself unique or without precedent. However, this is not sufficient evidence alone to 
support a case that the drug conventions can and should be interpreted in such a fashion.  
Reaching this conclusion requires a secondary test to determine the conditions necessary for 
the application of dynamic interpretation to a treaty outside of the human rights regime, and 
then whether those conditions exist in the context of international drug control law.  Guidance 
in forming such a test is found in the jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice. 
6.4 Dynamic Interpretation and the International Court of Justice
When examining the application of evolutive interpretation outside of the human rights 
system, the approach of the International Court of Justice is of particular interest, both 
because of the Court’s authoritative role in dispute settlement between States, and because 
the Court is the body empowered within the drug conventions to arbitrate treaty disputes 
between States Parties.642 As will be explored, the International Court of Justice has taken an 
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evolutive approach to treaty interpretation in several cases, which has clear significance to 
the question of dynamic interpretation of international drug control law.643
The Court has adopted two separate approaches to determining when an evolutive approach 
to treaty interpretation should be engaged. These approaches are described by Helmersen as 
being ‘value driven’ and ‘non-value driven’ in nature,644 and both are of relevance to the 
question of international drug control law. The ‘value driven’ approach is based on a 
consideration of the original intention of the parties, and is drawn from the Court’s 1970 
Advisory Opinion on Namibia.645  In considering language within Article 22(1) of the 
Covenant of the League of Nations,646 which was central to the case, the Court found that 
terms such as ‘the well-being and development’ of peoples, ‘sacred trust’ and ‘the strenuous 
conditions of the modern world’ were intended by the drafters to be read in evolutive manner. 
According to the Court, the concepts ‘were by definition evolutionary...[and] [t]he parties to 
the Covenant must consequently be deemed to have accepted them as such’.647 In this 
circumstance, where the terms in question were ‘value driven’ and therefore ‘by definition 
evolutionary’, the Court concluded that the intent of the drafters was that the language should 
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be interpreted dynamically, ‘presumably because values inevitably change over time, as new 
generations will have their own views on what is (for example) “inhuman” or “fair”’.648 
However, the absence of such ‘value driven’ language does not necessarily mean the Court 
will not find it appropriate to adopt a dynamic approach to interpreting a treaty. Where a 
dynamic, ‘value driven’ intent of the drafters cannot be reasonably inferred from the language 
in question, the Court has developed a test or ‘general rule’ to consider the question of 
interpretation. This ‘general rule’ originates in the 2009 judgement in the Dispute Regarding 
Navigational and Related Rights, in which the Court was required to apply the terms of an 
1858 treaty between Costa Rica and Nicaragua. In doing so, the Court decided that,
[W]here the parties have used generic terms in a treaty, the parties necessarily having 
been aware that the meaning of the terms was likely to evolve over time, and where 
the treaty has been entered into force for a very long period or is “of continuing 
duration”, the parties must be presumed, as a general rule, to have intended those 
terms to have an evolving meaning.649
In the Costa Rica v Nicaragua case, the Court decided that the key treaty terminology at the 
heart of the dispute was intended by the drafters to evolve, and that therefore the Court 
should adjudicate the dispute in the context of the modern understanding of the terms.650 This 
‘non-value driven’ approach, then, is utilised by the Court where clear intent of the drafters is 
not evident, yet where the language is also non-specific. As described in the judgement 
above,  the ‘general rule’ has two components.  The first element is the use of ‘generic terms’, 
180
648 Helmersen (n 643) 139.
649 Costa Rica v Nicaragua (n 645) para 66
650 Helmersen (n 643) 136.
which the Court characterises as a ‘referring to a class of activity’.651  In addition, these 
‘generic terms’ must be ones that the parties would be ‘aware that the meaning of the terms 
was likely to evolve over time’.652 The second element of the Court’s general rule is ‘where 
the treaty has been entered into force for a very long period or is “of continuing duration”’.653  
Both of these conditions are relevant to the question of the international drug control treaties.
6.5 Dynamic Interpretation and International Drug Control Law
The International Court of Justice’s approach to dynamic interpretation is instructive in 
considering the question of whether the international drug control treaties should be 
considered in an evolutive or a static manner.  The two approaches to this question reflected 
in the Court’s jurisprudence, ‘value driven’ and ‘non-value driven’,654 sit neatly alongside the 
teleological analysis of the drug conventions explored in chapter five, and in both cases 
support the case for a dynamic approach.  
In the first instance, as seen in the Namibia case, the Court opted for an evolutive 
interpretation based on its determination that the language embodied in Article 22 of the 
Covenant of the League of Nations expressed values that were intended to be evolutive.  The 
Court considered that the use of concepts such as ‘well-being and development’ and ‘scared 
trust’ were intended to be read in a dynamic manner, as they ‘were by definition 
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evolutionary’.655 This ‘value driven’ approach supports an evolutive reading of the drug 
conventions, where the telos - to promote ‘the health and welfare of mankind’ - is nearly 
identical in meaning, and indeed in actual textual formulation, to the obligation to promote 
‘the well-being and development of...peoples’ enshrined in Article 22 of the Covenant.  
‘Health and welfare’ in this context clearly describe societal values, the content and meaning 
of which necessarily change and evolve with each generation, and therefore meet the Court’s 
criteria for applying dynamic interpretation to the drug conventions.
The Court’s second, ‘non-value driven’ approach, which is engaged where clear intent of the 
drafters is not evident, also supports the case of an evolutive interpretation of the drug 
conventions when applied to the utilitarian object and purpose of the regime. The first 
element of the two part ‘general rule’ developed by the Court is use of ‘generic terms’ in the 
treaty, which the Court characterises as a one ‘referring to a class of activity’.656  In addition, 
these ‘generic terms’ must be ones that the parties would be ‘aware that the meaning of the 
terms was likely to evolve over time’.657 As an example, in discussing the use of generic 
terms in world trade law, Pauwelwn suggests 
[I]t could be submitted that the use of broad, unspecified terms - such as ‘exhaustible 
natural resources’, ‘public morals’ or ‘essential security interests’...is an indication 
that the drafters intended these terms to be interpreted in an ‘evolutionary’ manner. It 
may, indeed, be an indication that WTO members wanted these terms to evolve with 
society and international law or, at least, should have realised that the vagueness of 
these terms would result in their meaning being open to discussion and variation 
depending on the context and times.658
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This first element of the Court’s test is clearly met by the term ‘medical and scientific 
purposes’ employed to describe the utilitarian object and purpose of the drug control regime. 
In a similar manner to that described by Pauwelyn, ‘medical and scientific purposes’ is a 
generic, blanket term, that refers to broad classes of activities.  Furthermore, it is one clearly 
intended to evolve over time, in keeping with global medical and scientific progress. Medical 
and scientific knowledge is by its very nature constantly evolving, changing and expanding.  
What was known about legitimate medical and scientific purposes in 1912 is different than in 
1961, and different again in the present day. Indeed, evidence can be found of the evolutive 
nature of the term ‘medical and scientific’ in the drafting history of the 1961 Convention, and 
a reluctance of States as a consequence to be locked into a static interpretation of treaty 
language. 
 
During the drafting of Article 38 on the ‘Treatment of Drug Addicts’,659 the delegation of the 
United States proposed that the provision include specific language mandating ‘compulsory 
drug treatment in closed institutions’.660  However, this proposal was opposed, and eventually  
rejected, in large part because it undermined the ability of States to interpret the language in a 
manner that evolved in keeping with modern medical knowledge. In arguing against the U.S. 
proposal, The Netherlands opposed this language as ‘better methods of treatment might be 
devised in the future’, while the delegate from Uruguay noted that ‘modern techniques [of 
treatment] were being improved every day’.661  The delegate from Canada stated that ‘since 
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the treatment of drug addicts involved medical responsibilities, it might unduly impede or 
hamper the development of improved treatment facilities or procedures in the future if the 
Convention limited treatment to that provided in closed institutions only’.662 The United 
Kingdom expressed concern that as ‘[t]he Single Convention was intended to be a lasting 
instrument; it could hardly recommend methods which, even if they were the best at the 
moment, might not continue to be the best in the more or less distant future’.663 Making an 
even more specific case for the need for evolutive interpretation of the obligation, the 
delegation from Israel called for flexibility ‘to allow for...eventual scientific progress’ while 
Peru stated ‘it would be better to adopt a wording which was not as likely to become outdated 
by scientific progress’.664 Similar concerns were voiced by the delegation of Yugoslavia, who 
stated that ‘[j]ust as some diseases which had formerly required long treatment were now 
quickly cured by a few injections, it might be hoped that, before the Single Convention 
ceased to be operative, new and more rapid means of treatment would have been discovered 
which would make the measures provided for in paragraph 2 obsolete’.665 In the end, the final 
agreed wording was ‘desirable’ that States ‘establish adequate facilities for the effective 
treatment of drug addicts’.666 There are clearly limitations to extrapolating the significance of 
the drafting debate of a single article to apply to the regime as a whole.  However, this record 
is notable in this context as it demonstrates that the drafters recognised that the concept of 
‘medical and scientific’ knowledge within the drug conventions was one that would 
necessarily evolve over time.  It also shows reluctance to enshrine language that would have 
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the effect of limiting the ability of States Parties to apply evolving medical standards to the 
question of drug treatment.  In this sense, it supports the application of the International Court  
of Justice’s general rule in this case, and that ‘medical and scientific’ is a generic term whose 
nature was seen as evolving over time. 
The second element of the Court’s general rule is that evolutive interpretation may be 
appropriate ‘where the treaty has been entered into force for a very long period or is “of 
continuing duration”’.667    Both of these conditions are applicable to the international drug 
control regime.  Although not as old as the 1858 treaty at the heart of the Costa Rica v 
Nicaragua dispute in which the Court’s test was established, the Single Convention on 
Narcotic Drugs was adopted in the early 1960s, and as described in chapter two, is based 
upon treaty law developed over the fifty years preceding it.  In this sense, the core tenets of 
international drug control law have been in force for a century. In addition, the obligations 
enshrined in the drug control treaties are of a continuing character, in that they describe what 
is intended to be a framework of ongoing international control and cooperation in the area of 
drugs. Pauwelyn characterises ‘continuing’ treaties as instruments in which the ‘regulatory 
framework or legal system...was created at one point in time but continues to exist and evolve 
over a mostly indefinite period’.668 He continues,
Most rules of modern multilateral conventions are of this nature...They are rules part 
of a framework or system which is continuously confirmed, implemented, adapted 
and expanded, for example, by means of judicial decisions, interpretations, new 
norms or the accession of new state parties...Such treaty norms were not only 
consented to when they originally emerged, but  continue to be confirmed, either 
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directly  or indirectly, throughout their existence, in particular when monitored and 
evolving within the context of an international organisation.669
This again is applicable to the international drug control conventions.  Therefore, following 
the approach of the International Court of Justice to the question of evolutive interpretation of 
treaties, it is clear that the drug conventions meet both of the Court’s tests for where dynamic 
interpretation is warranted.
6.6 The Case for a Dynamic, Human Rights-based Interpretation  of 
International Drug Control Law
Taking these conclusions a step further, and considering the utilitarian object and purpose 
alongside the telos of the regime, not only should the interpretation of drug treaty obligations 
evolve, but it should evolve in a dynamic manner consistent with, and in some cases directed 
by, obligations in international human rights law. The necessity of engaging other concurrent 
international legal regimes in interpreting the drug conventions is supported by the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties. Returning to the Article 31, which defines the ‘General 
rule of interpretation’ under the treaty, subsection (3)(c) identifies that ‘any relevant rules of 
international law applicable in the relations between the parties’ is one of the elements to ‘be 
thrown into a crucible, and their interaction would give the legally relevant interpretation’, 
using the description of the International Law Commission.670 Article 31(3)(c) allows for 
consideration not only of laws of custom, but also of other treaty obligations, in the process 
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of interpretation.671 As explained by Villiger, ‘[i]t is assumed that in entering treaty 
obligations, the parties did not intend to act inconsistently with other previous obligations’.672 
Indeed, according to Sorel and Eveno, the ‘context [of interpretation] also includes 
agreements with a bearing on the treaty [in question] as well as similar agreements between 
certain parties to the treaty which have been approved by other parties’.673 McLachlan 
describes this as reflecting the principle of ‘systemic integration’, arguing that ‘treaties are 
themselves creatures of international law. However wide their subject matter, they are all 
nevertheless limited in scope and are predicated for their existence and operation on being 
part of the international law system.’674
Article 31(3)(c) has been engaged by several international courts and tribunals to inform their 
interpretation of treaty provisions. The European Court of Human Rights, for example, has a 
long history of citing the Article 31 in its jurisprudence,675 accepting it as a ‘generally 
accepted principle of international law.’676 For example, in the 1975 case of Golder v United 
Kingdom, the Court explicitly cited Article 31(3)(c) in finding that ‘for the interpretation of 
the European Convention account is to be taken of those Articles subject, where appropriate, 
to "any relevant rules of the organization" - the Council of Europe - within which it has been 
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adopted’.677 It has subsequently reaffirmed its embrace of Article 31 in a number of cases, 
noting in Saadi v United Kingdom, for example, that ‘the Court must also take into account 
any relevant rules and principles of international law applicable in relations between the 
Contracting Parties’.678 In the case of Al-Adsani v United Kingdom, the Court again cited 
Article 31(3)(c), noting that the European ‘Convention should so far as possible be 
interpreted in harmony with other rules of international law of which it forms part’.679 The 
International Court of Justice has also cited Article 31(3)(c) in its jurisprudence, noting in the 
Oil Platforms Case that, when interpreting a provision of the Friendship Treaty between the 
United States and Iran, ‘[t]he Court cannot accept that Article XX, paragraph 1 (d), of the 
1955 Treaty was intended to operate wholly independently of the relevant rules of 
international law’.680  Similarly, the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization has 
invoked the principle, if not the actual provision, in its work, noting that the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade should not be interpreted ‘in clinical isolation from public 
international law’.681
As the Vienna Convention rule allows for the consideration of other treaty regimes within the 
interpretive process, and given the explicit invocation of this provision within the 
interpretative approaches of major international courts and adjudicatory bodies, it is 
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reasonable to conclude that the application of this principle to international drug control is a 
legitimate exercise. The question then becomes one of how should the obligations within the 
drug control treaties be interpreted in the context of concurrent commitments within 
international human rights law? Consideration of the object and purpose of the drug control 
regime explored in chapter five, in the context of the interpretive rules explored above, 
suggests not only that the principle of dynamic interpretation should be applied when 
interpreting international drug control law, but also that this interpretation should be done in a 
manner that is consistent with principles and parallel obligations under international human 
rights law.  As described in the 2006 Report of the Study Group on Fragmentation of 
International Law, 
[A]ll international law exists in systemic relationship with other law, no such 
application [of interpretation] can take place without situating the relevant 
jurisdiction-endowing instrument in its normative environment. This means that 
although a tribunal may  only have jurisdiction in regard to a particular instrument, it 
must always interpret and apply that instrument in its relationship  to its normative 
environment - that is to say “other” international law.682 [emphasis in original]
This question of situating a treaty within its ‘normative environment’ for the purposes of 
interpretation is key, as the object and purpose test applied to the international drug control 
regime illustrates that, in core areas, the normative environment of the drug control regime is 
also one shared by international human rights law.  This is important to the interpretive 
process as, in order for Article 31(3)(c) to be engaged, the other rules in question ‘have to be 
relevant, i.e., concern the subject-matter of the treaty term at issue’.683 
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In this case, both the concepts of ‘medical and scientific purposes’ and ‘concern for the health 
and welfare of mankind’ are integrally linked, if not inextricable, from international human 
rights norms. For example, the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, under Article 
25, enshrines the ‘right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of 
himself and of his family’,684 language very similar in both construction and content to ‘the 
health and welfare of mankind’ found in the preambles of the 1961 and 1971 drug treaties.  
Similarly, the 1946 Constitution of the World Health Organization describes ‘the enjoyment 
of the highest attainable standard of health’ as being ‘one of the fundamental rights of every 
human being’.685 The consideration of health and well-being within a human rights 
framework was therefore enshrined in important early United Nations instruments, 
suggesting that concepts of health, welfare and medical purposes as described in the drug 
treaties engaged human rights norms even at the time of their drafting.  In a present day 
context, where ‘the right to the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health’ has 
been enshrined within both the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights686 and the Convention on the Rights of the Child,687 the argument that the normative 
environment for international drug control law is one shared by international human rights 
law is compelling. Indeed, in addition to the right to health, the specific concept of medical 
and scientific purposes relates to, and must be considered alongside, the right to enjoy the 
benefit of scientific progress, originally enshrined under Article 27 of Universal Declaration 
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of Human Rights688 and later expressed under Article 15 of the Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights.689 
Examples of this common normative environment in practice, and the engagement between 
the two regimes, can be found in both the human rights and drug control systems. For 
example, the Committee on the Rights of the Child, in its General Comment on the right to 
health, ‘encourages States...to ratify the international drug conventions’, in this context 
viewing the obligations the drug treaties create within the context of Article 24 of the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child.690 In doing so, the Committee conceptualises drug 
control efforts as measures towards fulfillment of the right to health.  This suggests that the 
drug control regime’s overarching goal of promoting the health and welfare of mankind is not  
one that can be measured in drug control terms, as the presence of effective drug control does 
not in itself mean the presence of health and welfare. Realising this overarching purpose is 
one that can only be measured and achieved in human rights terms, where the success of drug 
control efforts is a single component. In the same General Comment, the Committee also 
‘underscores the importance of adopting a rights-based approach to substance use’, again 
demonstrating its perspective that drug control obligations engage, and must be interpreted in 
a manner consistent with, human rights norms.691
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Another example is found in the Single Convention’s preambular statement on the 
importance of the ‘adequate provision’ of medicines, and the need for States to ‘ensure the 
availability of narcotic drugs’ for the purpose of ‘the relief of pain and suffering’.692 This 
preambular section specifically engages State obligations under Article 12 of the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,693 as the Committee on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights considers that the fulfillment of the right to health includes proper access 
to essential drugs.694 In its General Comment on the right to health, the Committee includes 
such access among the Core Obligations of States.695  The Single Convention’s language on 
the importance of ‘ensur[ing] availability’ of controlled medicines also engages State 
obligations ‘to take positive measures that enable and assist individuals and communities to 
enjoy the right to health’, as described in the Committee’s General Comment.696 The failure 
of States to provide access to medicines to alleviate pain and suffering has also prompted 
critical comment from the UN Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment,697 evidence that the shared normative environment of the 
drug treaties extends beyond the right to health and also engages other human rights regimes.  
The example of access to controlled medicines also offers an illustration of the limitations of 
drug control alone as a tool in measuring progress towards achieving the regime’s object and 
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purpose. While the system of estimates and import/export controls established by the drug 
treaties can, in theory, measure the supplies of controlled medicines reaching an individual 
State, it does nothing to measure the impact of those medicines.  It does not measure, for 
example, whether medicines are being appropriately distributed within a State, or if they are 
having the desired impact of promoting health and welfare of the populace.  This requires 
human rights-based indicators and measurements, as illustrated by the comments of both the 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the Special Rapporteur on torture 
on this issue, again demonstrating the interconnectedness of the regimes and the common 
normative environment in which they exist.
Although significant, the right to the highest attainable standard of health is only one example 
where human rights law and drug control law intersect, and where an interpretation of drug 
control obligations must incorporate concurrent human rights obligations. According to the 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the right to health itself incorporates a 
broad range of other rights.
The right to health is closely  related to and dependent upon the realization of other 
human rights, as contained in the International Bill of Rights, including the rights to 
food, housing, work, education, human dignity, life, non-discrimination, equality, the 
prohibition against torture, privacy, access to information, and the freedoms of 
association, assembly and movement. These and other rights and freedoms address 
integral components of the right to health.698
Based upon the Committee’s approach, the normative environment in which the drug 
conventions operate and must be interpreted is extremely broad. As a result, according to the 
Barrett and Nowak, ‘[t]here are inevitable crossovers [between the two legal regimes], and 
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upon analysis, there is a strong case that the drug conventions are insufficient, alone, as a 
legal framework for the range and complexity of issues involved’.699 They argue that in many 
cases, human rights law must be the guide for what constitutes appropriate measures in drug 
control. They argue that ‘[w]here the drug conventions fail to legislate or are unclear, human 
rights law must fill the gaps’.700  
Explicit examples illustrating this point can be found within the core instruments of the two 
regimes. For example, Article 14(2) of the 1988 drug convention, which creates obligations 
for States to ‘Eradicate Illicit Cultivation of Narcotic Plants’, 701 states that 
Each Party shall take appropriate measures to prevent illicit  cultivation of and to 
eradicate plants containing narcotic or psychotropic substances, such as opium 
poppy, coca bush and cannabis plants, cultivated illicitly in its territory. The 
measures adopted shall respect fundamental human rights and shall take due account 
of traditional licit uses, where there is historic evidence of such use, as well as the 
protection of the environment.702
In this instance, engagement between the two regimes is not inferred, but is specifically 
prescribed.  Article 14(2) is in fact the only provision within the three UN drug treaties that 
explicitly mentions human rights.  While this is itself significant and worthy of attention, the 
context is of particular relevance to the question of evolutive treaty interpretation.  In 
directing that States take ‘appropriate measures’ to prevent cultivation and to eradicate illicit 
crops, it necessitates that a determination of what measures are, or are not, ‘appropriate’ must 
include an assessment of the human rights impacts of the measure in question. In essence, a 
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process of interpretation must be undertaken, and this process must include consideration of 
human rights norms, which are generally agreed to be evolutive.  Therefore, any 
interpretation of the obligation created under Article 14(2) must by definition not only be 
dynamic, but dynamic and human rights-based.  It is also notable that Article 14(2) includes 
environmental protection as an element that must be considered  in determining whether a 
measure is ‘appropriate’. As described above, the Appellate Body of the World Trade 
Organization considers that concepts of environmental protection are also evolutive in nature, 
again suggesting that this specific provision of the drug treaties must be subject to dynamic 
interpretation, and an interpretation be consistent with international environmental treaties.
Barrett and Veerman make a similar point in their work on Article 33 of the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child,703 the only provision within the United Nations human rights treaty 
regime to explicitly mention drugs.704 Under Article 33,
States parties shall take all appropriate measures, including legislative, 
administrative, social and educational measures, to protect children from illicit  use of 
narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances as defined in the relevant international 
treaties and to prevent the use of children in the illicit  production and trafficking of 
such substances.705
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In addressing the question of how drug control obligations should be interpreted in the 
context of children’s rights, Barrett and Veerman argue that ‘[w]hen it comes to children, the 
drug treaties must be read in the light of the [Convention on the Rights of the Child] to ensure 
appropriate interpretation’.706 Focussing on the language of ‘appropriate measures’ common 
to both Article 33 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child and Article 14(2) of the 1988 
drug treaty, they argue that any assessment of what is or is not ‘appropriate’ in the context of 
drug control or enforcement measures where children are affected must be made with best 
interests of the child at the centre, and therefore be consistent with and supportive of 
children’s rights norms, as ‘[t]he reverse would be anathema to the role of human rights as a 
check and balance against the impact of law and policy on individuals and groups.’707 Using 
a number of case examples from the drug control regime, including crop eradication and drug 
treatment, the authors conclude that in order for these obligations ‘to have relevance to 
children, and if their rights are to be respected, protected and fulfilled, [the obligations] must 
be read in the light of the [Convention on the Rights of the Child]’.708
Returning to the drug conventions, while the case for dynamic interpretation of Article 14(2) 
is clear, it would be nonsensical to suggest that evolutive interpretation of international drug 
control law be limited to this single provision.  Given the multiple areas in which drug treaty 
obligations engage other human rights norms, and applying Barrett and Veerman’s child 
rights approach to encompass the broader tapestry of rights protections, it is clear that a 
dynamic, human rights-based approach should also be applied when interpreting other areas 
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of the drug control regime.  For example, all three drug treaties include provisions on 
extradition709 and on penal sanctions.710 In both of these cases, international human rights law 
provide essential rules and safeguards regulating the behaviour of States that contribute to the 
normative environment occupied by the drug treaties. While international drug control law 
may define the content of State response, or the circumstances in which the response is 
triggered in the context of drugs, human rights law defines the limitations of those responses 
as they affect the rights of individuals.  Without such balances and safeguards, ‘appropriate’ 
drug control and enforcement measures ‘could be read to justify anything’.711
Therefore, rather than a limitation on where such a balancing process is warranted, Article 
14(2) should instead be seen as a window into how drug control measures emerging from 
treaty obligations should be interpreted in light of the normative environment as a whole.  If 
measures deemed ‘appropriate’ for controlling cultivation must include consideration of 
human rights, then surely those addressing penal laws and sanctions, extradition and health 
concerns must similarly undertake this same process, an interpretive process that is both 
dynamic and human rights-based.  When interpreting drug control obligations within the 
broader normative environment in which the treaties exist, for example, it cannot be the case 
that an ‘appropriate’ measure in drug control terms is one fundamentally ‘inappropriate’ in 
human rights terms.  As described by the Study Group on the Fragmentation of International 
Law, ‘[i]n international law, there is a strong presumption against normative conflict. Treaty 
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interpretation is diplomacy, and it is the business of diplomacy to avoid or mitigate conflict. 
This extends to adjudication as well.’712 Similarly, Jenks states it is ‘reasonable to presume, 
when the interpretation of an instrument is doubtful, that the parties intended it to be 
construed in a manner consistent with the obligations of some or all of them under other 
instruments’.713 This is also the approach of the European Court of Human Rights. 
Where a number of apparently  contradictory instruments are simultaneously 
applicable, international case-law and academic opinion endeavour to construe them 
in such a way as to coordinate their effects and avoid any opposition between them. 
Two diverging commitments must therefore be harmonised as far as possible so that 
they produce effects that are fully in accordance with existing law.714
 Clearly, then, the ‘correct’, or at least most preferable, interpretation is one that strives for 
consistency between all concurrent obligations.
6.7 Conclusion
Chapter six has proposed a dynamic, human-rights based interpretive approach be applied to 
international drug control law. Despite the strong case supporting such an approach, and the 
need for such a process to resolve current or future conflicts, the question remains as to where 
such matters are to be adjudicated, and how the progressive development of international law 
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will therefore take place. The areas of engagement between the two legal regimes is clear, as 
are some of the potential human rights impacts of State activities implemented to meet drug 
treaty obligations. However, unlike other legal regimes, such as world trade law, or even 
human rights law, international drug control law creates no judicial or adjudicatory body 
where such questions or disputes might be considered, and where such dynamic interpretation 
of drug control obligations might take place.  Therefore, dynamic interpretation of 
international drug control law will necessarily take place outside of the structures of the drug 
control regime itself.  The following chapter will explore the question of potential 
adjudicatory bodies, and examine existing jurisprudence where such conflicts have been 
addressed.
199
Chapter Seven —  Moving the ‘thumb on the scales’ - 
Towards a Dynamic Human Rights-based Interpretation 
of International Drug Control Law
Drug abuse and illicit trafficking are dynamic processes; consequently any effective 
response to them must also be dynamic.715
International Narcotics Control Board
For the purposes of balancing, some laws (or parts of laws) will of necessity  be more 
equal than others.716 
Justice Albie Sachs
7.1 Introduction
Previous chapters have explored the evolution of the international legal regime of drug 
control.  They have examined the historic tensions within the regime, and their impacts on 
human rights in the modern era; the object and purpose of the international drug conventions; 
and made the case that the drug treaties must be interpreted in a dynamic fashion, particularly 
where their provisions engage human rights.  The final questions to be considered are where 
such a process of dynamic interpretation should take place, and how it might be applied. In 
short, what might a ‘fifth stage’ of international drug control law look like in practice?  This 
chapter will explore these questions. It will review the key international and domestic fora 
through which a dynamic interpretation of drug control law might take place.  It will also 
consider how a dynamic human rights-based interpretation of international drug control law 
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might proceed, using the examples examined in chapter four, that resolve regime tensions and 
conflicts in a manner that promotes human rights.  Through this process, the chapter will 
offer principles of how a ‘fifth stage’ of international drug control law should develop.
 
7.2 Key Interpretive Bodies
  
It has been observed that treaty ‘interpretation occupies a prime position on the crossroads 
between law and politics’.717  This assessment is certainly appropriate to describe the 
interpretive challenges in this context, where both international drug control law and 
international human rights law are regimes intertwined with domestic and international 
history and politics.   Coupled with this existential challenge is the more immediate one of 
identifying in what venue(s) the dynamic human rights-based interpretation of international 
drug control law might take place. As explored in chapter two, international drug control law 
establishes a system of indirect control, in which the treaties define the laws and 
administrative practices that States are required to implement within their own territories, as 
well as creating a supervisory organ to monitor and assist States in fulfilling these 
obligations.   Unlike some other areas of international law, international drug control law 
provides no formal adjudication mechanism or body through which tensions or conflicts 
might be examined, and dynamic interpretation might occur. Therefore, rather than taking 
place via the jurisprudence of a central court or other body, a ‘fifth stage’ of international 
drug control must necessarily emerge from the interaction between several key fora, each 
with its own role to play in, and mandate to influence, this process.  The most influential 
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actors in this context are the International Narcotics Control Board, domestic constitutional 
courts and international human rights courts and treaty bodies.  
7.2.1 International Narcotics Control Board
As was described in chapter two, the International Narcotics Control Board is the treaty body 
established under the 1961 drug convention to monitor State compliance with the regime.718 
Although the Board’s primary functions are technical in nature, over the years it has taken on 
what it describes itself as a ‘quasi-judicial’ role regarding the treaties,719 and is often 
characterised as being the ‘guardian of the conventions’.720  While it possesses no direct 
powers of sanction for treaty violation, the Board does wield significant moral authority 
through its ability to ‘name and shame’ States via its high profile annual reports, as well as to 
influence an overall tone of the regime towards drug control and related issues.721  Therefore, 
the Board has a potentially significant role in ‘fifth stage’ interpretive processes. 
That said, numerous human rights criticisms have been legitimately leveled at the Board in 
the past, ranging from its failure to criticise abusive State policies and practices, to its 
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praising of human rights violating governments for their supposed success in combatting 
drug trafficking.722  In addition, the Board has historically resisted any suggestion that it has a 
human rights mandate, or that its deliberations should be informed by human rights 
concerns.723  As a result, the response from some observers has been to argue that the Board’s 
functions should be limited to narrow technical parameters, and therefore isolate it from 
engagement with broader policy and rights issues.724 Others have suggested that the principle 
of State sovereignty means that the Board’s ability to legitimately criticise individual 
governments on drug control should be curtailed.725  Such proposals appear rooted in 
critiques of the Board’s practice and public statements on key issues, which, it can be argued, 
is more reflective of the individual membership of the Board, rather than its mandate as an 
international treaty organ.  On the other hand, Barrett and Nowak argue against the narrowing 
of the Board’s mandate and functions, proposing instead an ‘alternative view, that the INCB 
has an important role in ensuring not only that the drug conventions are applied, but applied 
in full conformity with human rights. This would means expanding the Board’s mandate, 
rather than limiting it, demanding an invigorated Board membership.’726  
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If a ‘fifth stage’ drug control regime is to emerge, in which human rights become a central 
feature, the role of the International Narcotics Control Board is indeed a critical one, not least  
because the tone of the Board’s work, and whether or not it chooses to embrace human rights 
norms, has an influence on State practice.  For example, in a 2014 case before the Supreme 
Court of India on the death penalty for drug offences, the State’s submission in defense of its 
capital drug laws cited the absence of Board criticism of such laws as evidence that the 
practice was supported under the international drug control treaties.  According to the State, 
[T]here has never been any objection from the INCB regarding the provision of the 
death penalty in the NDPS [Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances] Act...It is 
therefore apparent that even the body which is mandated to ensure compliance of the 
UN Drug Conventions has no objection to the presence of capital punishment in the 
NDPS Act. It is, therefore, wrong to say  that such provisions are contrary to the UN 
Conventions.727
Given its central role within the regime, and its influence on States’ perceptions and practice, 
a ‘fifth stage’ of international drug control law cannot emerge without the active engagement 
and support of the International Narcotics Control Board.  While the role of the Board is 
critical, playing such a constructive role would require a fundamental shift in the way the 
Board conceptualises its mandate, and carries out its activities. Csete details a number of 
needed areas of Board reform in this regard, in order for it to play a positive role in limiting 
‘the ready tendency of states to limit human rights in the name of drug control’. 728  While the 
challenges in moving the Board forward in this fashion should not be underestimated, they 
are less difficult than are the challenges of shaping a human-rights based approach to drug 
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control in the face of an openly obstructionist treaty organ at the centre of the drug control 
regime.
7.2.2 Domestic Courts
As the Indian Supreme Court case above illustrates, a second critical forum for the dynamic 
human rights-based interpretation of international drug control law are domestic 
Constitutional Courts.  The role of national high courts in this regard is crucial for a number 
of reasons.  The first is that the system of indirect control established by the drug treaties 
means that drug administrative, control and enforcement practices are the responsibility of 
States to implement, therefore placing these activities and policies squarely within the realm 
of national legislation and domestic court oversight.  The second is that all three drug treaties 
contain various caveats on key provisions, specifying that the relevant obligations are subject 
to domestic or constitutional law.  These are generally described as ‘safeguard clauses’,729 
examples of which are found in Articles 35 (‘Action Against the Illicit Traffic’) and Article 
36 (‘Penal Provisions’) of the 1961 Convention.730  Article 36 specifies that its obligations are 
‘[s]ubject to...constitutional limitations’,731 and that ‘[n]othing contained in this article shall 
affect the principle that the offences to which it refers shall be defined, prosecuted and 
punished in conformity with the domestic law of a Party’.732 Similar safeguard clauses are 
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present in the 1988 Convention,  particularly in ‘the more contentious penal provisions’733 
under several parts of Article 3, which are ‘subject to [the State’s] constitutional principles 
and the basic concepts of its legal system’.734 Similar clauses within the 1988 treaty are found 
at Article 5 on confiscation of property 735 and Article 6 on extradition,736 among others.737  As 
mentioned in chapter six, one safeguard clause worthy of particular note is Article 14 on the 
eradication of illicit crops, the only provision within the three treaties with a specific 
provision specifying that the ‘measures adopted shall respect fundamental human rights’.738 
Therefore, domestic high courts have a clear role to play in the evolution of a ‘fifth stage’ of 
drug control, and in applying national constitutional rights to issues of drugs.739  However, 
such balancing tests are not without their own risks and challenges.  As described by Boister, 
‘limitation clauses provide no guarantee of constitutional limitation. A municipal court 
may...choose to limit the constitutional protection rather than the domestic law flowing from 
the treaty provision and justify doing so by giving disproportionate weight to the international 
authority behind the domestic law’.740  Therefore, in order for domestic courts to contribute to 
the development of the ‘fifth stage’ of international drug control, they would be required to 
adopt a dynamic human rights-based approach to considering tensions and conflicts taking 
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place within national law, or between national law and international obligations, as will be 
explored below.
7.2.3 United Nations and Regional Human Rights Mechanisms
A third key forum for dynamic interpretation to emerge is within international human rights 
courts and treaty bodies themselves.  Given the multiple areas in which drug control and 
enforcement activities have an impact on human rights protection, as discussed in previous 
chapters, there is a clear role for human rights courts and treaty bodies to be active agents in 
shaping ‘fifth stage’ drug control.  This could take place through specific challenges before 
courts, though periodic reporting functions, general comments or the consideration of 
individual complaints (where such a mechanism exists) of treaty bodies. Given that the 
principle of evolutive interpretation is well established within international human rights 
jurisprudence,741 the potential to expand this approach in the context of drug control issues is 
significant.  However, this will again require the human rights bodies to confidently embrace 
their role as a legitimate voice of oversight on drug control issues, which, as was explored in 
earlier chapters, has been far from common practice. Indeed, human rights bodies have 
traditionally been quite silent in commenting directly on drug control issues.
7.3 ‘Nullification’ as an Obstacle to Dynamic Interpretation
Several different domestic and international legal fora have potentially significant roles to 
play in shaping a ‘fifth stage’ of international drug control law. Indeed, questions of drug 
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control law and human rights law have been considered before domestic constitutional courts, 
as well as international courts and treaty bodies in both the human rights and drug control 
regimes.  However, in reviewing the approach of these bodies, a trend is often apparent that 
stands in the way of the development of a dynamic, human rights-based approach to treaty 
interpretation. This trend might be described as a process of ‘nullification’, which is exhibited 
in two divergent but equally problematic ways, and might be described as ‘passive 
nullification’ and ‘active nullification’.  
As explored in previous chapters, the relevant drug control and human rights treaty bodies 
rarely consider the intersection between these two international legal regimes in their 
deliberations, or do not embrace a mandate to comment in an inter-disciplinary fashion on an 
area often seen as outside their mandates. As a result, the UN human rights treaty bodies 
rarely comment on drug control issues, and the International Narcotics Control Board rarely 
mentions human rights issues. The result is a process of passive nullification, in which a 
narrow focus solely on their own legal regimes creates institutional blinders, nullifying any 
consideration of the many important areas where those regimes intersect and mutually affect 
the realisation of both objectives.  The proportionally tiny number of examples where the 
treaty bodies of one regime have commented robustly on the other is evidence that passive 
nullification represents a clear institutional barrier to the development of a ‘fifth stage’ of 
drug control. Indeed, a continuation of passive nullification in this manner will mean 
dynamic interpretation cannot develop, as the failure of each regime to engage with the legal 
obligations of the other means no interpretative process even takes place.   
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The second form, active nullification, is found where an interpretative process has taken 
place.  In these cases, the court or other adjudicative body has decided that drug control law 
either supersedes the relevant human right protections, or that the objective of drug 
suppression is so pressing that the human rights questions need not be considered at all, or 
not considered in a robust manner.  In effect, the objectives of drug control are allowed to 
trump human rights obligations.  Examples of active nullification are evident at both 
domestic and international level, and within both legal regimes.
For example, the International Narcotics Control Board has traditionally maintained a 
position that it has no human rights mandate, an opinion expressed both by the Board’s 
Secretariat742 as well as by its past President.743 As a consequence, the Board has, on 
numerous occasions, failed to express concerns about human rights abuses committed in the 
name of drug control.  Going even further, the narrow focus on drug control in isolation from 
human rights considerations has led to instances where the Board’s influential Annual Report 
has praised States for what are known to be fundamentally abusive policies.  For example, in 
Thailand in 2003 more than two thousand people were killed by police during a government 
led ‘war on drugs’. Despite wide criticism of the government by human rights monitors,744 
the Board failed to criticise the execution campaign, commenting only that it ‘trusts that the 
Government will continue to provide information to it regarding the progress of those 
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investigations’.745 The Board’s Annual Reports also have a history of commending 
governments for their ‘success’ in combatting drugs, in cases where the drug policies of the 
countries in question have been criticised as human rights violations.746  On the other side, 
the Board has been openly hostile towards governments that have implemented harm 
reduction programmes to prevent HIV infections among people who inject drugs,747 
approaches that are widely supported by other United Nations agencies.748  In effect, the 
Board’s exclusive focus on drug control has actively nullified any consideration of the human 
rights impacts, both negative and positive, of the drug control policies and activities it is 
mandated to monitor, a result that has been widely criticised by human rights advocates.749  
Indeed, the Board has in the past gone on record to affirm that commenting on domestic laws 
and policies, such as the death penalty for drug offences, ‘lie beyond the mandate and powers 
which have been conferred upon the Board by the international community’.750
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While one might expect to find active nullification in the work of the International Narcotics 
Control Board, given its location within the drug control regime, this approach is also found 
in the work of UN and regional human rights treaty bodies.  A particularly illustrative 
example is the case of Prince v South Africa of the UN Human Rights Committee in 2007. 
The case concerned a qualified attorney (Prince), who was Rastafarian.  The use of cannabis 
is a central tenet of the Rastafarian faith, and Prince had two convictions for cannabis 
offences on his criminal record as a result.  These drug charges, along with Prince’s assertion 
that he would continue to use cannabis as part of his religious practice, led the Law Society to 
reject his application for registration as a lawyer.  In effect, he was ‘placed in a position 
where he must choose between his faith and his legal career’.751 Prince unsuccessfully took 
his case as far as the South African Constitutional Court, where a narrowly divided Court 
ruled against him.752  Before the Human Rights Committee, he argued that the decisions of 
the South African courts violated his rights under Article 18(1) of the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights, which enshrines both the freedom of religion and the right ‘to 
manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching’.753 
Whether or not one agrees with Prince on the merits, there are clearly legal questions to be 
balanced in coming to a reasoned judgement. Indeed, both the majority and minority opinions 
in the judgement from the South African Constitutional Court engaged in such tests, coming 
to a divided 5-4 decision against him.754 However, the approach of the Human Rights 
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Committee was that such a robust test was not necessary or warranted. In the key paragraph 
of the judgement, 
The Committee observes that the prohibition of the possession and use of cannabis, 
which constitutes the limitation on the author’s freedom to manifest his religion, is 
prescribed by the law....It further notes the State party’s conclusion that the law in 
question was designed to protect public safety, order, health, morals or the 
fundamental rights and freedoms of others, based on the harmful effects of cannabis, 
and that an exemption allowing a system of importation, transportation and 
distribution to Rastafarians may constitute a threat to the public at large, were any  of 
the cannabis enter into general circulation. Under these circumstances the 
Committee cannot conclude that the prohibition of the possession and use of 
drugs, without any exemption for specific religious groups, is not proportionate 
and necessary to achieve this purpose. The Committee finds that the failure of the 
State party  to grant Rastafarians an exemption to its general prohibition of 
possession and use of cannabis is, in the circumstances of the present case, justified 
under article 18, paragraph 3, and accordingly finds that the facts of the case do not 
disclose a violation of article 18, paragraph 1.755 (emphasis added)
In its judgement, the Committee cites Article 18(3) of the Covenant, which states that the 
freedom of religion ‘may be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are 
necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and 
freedoms of others’.756 Article 18(3) demands a proportionality test.  However, the 
Committee failed to conduct a thoughtful test in this instance.  
In its opinion, the Committee notes that cannabis prohibition, which was the source of the 
limitation on Prince, was prescribed by law.  However, this fact was not in dispute.  Rather, 
the test should have focussed on whether that law was in fact proper and proportionate 
response ‘necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights 
and freedoms of others’.  Yet rather than interrogate the merits of the Government law in this 
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regard,  the Committee instead deferred to the ‘State party’s [own] conclusion’ that the 
legislation met these thresholds. It can hardly be imagined that the State would suggest its 
own law was anything other than appropriate. Therefore, the Committee’s uncritical 
acceptance of the State’s own assessment of the purpose and effect of its drug laws not only 
actively nullified consideration of the freedom of religion, it also nullified the need to 
properly weigh the merits of the case.  Such an outcome was presciently described by Justice 
Albie Sachs in his dissent to the majority opinion in Prince before the South African 
Constitutional Court.  Wrote Sachs,
[T]here is the tendency  somnambulistically to sustain the existing system of 
administration of justice and the mind-set that goes with it, simply  because, like 
Everest, it is there; in the words of Burger CJ, it  is necessary  to be aware of 
“requirements of contemporary society exerting a hydraulic insistence on conformity 
to majoritarian standards.”757
The African Commission on Human and People’s Rights also adopted an active nullification 
approach in its hearing of the Prince case, finding that ‘the respondent state's interest to do 
away with the use of cannabis and its abuse/trafficking...constitutes a legitimate limitation on 
the exercise of the right to freedom of religion within the spirit of article 27(2) cum article 
8’.758  Prince also argued before the African Commission that his right to occupational choice 
under Article 15 had also been violated in the decision of the Law Society. Again, the 
Commission took an active nullification approach, noting ‘the legitimate interest the state has 
in restricting the use and possession of cannabis’ and that his right to choose a profession was 
not violated ‘as he himself chose...to disqualify himself from inclusion by choosing to 
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confront the legitimate restrictions’ of the Law Society.759 In effect, the Commission found 
that in choosing to observe his religious practice and use cannabis, Price was also making the 
decision to be barred from registration as an attorney.
Examples of an active nullification approach are also evident in domestic jurisprudence. One 
example is the 2007 case of Edith Yunita Sianturi and others, before the Constitutional Court 
of Indonesia.760 The case examined the question of the death penalty for drug offences, and 
whether such offences met the threshold of ‘most serious crimes’ necessary for capital 
punishment under Article 6(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.761 
Although recognising the evidence from the petitioners that the UN Human Rights 
Committee, the body that oversees the Covenant, had found that drug offences do not meet 
this threshold, the majority of the Constitutional Court justices ruled that Indonesia’s status as 
a State Party to the 1988 drug convention superseded its international human rights 
obligations. Specifically, the judgement referred to Article 24 of the 1988 Convention, which 
states that, ‘[a] Party may adopt more strict or severe measures than those provided by this 
Convention if, in its opinion, such measures are desirable or necessary for the prevention or 
suppression of illicit traffic’.762 Referring to Article 24, the Court stated, 
In other words...if according to Indonesia, more severe measures are needed to 
prevent and eradicate such crimes, such measures are not contradictory  to but rather 
are justified and suggested instead by  the [1988 drug] Convention. This means that 
Indonesia as a state party adopting the system of capital punishment against certain 
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Narcotics criminals has the right to determine capital punishment to the Narcotics 
criminals.763
In its judgment, the Court found that Article 24 of the 1988 drug convention actively nullified 
the effect of Article 6(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The 
majority opinion judgement took this logic a step further, commenting that the drug 
conventions, or at least the Court’s own interpretation of them, occupied a higher status in 
law than did the Covenant as interpreted by the Human Rights Committee.
The consequences of Indonesia’s participation in the Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances Convention [sic] in order to take more strict national 
measures in legally eradicating Narcotics crimes shall have a higher degree of 
binding force in the light of international law sources, as regulated in Article 38 
Paragraph (1) of the Statute of International Court of Justice than the opinion of the 
Human Rights Commission of the United Nations [sic] to the effect that crimes 
related to the drugs abuse do not belong to the category of the most serious crimes.764
The examples cited above illustrate the degree to which both passive and active nullification 
act as impediments to the evolution of a ‘fifth stage’ of international drug control law.  Were 
passive nullification the only barrier, then the challenges could be met simply by encouraging 
the relevant legal bodies to adopt more inter-disciplinary and holistic approaches to their 
respective mandates.  In doing do, the legal contours of a ‘fifth stage’ approach would 
organically begin to evolve. However, the risk of active nullification demonstrates that 
simply promoting inter-disciplinary thinking between the regimes is insufficient to ensure 
that the outcome is an interpretive approach that safeguards human rights.  Therefore, the 
question of how actual tensions and conflicts between the regimes should be balanced in a 
manner that avoids active nullification is critical.
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7.4 Towards a ‘Fifth Stage’ of Drug Control Law
Chapter five examined how the norms of international drug control law and international 
human rights law interact in one of three ways: complementarity, tension or conflict.  For the 
purposes of a dynamic ‘fifth stage’ of drug control, consideration of complementary or 
accumulating norms is of little concern, as these norms by definition add to or reinforce the 
normative content of each other. The challenge instead is how to resolve those instances of 
regime tension, where the implementation of drug control law, policy or enforcement breach 
human rights protections without an explicit treaty obligation to undertake such actions; and 
regime conflict, where a Party to the drug control and human rights treaties cannot 
simultaneously comply with its obligations under both regimes.  
In the words of South African Supreme Court Justice Albie Sachs, in his spirited dissent to 
the Court’s majority opinion against Prince,
In my view the majority judgment [against Prince] puts a thumb on the scales in 
favour of ease of law enforcement, and gives insufficient weight to the impact the 
measure will have, not only  on the fundamental rights of the appellant and 
his...community, but on the basic notion of tolerance and respect for diversity that 
our Constitution demands for and from all in our society.765
As explored above, Justice Sachs’s metaphor of a ‘a thumb on the scales in favour of ease of 
law enforcement’ neatly describes the process of active nullification of human rights 
considerations. Therefore, a central challenge in developing a ‘fifth stage’ of  international 
drug control is, at minimum, to remove the drug enforcement ‘thumb on the scales’ of justice 
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that causes active nullification, thereby allowing the regimes to rebalance in favour of human 
rights.  Indeed, in some cases a dynamic, human-rights based interpretation will require not 
simply removing the thumb, but moving its force squarely onto the human rights side of the 
scales. Although engaging different interpretive processes and logics, a dynamic interpretive 
approach demands that both tensions and conflicts between the regimes be resolved in a 
manner in which the thumb is clearly on the side of the scales that ensures human rights are 
safeguarded.
7.4.1 Resolving Regime Tensions
Regime tensions are, by definition, not the outcome of a State implementing explicit drug 
treaty obligations, but rather are the result of how an obligation is be interpreted. Because 
tensions are not a consequence of explicit regime conflicts, and because ‘[i]n international 
law, there is a strong presumption against normative conflict’,766 a dynamic interpretive 
approach must necessarily be one that brings these laws, policies or practices into conformity 
with international human rights law. The process for resolving tensions through a dynamic 
approach can be illustrated using the three areas of regime tension explored in chapter four: 
the death penalty for drug offences, compulsory detention in the name of drug treatment and 
the provision of harm reduction services to active drug users.
7.4.1.1  Death Penalty for Drug Offences
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As discussed previously, the death penalty for drugs has been a key area of regime tension 
between States and international human rights bodies.  As seen in the Indonesian case above, 
it is also an issue that has led to some troubling jurisprudence at domestic level, where 
international drug control obligations have been used to actively nullify human rights.  
However, despite the controversial history of the issue of the death penalty for drug offences, 
it is actually a question for which a dynamic interpretive approach offers a clear resolution.  
Given the ‘strong presumption against normative conflict’ in international law,767 when 
balancing competing, or apparently competing, treaty obligations, the preferred interpretation 
is one that strives for consistency between all concurrent obligations for, as characterised by 
Jenks, ‘[i]t seems reasonable to start from a general presumption against conflict’.768 
A dynamic interpretive approach to international drug control law takes this premise and 
operationalises it. In this case, none of the three drug treaties make mention of capital 
punishment.  However, even if one were to accept a suggestion that the silence of the treaties 
on this question means that the death penalty is an allowable sanction within international 
drug control law, as was the opinion of the Constitutional Court of Indonesia769 and the 
argument of the Government of India,770 at the same time the drug treaties clearly do not 
obligate or compel States to enact capital drug laws.  Therefore, even if allowed within the 
terms of the drug conventions, legislating for capital punishment for drug offences is clearly 
not required by the treaties.  On the other hand, executions for drug offences are illegal under 
international human rights law, as described in chapter four. As a consequence, the only 
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interpretive conclusion consistent with the international legal environment as a whole, 
avoiding normative conflict, is that capital punishment for drugs is unacceptable. 
International drug control law does not obligate capital punishment, therefore not executing 
people for drug offences does not violate any drug treaty obligations.  At the same time, 
executions for drug offences do violate international human rights law. Therefore, an 
abolitionist national drug law is the only option consistent with both legal regimes, violating 
neither.  This approach is again one consistent with the findings of the Fragmentation Report, 
which concluded that ‘[i]t is a generally accepted principle that when several norms bear on a 
single issue they should, to the extent possible, be interpreted so as to give rise to a single set 
of compatible obligations’.771
7.4.1.2  Compulsory Detention in the name of ‘Drug Treatment’
A similar exercise undertaken on the question of compulsory detention for drug use again 
illustrates that adopting a dynamic interpretive approach results in a conclusion that 
safeguards human rights, and repudiates repressive drug policies.  As described in chapter 
four, the compulsory detention en masse of persons who use, or are suspected of using, illegal 
drugs is a widespread issue of concern in a number of countries.  It is also a policy that has 
received criticism from human rights bodies as constituting a form of arbitrary detention, 
violating the right to liberty and security.  The 1961 and 1971 drug treaties create clear 
obligations for States to provide drug treatment services.772 However, similar to the question 
of the death penalty above, this obligation to provide treatment does not create a requirement 
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to force people into treatment, or to detain them against their will for such purpose.  In fact, 
the draft history of Article 28 of the 1961 Convention reveals just the opposite. 
The question of whether involuntary or compulsory drug treatment should be explicitly 
included within Article 38 was the source of significant debate during the plenipotentiary 
conference that finalised the draft treaty, driven primarily by the United States delegation, 
which argued that ‘[t]reatment in liberty had failed wherever it had been tried’.773 The U.S. 
proposed language that States Parties ‘shall use their best endeavours to establish facilities for 
the compulsory treatment of drug addicts in closed institutions’.774  Although the U.S. 
proposal received some support,775 it was eventually amended to remove reference to 
compulsory treatment in closed facilities, and instead the term ‘adequate facilities’ was 
agreed for use in the final treaty text.776  Given the content of these drafting debates, and the 
specific and deliberate decision to delete reference to ‘compulsory treatment of drug addicts 
in closed institutions’ from the final 1961 treaty, it is difficult to make the case that 
international drug control law requires the use of involuntary detention or compulsory drug 
treatment. Moreover, from the perspective of international human rights law, the practice is 
clearly illegal, constituting breaches of both the right to liberty and security and the right to 
consent to treatment.777  As compulsory detention is not required by treaty, the failure to 
220
773 1961 Official Records vol I (n 238) 103
774 1961 Official Records vol II (n 297) 18.  Article 38 of the final treaty was debated 
as draft Article 47.
775 The Official Records indicate support from Canada, China, India, Iran and the  
United Arab Republic. 1961 Official Records vol I (n 238) 103, 106.
776 1961 Convention amended (n 203) art 38.
777 See, for example, UN General Assembly, ‘Special Rapporteur Health 2010’ (n 23) 
para 38.; Lines, ‘Treatment in Liberty’ (n 467).
provide it is not a breach of international drug control law.  However, the compulsory 
detention of persons on the basis of providing drug treatment is a violation of international 
human rights law. Therefore, this tension again is one that is necessarily resolved in favour of 
human rights, as the prohibition of mass detention for the purposes of drug treatment is the 
only solution that is consistent with both legal regimes, violating neither.
7.4.1.3 Harm Reduction
The same result is found when a dynamic process is applied to the question of the provision 
of harm reduction services such as needle and syringe programmes, access to opioid 
substitution treatments such as methadone and safe injecting facilities for people who use 
illicit drugs.   Despite the controversy that discussions of harm reduction create at the 
international level,778 the provision of harm reduction services is not prohibited by the 
international drug control treaties.  Although the approach of the International Narcotics 
Control Board towards harm reduction has been at best ‘lukewarm’779 and at worst ‘generally 
hostile’,780 the Board does not, in the main, argue that key harm reduction interventions such 
and needle exchange and methadone are illegal.  A significant departure is the Board’s 
opposition to safe injecting facilities, which was discussed in chapter four.  In addition, the 
conclusion of the Legal Affairs Section of the UN Drug Control Program in 2002 on the 
question of harm reduction within the framework of the international drug control treaties 
was that not only needle exchange and opioid substitution, but also safe injecting facilities, 
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were legal health interventions under the treaties.781  Therefore, despite the contentious nature 
of the harm reduction question within many UN bodies, there is no credible basis upon which 
to suggest the approach is prohibited under the drug treaties.  Within international human 
rights law, on the other hand, there is growing recognition that access to harm reduction 
constitutes a component element of the right to health under Article 12 of the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,782 essential to the fulfillment of that right 
among people who use drugs.  The UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Health has 
specifically highlighted access to harm reduction within the context of Article 12, calling on 
States to ‘ensure that all harm-reduction measures...are available to people who use drugs’.783 
Therefore, taking a dynamic approach, the provision of harm reduction services does not 
breach the drug conventions, while the failure to provide them in increasingly seen to be a 
violation of the right to health under international human rights law.  As a result, provision of 
harm reduction services by States is the only solution that is consistent with both regimes, 
violating neither.
A dynamic approach therefore offers a clear interpretive process for the resolution of the vast 
majority of human rights violations taking place under the auspices of drug control, namely 
those resulting from tensions rather than conflicts between the two regimes.  Significantly, it 
offers an approach that has the effect of ensuring human rights are safeguarded, even as drug 
control treaty obligations are themselves fulfilled.  In doing so, the risk of the active 
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nullification of internal human rights law is minimised or even eliminated.  The second 
question is how a dynamic approach should be undertaken in instances where the two 
regimes come into explicit conflict.
 7.4.2 Resolving Regime Conflicts
Human rights violations resulting from regime tensions are perhaps the most obvious and 
widespread, and as discussed above are perhaps easiest to resolve in favour of human rights 
protection using established rules of interpretation. However, the question of conflicts 
between treaty obligations within the two regimes, ‘where simultaneous compliance with the 
obligations of different instruments is impossible’,784 must also be considered. Although these 
instances are less frequent in the context of human rights and drug control than are the 
tensions, they nonetheless require attention when considering the development of a ‘fifth 
stage’ of drug control.  This section will explore a dynamic interpretative approach using the 
two examples of regime conflict described in chapter four, the traditional uses of coca and the 
application of more severe measures.
7.4.2.1  Traditional Uses of Coca
Article 49 of the 1961 Convention is perhaps the clearest example of regime conflict between 
the drug control and human rights legal systems, creating a positive obligation to eradicate 
the chewing of the coca leaf,785 a traditional practice of cultural significance to many 
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indigenous peoples in the Andean region of South America. Article 49 therefore comes into 
explicit conflict with State obligations to protect the traditional cultural practices of 
indigenous peoples reflected in multiple human rights instruments and the work of human 
rights bodies.786  The challenge of resolving this conflict was addressed in a 2013 article by 
Pfeiffer, which serves to illustrate the inherent limitations of a traditional interpretive 
approach when balancing obligations in drug control law and human rights law.  While not 
intending to do so, the article affirms the need for a dynamic approach to prevent human 
rights protection from being actively nullified by drug control law.  
Pfeiffer’s interpretive approach is built on the assumption that ‘[g]iven the rigidity of the 
rules on drug control, it is necessary to consider whether the rules on the rights of indigenous 
peoples are more flexible in allowing for harmonization and systemic integration’.787 In other 
words, he begins the balancing process from the presumption that only human rights 
obligations offer flexibility or interpretative space in this matter, which has the inevitable 
consequence of putting ‘a thumb on the scales’ in favour of international drugs control law 
over international human rights law. The analysis adopts a proportionality test using a human 
rights framework, yet one in which the drug control norm is deemed sacrosanct and the only 
relevant interpretive question is to what degree, and under what conditions, it is acceptable to 
limit indigenous rights.  The idea that drug control norms should themselves be open to 
evolutive interpretation, particularly in the context of the codification and expansion of the 
224
786 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (n 338) art 27.; International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (n 436) art 27.; International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (n 421) art 15.; Committee on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination (n 510) paras 4-5.; United Nations Declaration on 
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (n 511) art 31.
787 Pfeiffer (n 49) 313.
international law on indigenous rights in the decades subsequent to the entry into force of the 
1961 drug treaty, does not enter into the analysis.  Pfeiffer himself recognises the limitations 
of this approach, which he admits inevitably undermines human rights protection, as ‘the 
rules in question can be harmonized only by restricting the right of indigenous peoples to 
their customs and traditions’.788  He continues,
States who are obliged to implement the prohibition on coca leaf chewing can 
restrict the right of indigenous peoples to their customs and traditions, but should 
follow the appropriate procedures to do so in consultation with the peoples 
concerned, in line with the object and purpose of the relevant instruments. Although 
this outcome appears legally sound, it is not very favorable to the rights of 
indigenous peoples, because the balance to be drawn will be tilted in favor of the 
abolition of coca leaf chewing.789  
Pfeiffer’s conclusion touches on the critical question in the context of dynamic interpretation, 
‘whether the rule to abolish coca leaf chewing has lost its legitimacy and whether the 
principle of harmonization should be applied in this case’.790  Given the extensive framework 
of international legal protection for indigenous rights that has emerged since 1961, any 
interpretive process occurring in a modern legal context cannot be anchored on the notion of 
Article 49 as a rigid norm. Pauwelyn characterises this type of conflict as a ‘conflict in the 
applicable law’, or a case in which ‘[c]ompliance with, or exercise of the rights under, one of 
the two norms constitutes breach under the other norm’.791 In resolving such situations, the 
question is not ‘which of the two norms survives, but which of the two norms applies. In that 
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sense, “conflict of applicable law” is a question of “choice of law”; not one of validity or 
legality of one norm in the light of another norm.’792  Says Pauwelyn,
In terms of state responsibility...only the rule that must finally be applied can be 
breached and result in responsibility. The discarded rule does not apply and can 
hence a fortiori not be breached. However, although this rule is disapplied in the 
particular circumstances, it is not declared invalid nor is it  in any way seen as an 
‘illegal’ rule. It is simply a rule that must give way to another in one in the 
circumstances. In other circumstances, the discarded rule may continue to apply.793
The circumstances described by Pauwelyn neatly characterise the conflict regarding the 
traditional uses of coca. The application of Article 49 on coca does not universally conflict 
with international human rights obligations on indigenous rights. For States without a 
tradition of coca chewing, even those with large indigenous populations, Article 49 poses no 
inherent human rights conflict. However, for those few countries where traditional 
indigenous use of coca is evident, a conflict exists for those governments seeking to fulfil 
their obligations under both regimes.  Resolving this conflict demands an evolutive, human 
rights-based approach. As written by Justice Albie Sachs in his dissent in the Prince case, 
‘[f]or the purposes of balancing, some laws (or parts of laws) will of necessity be more equal 
than others.’794  
In this case, and in these States, the laws on indigenous rights are the ‘more equal’ laws for 
the purposes of interpretation, and adopting a dynamic approach requires that the 
international legal protection of the cultural rights of indigenous coca-using communities 
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should prevail over Article 49 of the 1961 drug convention.  To paraphrase Pauwelyn, the 
rule in the drug treaty must ‘give way’ to the rule in human rights law in this particular 
circumstance, given the current development of international law as a whole.  The Judge v 
Canada case before the Human Rights Committee, where the Committee found that ‘a 
broadening international consensus in favour of abolition of the death penalty’ was a 
sufficient basis to ‘review...the scope of the application of the rights protected’ under Article 6 
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights795 offers an instructive parallel 
example of how a dynamic interpretive approach might look in the case of coca. The 
Committee found ‘that the protection of human rights evolves and that the meaning of 
Covenant rights should in principle be interpreted by reference to the time of examination 
and not, as the State party has submitted, by reference to the time the alleged violation took 
place’.796  Considering Article 49 of the 1961 drug treaty in this light, it is impossible to 
conceive of a modern international instrument being adopted in which the eradication of a 
historically documented indigenous practice is made a core State obligation.   Resolving this 
conflict is therefore not a question of how and where to restrict indigenous rights in order to 
satisfy the rules of drug control, as suggested by Pfeiffer, but instead an instance where the 
logic of drug control is not applicable to a modern international legal environment in which 
indigenous rights have achieved a protected status that did not exist in 1961. The onus should 
not be on States to restrict their interpretation of human rights law to that as existed at the 
time the 1961 drug treaty was adopted, but rather to interpret 1961 drug control obligations 
that engage human rights as evolving in the context of modern international law, or in the 
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words of the Human Rights Committee, it should ‘be interpreted by reference to the time of 
examination’.
Boister writes that although the drug ‘conventions are principally concerned with effective 
crime control, one of their functions should be to protect the human rights of the individuals 
subject to their processes’.797 In this context, and in keeping with the telos of the drug control 
regime, protecting and promoting the cultural rights of indigenous communities in the 
Andean region means that the obligation defined in Article 49 regarding coca must give way.  
This is not to say the obligation as a whole has ‘lost its legitimacy’, to use Pfeiffer’s term, but 
rather that in these particular circumstances, in the specific countries where the conflict is 
extant, international human rights norms must take precedence.  Otherwise, what is left is a 
process that actively nullifies indigenous cultural rights.
The case for dynamic interpretation in this instance is made even more compelling when 
weighing counter arguments, which are essentially based on the premise that allowing for the 
indigenous use of coca will weaken the international drug control regime.  This was a 
common theme among the States lodging objections to Bolivia’s 2012 reservation to Article 
49, which had the effect of allowing traditional uses of coca within the country.  The United 
States, for example, argued that this would mean ‘more cocaine will be available for the 
global cocaine market, further fueling narcotics trafficking and related criminal activities’.798 
Similarly, the United Kingdom objected that allowing traditional uses of coca ‘could lead to 
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increases in coca production and...weaken international law as it relates to the global effort to 
tackle drugs’.799  The International Narcotics Control Board also issued a similar statement.800 
However, given the huge scope of the international illicit market in cocaine, it is difficult to 
make the case that allowing licit traditional uses among indigenous communities in a handful 
of countries will truly undermine global drug prohibition.  Interestingly, the 2013 UN World 
Drug Report reports a decline in coca bush cultivation in Bolivia, not the increase predicted 
in the statements above.801  It also suggests that ‘the growth in global population may be a 
major driving force in setting the trend for global demand’, rather than the available supply 
driving use.802 
In testing this opposition to a dynamic approach it is also useful to draw insight from other 
areas of international law.  For example, the United Nations Convention on Biological 
Diversity provides guidance on interpretation under Article 22, ‘Relationship with Other 
International Conventions’.803  It states that the Convention will only ‘affect the rights and 
obligations...deriving from any existing international agreement...where the exercise of those 
rights and obligations would cause a serious damage or threat to biological diversity’.804  
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Using this threshold as guidance, it is difficult to credibly argue that allowing the traditional 
use of coca in a handful of States presents ‘serious damage or threat’ to the fabric of the 
international drug control regime. However, it can easily be argued that the obligation to 
eradicate the use of coca represents a ‘serious damage or threat’ to the rights of those 
indigenous communities in which coca forms an important traditional and cultural practice.  
Using another example from a separate body of international law, the International Whaling 
Commission recognises ‘that indigenous or “aboriginal subsistence” whaling is of a different 
nature to commercial whaling. It is thus not subject to the [international commercial whaling] 
moratorium’.805  This accommodation by the International Whaling Commission to respect 
the cultural practices of indigenous communities is allowed in only four countries,806 
approximately the same number of States for which there is history of indigenous coca use, 
and offers a clear example of a regime in which global prohibition (in this case on 
commercial whaling) is not considered to be weakened or threatened by a specific exception 
for indigenous cultural practices.  Therefore, a dynamic interpretation of this particular 
conflict must be resolved by placing the ‘thumb on the scales’ of human rights in those States 
where the conflict is apparent.
7.4.2.2  Application of More Severe Measures
A second area of conflict explored in chapter four is the permissive obligation common to all 
three drug treaties allowing States to adopt ‘more strict or severe measures’ than those 
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required in the treaties themselves.807 As explored above, the Indonesian Constitutional Court  
cited Article 24 of the 1988 Convention as a basis to uphold the legality of the death penalty 
for drug offences.808 This case demonstrates how these permissive obligations, enshrined 
without safeguards or limitations,809 create a potential justification for the active nullification 
of human rights obligations, and violation of international human rights law.  The mere 
existence of these permissive norms alongside parallel human rights treaties does not in itself 
create a conflict.810 The conflict only emerges where the permissive norm is invoked to 
violate another norm, as occurred in the Indonesian case.  In adopting a dynamic approach to 
considering these permissive norms, it is apparent that appropriate conflict resolution, or even 
conflict avoidance, must be a process that again places the ‘thumb on the scales’ of human 
rights.  This conclusion is evident for two reasons.
The first is the consideration of the context of the permissive articles themselves.  Although 
each allows for the application of ‘more strict or severe measures’, the context of this 
permission is limited specifically to the terms of the drug conventions.  For example, Article 
39 of the 1961 Convention states that ‘a Party shall not be, or be deemed to be, precluded 
from adopting measures of control more strict or severe than those provided by this 
Convention’.811  Article 24 of the 1988 Convention similarly states that ‘[a] Party may adopt 
231
807 1961 Convention amended (n 203) art 39.; 1971 Convention (n 186) art 23.; 1988 
Convention (n 194) art 24.
808 1988 Convention amended (n 194) art 24.
809 Boister, Penal Aspects (n 46) 527.
810 Jenks (n 412) 451.
811 1961 Convention amended (n 203) art 39.
more strict or severe measures than those provided by this Convention’.812 Identical wording 
is used to frame the permissive article in the 1971 Convention.813 In each case, the provision 
is situated specifically within the relevant drug treaty, and defines permission to adopt 
measures only beyond those prescribed in each convention.  It does not permit the adoption 
of more strict or severe measures than those legally allowed elsewhere in international law, or 
provide permission to exceed safeguards established in other legal regimes.
The context now established, the second consideration is one of appropriate balance.  As the 
nature of the permissive norm is strictly limited to the scope of the drug conventions 
themselves, the question then is how this obligation interacts with those of other legal 
regimes, specifically international human rights law. In this case, applying more strict and 
severe measures of drug control than those outlined in the treaties is allowable only to the 
degree that the measures in question do not violate other international legal obligations. 
Given the presumption in international law against normative conflict, the correct application 
of these permissive obligations must be one that maintains coherence with parallel 
international human rights obligations, and places a ‘thumb on the scales’ of human rights.  
Herein lies the essential error at the heart of the Indonesian Constitutional Court’s application 
of this provision. As the permissive obligations within the drug conventions are limited 
narrowly to the measures within the drug treaties, the Court’s invoking Article 24 as 
justification to override Article 6(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights is a misapplication of the provision, creating a breach of international human rights 
law.  As described by Jenks, ‘[t]here is no conflict if...it is possible to comply with the 
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obligations of one instrument by refraining from exercising a privilege or discretion accorded 
by another.’814  Therefore, international human rights law must always act as a limiting 
control on the interpretation of these permissive obligations in order to avoid or mediate 
regime conflict.
7.5 Conclusion
International drug control law and international human rights law engage each other in 
multiple ways, and in multiple fora, both international and domestic.  In many cases, this 
engagement results in tensions or even conflicts between the regimes, resulting in 
undermining human rights protections.  Resolving these engagements in a manner that 
protects fundamental human rights norms is the key challenge in the evolution of a ‘fifth 
stage’ of drug control. Chapter seven has explored how this evolution might look in practice, 
outlining the legal bodies and fora through which a dynamic, human rights-based approach to 
drug control must evolve, and outlining the basic principles that should guide the necessary 
balancing tests.  Moving beyond the approaches of passive and active nullification that have 
historically impeded progressive legal evolution in this area, a dynamic approach offers clear 
guidance to ensure that the balancing exercise between human rights and drug control, 
upholding that human rights standards in a manner consistent with the telos of the drug 
control regime, and in most cases the obligations it enshrines.
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Chapter Eight - Conclusion: The Future for a ‘Fifth 
Stage’ of Drug Control?
This thesis has explored the question of treaty interpretation within international drug control 
law. Specifically, it has addressed the problem of human rights violations occurring in the 
name of drug control and enforcement, and proposed an interpretive approach to resolving 
tensions and conflicts between drug control law and human rights law to prevent such abuses. 
Through this process, it has proposed a framework and possible interpretive fora for the 
development of a ‘fifth stage‘ of drug control, one that ensures obligations enshrined within 
international drug control law are carried out in a manner that is human rights compliant.  
At the time of this writing, such a‘fifth stage’ of drug control remains far from being 
achieved.  Although United Nations human rights mechanisms and Special Procedures have 
in recent years become more active in addressing drug control issues within their mandates, 
examples are still so rare as to be notable when they occur.  The Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, for example, only made its first public statement on drug 
control in 2009.815  While the Special Rapporteurs on torture and on the right to heath have 
done thematic work on drug control within their mandates, in 2009816 and 2010817 
respectively, such cross-cutting work remains the exception. 
234
815 Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘High Commissioner 
calls for focus on human rights and harm reduction in international drug policy’ (n 
482).
816 UN Human Rights Council, ‘Nowak Report’ (n 36).
817 UN General Assembly, ‘Special Rapporteur Health 2010’ (n 23).
The UN drug control system has also taken some steps towards recognising human rights 
concerns, although the examples are again rare.  The first ever human rights resolution by the 
Commission on Narcotic Drugs was adopted in 2008.818 Although highly contentious at the 
time, use of basic language acknowledging human rights has subsequently become relatively 
routine in Commission resolutions.819  In 2010, the outgoing Executive Director of the UN 
Office on Drugs and Crime released an important conference room paper during the 
Commission on Narcotic Drugs session, addressing the question of a human rights 
perspective on drug control and crime prevention.820 This was followed two years later by a 
guidance paper on human rights and drug enforcement by the Office on Drugs and Crime.821 
However, despite these positive steps, the UN drug control bodies still struggle to fully 
embrace a human rights perspective in their deliberations, let alone their activities. The more 
common appearance of the term ‘human rights’ in resolutions of the Commission on Narcotic 
Drugs has not resulted in concrete operational commitments. Despite the progress on human 
rights within the Office on Drugs and Crime, a paper on international drug control law 
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prepared for the Commission on Narcotic Drugs in 2014 fell back into the ‘evil’, threat-based 
language explored in chapter three. According to that document, ‘people become dependent 
on drugs, slaves of drug dealers, isolated from the community, deprived of mental health and 
cognitive/affective abilities. This is inconsistent with basic human rights.’822 Despite the 
positive recommendations contained in the 2014 human rights guidance paper, the Office on 
Drugs and Crime has yet to operationalise its key recommendations. Given this context, what 
is the future outlook for a ‘fifth stage’ of drug control?
The challenges and barriers inherent to overcoming fifty years of institutional inertia on these 
issues within both systems, and of bridging the ‘parallel universes’ identified by Paul Hunt, 
should not be underestimated.  For example, every year since 1990, the UN General 
Assembly has adopted a major resolution on drug control, in part ‘[r]ecognizing that the fight 
against drug abuse and illicit trafficking should be pursued in full conformity with the 
principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, and the principles of international 
law’.823  In 1993, the resolution ‘[re]affirm[ed] that the international fight against drug 
trafficking should not in any way justify violation of the principles enshrined in the Charter 
of the United Nations and international law’.824 Beginning in 1997, this annual resolution 
began to make specific reference to human rights, that year ‘[s]tressing that respect for 
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human rights is and must be an essential component of measures taken to address the drug 
problem’.825 In more recent years, the agreed language in this regard has been strengthened, 
and the 2011 resolution read that the General Assembly,
Reaffirms that countering the world drug problem...must be carried out in full 
conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and 
other provisions of international law, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and 
the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action on human rights, and, in particular, 
with full respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of States, for the 
principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of States and for all human rights 
and fundamental freedoms, and on the basis of the principles of equal rights and 
mutual respect.826
In one sense then, the need to reconcile international drug control law obligations with those 
of other international legal regimes has been repeatedly articulated.  However, despite more 
than twenty years of General Assembly acknowledgement of this gap, examples of these 
principles being put into practice remain few, as described above. In recent years there have 
been some instances of promise, where the potential impacts of a ‘fifth stage’ interpretive 
process have been demonstrated.
For example, in March 2014, the International Narcotics Control Board issued a public 
statement ‘encourag[ing] States to consider the abolition of the death penalty for drug related 
offences’.827  This statement was important for at least two reasons.  The first is that is was a 
reversal of the Board’s long standing position that the drug treaties gave States the latitude to 
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determine criminal penalties and sanctions themselves, making it beyond the mandate of the 
Board to comment upon issues such as capital punishment.828  More significant, however, 
was the Board’s assertion that in reaching this new position, it was accepting the relevance of 
international human rights law.  While re-affirming its previous position that ‘specific 
sanctions applicable to drug-related offences remains the prerogative of States Parties’, it 
explained that its new position ‘takes into account the relevant international conventions and 
protocols, and resolutions of the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council and 
UN bodies pertaining to the death penalty’.829  While conspicuously avoiding any explicit 
acknowledgement of such, the Board’s statement accepts the relevance of human rights 
norms and standards within its own deliberations, and in doing so exhibits a human rights-
based evolution of its interpretation of the question of capital punishment.   When questioned 
by the author at a meeting during the 2014 session of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs, 
Board President Raymond Yans refused to acknowledge that this approach was relevant to 
other areas of the Board’s mandate, such as harm reduction.830 However, it is a clear example 
of the potential for the Board to be a forum where an evolutive human rights-based 
interpretation can occur, and also hints at its (as yet unrealised) potential to promote human 
rights-based approaches to drug policy in its engagement with States.  
Evidence of the positive human rights impact of a dynamic, as opposed to a nullification, 
approach can also be found at the domestic level.  Perhaps the most important example of this 
is drawn from the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of Canada.  As described in chapter 
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four, a series of domestic court cases were taken by the Canadian federal government in an 
attempt to force the closure of ‘Insite’, a safe injecting facility in Vancouver, British 
Columbia, which operated with the support of both the city and the province.  Specifically, 
the federal government argued that in knowingly allowing people to possess and consume 
illegal drugs within the facility, Insite was in violation of the federal Controlled Drugs and 
Substances Act (CDSA).831  When the facility was first established some years earlier, the 
previous liberal federal government has issued a waiver to the relevant provisions of the Act 
to enable the facility to operate its health services within the law.  However, the new 
conservative federal government was refusing to renew the waiver, thereby placing Insite in 
violation of the Act.  The case eventually went to the Supreme Court in 2011.
An element of the Court’s deliberations in this case, and one of direct relevance to a ‘fifth 
stage’ approach to interpretation, was its testing of the relevant drug control provisions in 
light of Article 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,832 assessing whether 
subsections ‘4(1) and 5(1) of the CDSA, which prohibit possession and trafficking 
respectively, are invalid because they limit the claimants’ s[ection] 7 rights to life, liberty and 
security of the person’.833  The Court found that subsection 4(1) of the Controlled Drugs and 
Substances Act prohibiting possession constituted a violation of the rights to life, liberty and 
security of the person of Insite staff because ‘by operating the premises — opening the doors 
and welcoming prohibited drugs inside — the staff responsible for the centre may be “in 
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possession” of drugs brought in by clients’ and ‘their minimal involvement with clients’ 
drugs may bring them within the legal concept of illegal possession of drugs, contrary to s. 
4(1)’.834  The Court concluded that the violations of the rights of staff in this regard would 
inevitably result in further violations of the rights of the people using the health clinic. 
According to the judgment,
[W]ithout an exemption from the application of the CDSA, the health professionals 
who provide the supervised services at Insite will be unable to offer medical 
supervision and counselling to Insite’s clients. This deprives the clients of Insite of 
potentially lifesaving medical care, thus engaging their rights to life and security of 
the person. The result is that  the limits on the s. 7 rights of staff will in turn result in 
limits on the s. 7 rights of clients.835
The justices took this argument a step further, finding not only an indirect violation of the 
rights of people who use Insite, but also a direct violation of their rights, as ‘[i]n order to 
make use of the lifesaving and health-protecting services offered at Insite, clients must be 
allowed to be in possession of drugs on the premises. To prohibit possession by drug users 
anywhere engages their liberty interests; to prohibit possession at Insite engages their rights 
to life and to security of the person.’836 
In an approach relevant to that proposed in this thesis, the Supreme Court’s consideration of 
the case was informed by its assessment of what it called ‘the dual purpose of the CDSA: the 
protection of both public safety and public health’.837  In effect, the objective of the control 
measures defined within the national drug legislation was not control for the sake of control, 
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but rather control to promote other public interests, in this case public health.  If elements of 
that law were found to undermine public health, then clearly those measures were neither 
consistent with human rights protections, nor with the objectives of the drug legislation itself. 
The Insite decision offers a clear window into the potential benefits of a ‘fifth stage’ 
interpretive approach at domestic level, where a nullification approach is pushed aside in 
favour of a human rights-based balancing of the relevant legal tensions.
While the mandate of national courts in providing human rights checks and balances on 
abusive domestic laws and practices is clear, as is the potential role of the International 
Narcotics Control Board on influencing treaty interpretation, the role of international human 
rights bodies is somewhat more ambiguous. The primary challenge is to determine whether 
international human rights bodies have a mandate to influence the interpretation of 
international drug control law, above and beyond the scope to adjudicate individual 
complaints.838  Is there any possibility of a systemic influence of human rights bodies on the 
development of the international drug control regime as a whole? A useful approach to this 
question, one that provides a model for dynamic human rights interpretation of the drug 
conventions, is found in the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.  
As was discussed in chapter six, the Inter-American Court embraces an evolutive approach, 
finding that ‘to determine the legal status of the American Declaration [of the Rights and 
Duties of Man] it is appropriate to look at the inter-American system of today in light of the 
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33 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child makes specific mention of drug 
control, bringing consideration of these issues clearly within the Committee’s 
mandate.
evolution it has undergone since the adoption of the Declaration’.839 Significant to the 
question of a dynamic human rights-based interpretation of the drug control conventions is 
the fact that, over the course of a series of opinions, the Court has established its ‘jurisdiction 
to interpret, in addition to the American Convention [on Human Rights], “other treaties 
concerning the protection of human rights in the American States”’.840 The Court has 
furthermore adopted a broad perspective on the question of which ‘other treaties’ concern 
human rights, one not limited by either the subject matter of the treaty itself or the scope of 
the States Parties.  According to its Advisory Opinion on ‘Other Treaties’ Subject to the 
Consultative Jurisdiction of the Court,
By unanimous vote...the advisory jurisdiction of the Court can be exercised, in 
general, with regard to any  provision dealing with the protection of human rights set 
forth in any international treaty applicable in the American States, regardless of 
whether it be bilateral or multilateral, whatever be the principal purpose of such a 
treaty, and whether or not non-Member States of the inter-American system are or 
have the right to become parties thereto.841
In the Court’s Advisory Opinion on The Right to Information on Consular Assistance, it 
utilised this approach to conclude that individual due process rights of detainees are 
contained the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, an instrument of general 
international law outlining relations between States. In effect, the Court adopted a dynamic 
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(14 July 1989), para 37.
840 The Right to Information on Consular Assistance in the Framework of 
Guarantees of the Due Process of Law (n 625) para 69.
841 ‘Other Treaties’ Subject to the Consultative Jurisdiction of the Court (Art. 64 of 
the American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-1/82, Inter-
American Court of Human Rights Series A No 1 (24 September 1982), opinion para 
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human-rights based approach to the Vienna Convention, in which it engaged parallel 
obligations within the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, concluding that 
‘the individual’s right to information established in Article 36(1)(b) of the Vienna Convention 
on Consular Relations allows the right to the due process of law recognized in Article 14 of 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights to have practical effects in concrete 
cases’.842 According to Lixinski, ‘the Court said through that Opinion that human rights 
considerations permeate other areas of international law, and that when human rights interests 
are concerned legal obligations should be interpreted in a dynamic manner, so as to cover 
new situations on the basis of pre-existing rights’.843 As described in the Concurring Opinion 
of Court President Judge Cançado Trinade,
The progressive development of international law is likewise accomplished by 
means of application of human rights treaties...We are, thus, before a phenomenon 
much deeper than the sole recourse per se to rules and methods of interpretation of 
treaties. The intermingling between Public International Law and the International 
Law of Human Rights gives testimony of the recognition of the centrality, in this 
new corpus juris, of the universal human rights, what corresponds to a new ethos of 
our times.844
This approach has significance for the development of a human rights-based interpretation of 
international drug control. As has been explored in earlier chapters, there is a compelling case 
that the three drug conventions fall into that category of  ‘other treaties concerning the 
protection of human rights’. First, as explored in chapter five, the telos of the drug control 
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844 The Right to Information on Consular Assistance in the Framework of 
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regime, to promote ‘the health and welfare of mankind’, itself engages human rights 
concepts, concerns and parallel treaty obligations.  The second is because the nature of many 
obligations within the drug treaties potentially create an environment of heightened human 
rights risk.  As described by Boister, ‘[t]he suppression conventions threaten the human rights 
of the individuals caught up in the panoply of national laws derived from the conventions in 
many different ways. Consider, for example, the drug suppression conventions....They have 
enormous potential for human rights violation.’845 If the approach of the Inter-American 
Court were to be embraced by other regional and international human rights bodies, it would 
provide an important mechanism to review and assess the human rights implications of the 
drug treaty obligations themselves, not simply their domestic implementation by various 
States.  In this manner, the Inter-American Court’s approach to considering ‘other treaties’ 
opens a door to the international human rights system to engage directly with the terms of the 
international drug treaties, with a potential to influence the development of a ‘fifth stage’ 
drug control paradigm.
The need to bridge the ‘parallel universes’ of drug control and human rights is a clear one, 
and is a need increasingly acknowledged by both international regimes.  The interpretative 
challenges to resolving or preventing conflicts and tensions between the two bodies of law 
are apparent.  However, the potential for the development of drug control’s ‘fifth stage’ of 
international drug control exists in law and practice, and rare examples of this approach in 
action can be identified and built upon.  In this process, the leadership of the international 
bodies established within both regimes is critical, and the institutional inertia that has 
historically characterised the relationship between drug control and human rights law be 
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broken down, and transformed into active leadership on human rights issues and the 
progressive development of international law. To paraphrase the words of Justice Albie 
Sachs, the ‘fifth stage’ of drug control must put a thumb on the scales in favour human 
rights,846 and ensure when balancing obligations between the two regimes that human rights, 
and the health and welfare of humankind, are promoted, protected and fulfilled.
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